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A

TREATISE

ON

JUSTIFICATION.

BY

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PREFACE.

That an age, claiming distinction above most which have preceded it, for benevolent enterprise in disseminating the Bible and Christianity, should, notwithstanding, be characterized by indistinct views of the great doctrines of religion, may at first seem contradictory. Such, however, it appears to me, is the true state of the christian world at present. A general laxness prevails as to doctrinal opinions. Indeed, not unfrequently, indifference is deemed a virtue; and a man felicitates himself upon his liberality, because he feels no peculiar attachment to any particular religious creed. Opinions in politics are of great consequence—opinions in law, in medicine, in science, in the arts; every where but in religion, to be without any fixed opinions, is deemed dishonourable and unworthy of a noble and generous spirit. There is no illiberality in every other department of thought and enterprise, in a man's holding and defending a series of fixed doctrines; but by a strange inconsistency, this age denounces as bigotry and narrowness of spirit, the steadfast maintainance of the revealed system of religious truth. This feature of the age—which may be correctly designated the *bigotry of liberalism*—may be traced in indistinct lines on the fair countenance of the daughter of Zion, and rudely defines the measure of her conformity to this world. Hence the diminished attention to doctrines. Hence the singular fact, that in a land teeming with Bibles, and Bible Societies, and Bible Classes, and helps to Bible interpretation, Bible exposition is nearly banished from all their pulpits. What pastor ever thinks of expounding the sacred books in any continuous series of exercises? What congregation would endure an uninterrupted course of lectures on any portion of scripture? What preacher would venture to suspend his reputation on the delivery of fifty-two

lectures in the year on the Epistle to the Romans, or that to the Hebrews? My field of observation is very limited; but my impression is, that this most profitable description of pulpit labour has sunk into general neglect: and hence the deficiency of doctrinal knowledge: and hence the laxness of opinion: and hence the distractions and disputations in the church. With the ancient practice of lecturing continuously on some book of scripture, has fallen into disuse the reading of the old standard doctrinal writers. Books are so easily made, and so much under the dominion of fashion, that a leather cover, enclosing 400 pages, is opened reluctantly and soon closed, lest its musty odor should become offensive. We are hence obliged, though at some risk, to put the old wine into new bottles. Hence the present publication. Could Boston and Owen, and Witherspoon and Edwards, find studious readers, it were unnecessary to press this little work upon public attention. The author, apprehensive that the subject on which he treats is much misunderstood—that it is of prime importance—that ignorance of it leads to serious consequencs—and that a new book, from almost any source, will be more likely to be read than the more weighty and laboured productions of by-gone days, has conceived the present plan, and now offers it to the christian public.

There is no new doctrine in these pages. There is very little new illustration. There is, he hopes, some novelty in the modes of argumentation, and perhaps of exposition. He also supposes that the *plan* of the discussion has some claims to originality; whether this be so, and whether it be an advantage, the reader must judge. As to method, the scheme of the treatise is synthetic, as will be perceived by the scholar, upon a mere inspection of the contents. It begins with the simple elements of truth, and ascends to the highest doctrines of the moral system.

If there is any thing peculiar in the general design of the work, distinguishing it from other treatises on Justification, it will be found in the identification—or at least the attempt to identify the great principles of God's co-

venants with the first Adam and the second, and their use, in man's justification, with the fundamental principles of moral rule, whose application in human government must and will secure the highest measure of human freedom and happiness. I have laboured, with what success the reader will judge, to make it appear that the doctrines of the Bible, embraced in my subject, contain the very essence of all morality, and form the substratum of all sound, social, civil and political government—that there are not two systems of morality; one for the christian and one for the citizen; one for heaven and the visible church, its vestibule, and another for earth and the powers of this world. But, on the contrary, that the moral being, man, is a unity; and all the laws that can bind his conscience, are found in the Bible: and their application to him as a member of civil society, constitutes government. Thus, it appears to me, much gain must accrue to the cause of truth, by forcing away from man the delusion of a two-fold system of morals, wholly or largely dissociate from each other: and shutting them up to the conviction, that the same identical doctrines which constitute the substratum of republican government and social order, are embraced in christianity, and by them all men will be judged in the great day.

In the exposition of scripture, I have followed the method of induction—referring to the parallel texts, and collating all the passages where a term or phrase occurs; and thus enabling the reader to make scripture the interpreter of scripture. It has been my object, by this method, to bring down even verbal criticism; and that where the originals are concerned, to the comprehension of the simple English reader. I have thought that such criticism is not only useful, but may be entertaining and interesting to such readers. The best evidence of good preaching is, that it sets all hearers to search the Bible. The hope is entertained, that such critical examinations as are interspersed among the following pages, may operate in this way.

Another feature of the plan, is its philosophical arrangement. The design has been to connect the various

parts together in such manner as will be most easily followed up. For this reason, I have endeavoured to arrange the matter, according to those laws of mind, by which the train of thought is regulated: so that every preceding vehicle, with its treasure, shall have a certain aptitude to draw after it the one precisely adapted to it, and which will secure a similar sequence.

From this, and the occasional indulgence in argumentation, and even in metaphysical disquisition and mental philosophy, it may, perhaps, be thought that the mass of plain readers will not be accommodated: whereas, for them chiefly has the book been written. Should this arise as an odjection, I reply, that sound philosophy is nothing more than common sense. Let the mental philosopher and metaphysician keep out technical terms, or explain them clearly, and the common mind will comprehend his philosophy. It is moreover undeniable, that the moral system of the Bible is the most stupendously grand system of philosophy the world has ever beheld. Christianity is a system of practical and experimental philosophy. Its doctrines are founded on its facts, and I never could see any reason why the christian ministry—the authorised teachers of this philosophy, should labour to conceal its beauties and its glory, by presenting only detached parts of the system, without any well directed efforts at combining part with part, that the whole edifice might rise, in its beauty and grandeur, before the admiring eyes of those who are to dwell therein forever.

Besides it is the duty of the ministry to go before the flock. There ought to be constantly an ascending movement along the scale of intelligence. There is, therefore, no just objections to well timed and clear criticism; nor, occasionally, to the philosophical arrangement and discussion of such parts of the subject as admit, and, indeed, require it.

As to style, plainness has been studied, perhaps to a fault; and conciseness may sometimes run into obscurity.

A scheme of the work is prefixed. It consists of the simple headings of the chapters and sections, and in a

few instances the sub-sections, with reference for the chapters to the pages respectively.

Appended is an alphabetical index of subjects which will be found of considerable practical benefit: and also a table of texts, which have been incidentally less or more illustrated and explained.

With these remarks, the author commends this little performance to the indulgence of his kind readers—entreating them to bear in mind, that it has been prepared in the hurried intervals of a laborious avocation; and has been hastened through the press under circumstances very unfavourable to accuracy. Imperfect as it and all human productions are, he entrusts it to the guidance of that gracious Saviour, whose glory it is designed to promote; hoping, praying and believing, that He will make it a means of blessing to many who shall be found, in the great day of final accounts, arrayed with him in the spotless robes of IMMANUEL'S RIGHTEOUSNESS.

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ON JUSTIFICATION.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN GENERAL.

SECTION I.

The Creator, Absolutely Supreme.

By an original law of our being, we are led to infer causes from their effects. Changes are constantly occurring around us. We observe them. We look for their causes among the events of the past. We look for their effects among the contingencies of the future. We reason from the one to the other and the thought rarely occurs to our minds; that, perhaps, after all, there is no such connexion as is implied in the terms *cause* and *effect*. The one event indeed follows the other in almost uniform succession, but who can shew a reason for it? Who can reveal the chain and display to our view the links of connexion? Can the wise men of this world unveil the mysteries of nature? Can Newton, with all his philosophy, tell us why a stone, projected upwards, descends to the earth? If then human wisdom utterly fails, in the simplest operations of nature—if man with all his boasted *knowledge* cannot explain the nature of cause and effect, and shew in what it lies, what then? Will he deny all causation? Will he refuse to act on the belief, that certain things do always succeed certain other things? Will he refuse to reason and thereby to acquire knowledge? Because he cannot dive to the bottom and bring up, from the unfathomable stores of nature, all her pearls and gold, will he refuse to pick up beauteous pebbles on the strand?

No: despite of all his pride, he is constrained to rea-

son from effects to causes, and from causes to effects. Assuming the existence of a connextion, yet ignorant of what it is and how it operates, he proceeds to reason, and does reason, as correctly perhaps as if he knew the whole mystery, and rests in his conclusions with perfect confidence. On this very process of reasoning depend all our conclusions in reference to the business of this life. The farmer sows his grain; the merchant freights his ships; the manufacturer purchases his materials and his machinery—all because they believe that causes and effects are connected together and will continue to follow each other to the end.

Thus it is we trace such effects to their causes and these again to their causes, and these again to theirs, and so at last reach the conclusion, that a Great First Cause there must be "of causes mighty, cause uncaused"—"whose kingdom ruleth over all" and "is an everlasting kingdom and his dominion endureth throughout all generations.—The eyes of all wait upon thee; and thou givest them their meat in due season." This grand argument, in proof of the divine existence, depends for its whole force upon that law of our minds, by which we are irresistably impelled to believe that every effect must have a cause. This argument is accounted irrefragably conclusive. All men admit its force: to have stated it clearly has enrolled Bishop Butler among the benefactors of the human race.

But now, if the argument, which follows up the depedence of material effects upon their causes, brings us to such a satisfactory conclusion; much more, shall not that which begins with the dependence of mind upon mind, lead to results most perfectly satisfactory? If matter could not create itself, could spirit? Ignorant of a cause adequate to the production of matter, the ancient heathen philosophers asumed its eternity. How much more reasonably might the inference be deduced, that spirit is eternal? Our souls have existed from eternity, or they have been created by ourselves or by some other being. For the belief of their eternal past existence we have no evidence. For the belief of their self creation we have not capacity; the very thought is ab-

surd. For the belief of their creation by an uncreated First Cause, we have capacity, and evidence adapted to it. The belief that spirit is the result of creating power, is as full and perfect as that matter was created. God is the father of our spirits, in a sense far higher than that in which the term is or can be applied to signify our relation to man. He formed us and the same power which produced us out of nothing, sustains the existence it commenced. In him we live and move and exist.

Let the reader mark narrowly the emotions of his own mind, when the question is asked, has God a right of absolute control over all the creatures of his hand? What is the result? Does not your heart revolt at the thought?—the rights of God. Who is this that talks about rights? And dares he interrogate the Creator on a question of boundary? Can he (without impiety) agitate the subject of territorial limits? Will he venture to enquire whether God's rights over him and all, are uncontrolled and absolute? Has not the potter power over the clay? Surely if any truth commends itself, as it were, intuitively to the heart and conscience of man, it is the absoluteness of the divine right, authority, power, over all created existence.

SECTION II.

The Creature, Absolutely Dependant.

This is but the counter-part of the preceding—a different mode of expressing the same thought. He "that formeth the spirit of man within him," sustaineth that spirit and the body which it controls. In reference to to our bodies we have no self-sustaining power. Is his hand withdrawn? We return to dust. Equally dependant upon the sustaining power of God, is the soul of man. Its immortality is not a matter of physical but only of moral necessity. It can no more exist without God than the body can. If any man ask, *how* God keeps us in being; the answer must be—we know not. The fact only is known. Modes of existence are among the se-

cret things that belong unto the Lord our God. And therefore perhaps, even the enquiry, whether the mode of dependence of rational nature and of material substance be the same, may be improper. Certainly, at least, wisdom and piety both dictate the exercise of great prudence and humility in its prosecution.

We are in the constant habit of describing the government of God over material things, under the notion of laws of matter; and sometimes we even seem to think, that when we have given names to the different operations and orders of things, we have explained them. The truth is far otherwise. The names are a cover for our ignorance, and are useful only as arbitrary signs of the things, as to the general order of their occurrence. They explain nothing. Now if this be so in reference to material things, how much more may we expect difficulty in forming our conceptions and communicating our thoughts about the laws by which God governs the spiritual world, or even our own nature consisting of both matter and spirit? To this form of the divine administration we apply the name of *Moral Government;* and although much remains inexplicable, yet the dependence of all intelligent creatures upon God, is no doubt as real, as that of the brute creation and of inert matter. To point out some leading facts and principles is what we propose in this chapter; and the first shall be in answer to the question, what is the ground of moral obligation?

SECTION III.

The will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation.

The first proof we present is the strong presumption, arising from the universal practices of human legislation. Under all forms of government among men, from the most perfect auctocracy, to the purest democracy, the expressed *will* of the legislature—the law-making power, is authority—is law. So fully have men adopted this principle, that they very often forget there is a *will* superior to theirs, by which they are bound and beyond

which they cannot legislate with the hope of binding the human conscience. And this is father evident from the fact, that the interpreters of written law always enquire what was the will of the legislature? What did they intend by the language? If that can be ascertained, there is an end to the controversy; the law is settled and must be obeyed. In other words, the citizen is *bound* by it.

2dly. That the will of God is the basis of moral obligation, may be argued from the difficulty—the impossibility of establishing any other. If men are not bound to do the will of God, *because* it is his will, what then is the true reason for obedience? The happiness of man, say some. Whatever will promote human enjoyment upon the whole and in the highest degree, is right and *ought* to be done. To this there are several serious objections.

First, It makes the creature's happiness the supreme end of his creation, contrary to the testimonies of God on this subject. "Even every one that is called by my name; for I have created him for my glory."—(Isa. xliii. 7.) "All things were created by him, and for him."—(Col. i. 16.) "Thou has created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created."—(Rev. iv. 11,)

A *second* objection is found in the fact, that man, short sighted and imperfect in knowledge, could never be certain whether he was bound to do a particular act or not. For if the *obligation* rests in its adaptation to promote his happiness upon the whole, he must know whether it will so operate before he can feel the *obligation*. But *can* man, in one case out of a hundred, determine whether the measure proposed will in the end be beneficial to him? Can he run down the consequences of an act into eternity and weigh all its results? Must he not feel himself bound, until he knows the certainty that the act proposed will promote his good upon the whole? Or must he take his first and hasty opinion for a guide? In that case, it is manifest he can never be certain that he is right. In this, he is the mere creature of blind passion. Whatever he may, from selfish feeling, think best for him, he is obliged to do.

A *third* objection therefore, is, that this account of moral obligation runs into absolute selfishness. The immediate tendency and the remote consequences are, to carry away the heart from God and concentrate its affections in self. The facility with which the Sabbath breaker, the profane swearer, the drunkard, the debauchee, can engraft his favourite scion upon this stock, ought to insure its excision. What then is the basis of obligation?

The *eternal fitness of things*, say others. But to this the above reasoning is in part applicable, and a sufficient reply. Who is to judge whether a given act be or be not agreeable to the eternal fitness of things? Must man be released from moral obligation, until after he perceives in a proposed action, its adaptation to the eternal fitness of things? Who then, of finite mortals, will ever feel the bonds of duty?

We are thrown back upon the will of God as the only ground of moral obligation. Man is bound to do what God commands, and to abstain from what he forbids, simply *because* He commands and forbids. Beyond and above this there is no reason. Direct reference to this reason is essential to moral virtue. Here again appeal is made to the general sense of mankind. We always estimate the worth of an action by the measure of its regard to this standard. God's will was, that Israel should suffer most distressing calamities at the hand of the Assyrian. "Against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil and to take the pray, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets." But we award no virtue to the Assyrian, for the obvious reason, that he had no regard at all to the divine will in all he did. "Howbeit, he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so."—(Is. x. 7.) When an action is done regardless of God's *will*, no honor is shewn to him and the practical judgment of mankind refuses the award of virtue.

Such finally is the doctrine of the Bible. It knows no foundation of right or wrong—no obligation but God's will. But as the same passages may often establish the two points viz. the *obligation* and the *rule* of action, let us take them in connexion.

SECTION IV.

The will of God revealed is the rule of duty.

It is self-evident that it cannot rule, direct, govern us, unless it is applied. Accordingly, it has been made known in divers manners and at sundry times. Let us keep our eye upon the position, that the rule and its obligation are the will of God made known. Multitudes of passages might be quoted, a sample follows. "Thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."—Gen. II, 17. "Make thee an ark of Gopher wood, &c."—VI, 14. "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth."—Dan. IV, 35. "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion."—Rom. IX, 15. "I seek not to do mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me."—John V, 30. "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work."—IV, 34—VI. 38. "I delight to do thy will, O my God: yea, thy law is within my heart."—Psalms XI, 8. "Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister and mother."—Mark III, 35.

From these passages, no man can well avoid seeing that—1. God's own rule of action is his own will—higher and holier there can be none.

2. To the will of God, Jesus, the Saviour of men, uniformly referred, as containing the *obligation* and the *rule* of his own action. Even when the desires of his perishable nature—his animal body, were for escape, yet his soul felt the binding obligation of the divine will"—"not as I will, but as thou wilt." Reader, does not this settle the question? If the son of God looked no higher—no lower—no farther, why should you?

3. To man, compliance with the will of God, *because* it is the will of God, is the perfection of moral virtue. He who does so comply is a son of God—a brother of the Lord of glory, the man of Calvary. No

higher motive can draw, no stronger obligation can bind us. A loftier aim exceeds our conception, a lower falls short of God's requirement and our high destinies.

It remains only to enquire how this will is made known to us. And to this the answer is prompt, viz: In his two books—the book of providence and the book of revelation.

In God's book of providence he is daily displaying his will. All that occurs around us whatever be the agency, is according to his will. Whether prosperity or adversity be our lot, we are called upon to acquiesce without a murmur.

In his book of revelation he has recorded the great principles of his government, both preceptively and practically. He prescribes rules of faith and rules of duty. He addresses his law and his gospel, his precepts and his promises, and his examples to be shunned or to be imitated, to the proper faculties of our nature, which constitute us rational and accountable beings.

In addition to the above, the reader's attention is invited to a striking fact, viz: that whenever the heart of man is pierced and his soul is bowed down before the majesty of heaven—whenever he begins to feel, in the deep consciousness of his agitated bosom, that his accountabilities are fearful and must be met, he enquires, according to the doctrine we advocate, "what *wilt* thou have me to do?" Does not every man who has been taught of God know this to be true? Is there not therefore a revealed testimony in every sanctified heart to the correctness of the rule and the reality of its obligation? Unqestionably this is the very principle of christian fortitude and christian heroism. Under its genuine influences, the renewed man has only one enquiry in reference to any proposed enterprise—*is it the will of God?* Satisfied of this, his heart tells him, it must be done. Difficulties, dangers, peril, privations, hardships, persecution, rack, torture, burning, death—all present no obstacle—onward he presses in the path marked out for him by the will of his Father. Obedience to *that* is his only responsibility.

SECTION V.

Rational Intelligence, necessary to moral agency.

In all that has been said about the obligation and rule of action, it has been assumed, thus far, that for every talent he possesses, man is accountable. Nor shall any attempt now be made to prove the correctness of the assumption. It shall still be assumed that where God has given, he will require; and this in proportion to the amount of the gift. This truth is so fully and so plainly set forth in the parable of the talents, that it seems utterly useless to delay for the purpose of either illustration or proof.

The position here presented is simply this, that if man (or any other creature) has not reason—if he has no capacity to compare ideas, to mark their agreement or difference, and draw conclusions and infer results of conduct, he would not be moral: that is, he would not be under a law or will revealed, and liable to punishment for its violation; or to reward for its obedience. We never think of treating idiots or infants, or brutes as subjects of moral law. Let the evidence be presented, which shall convince a bench of judges, that the prisoner before them, on a charge of murder, was devoid of reason at the time the deed was perpetrated, and they immediately and without hesitation, decide that it is not murder. It may be in evidence that the deed was voluntary—the result of design, still in the absence of reason, they will not pronounce him guilty of murder. Such is the common sense of mankind: such the doctrine of scripture. The unhappy maniac is pitied, but not punished.

On this point there is no controversy. But whether rational intelligence is *all* that is necessary to moral accountability, is a different question, and one involved in some difficulty, and not without some importance to our future enquiries. Yet this question is not raised here with a view to its full discussion, and the hope of its satisfactory solution; but simply to give occasion to a remark or two, preparatory to our next position,

The first remark is, that a process of reasoning may occur, to which in itself, we can ascribe no moral character. What are the moral features of a mathematical demonstration? Using the terms in a moral sense, can you say it is right or wrong? Thus it would seem, that *as mere reasoning*, it is devoid of moral attribute. This is probably the reason, why Edwards reckons the understanding a natural faculty. He describes natural inability as existing "when we cannot do a thing if we will, because what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects." Works, ii, 35. Here, it is manifest, he places the understanding, that is, the rational faculty among the natural, as contradistinguished from the moral powers.

Hence it has been argued that brutes reason, and the case of the dog who scented his master's footsteps, has been adduced as proof. When he came to the triple fork in the road, and had scented along two of the branches, and perceiving no scent in either, he instantly took the third without smelling at all. The process is simple, one of the three the master took, but he did not take the right, nor the middle, therefore, he did take the left. But if brutes reason, are they moral? Men do not so account it. They have never proceeded on the belief of it. May we not infer, that something more than simply a capacity to reason, is included in our idea of moral agency?

SECTION VI.

Volition, or Choice is necessary to Moral Agency.

"We must remember, that *volition* or *willing*, is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. The will is nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction."—Locke, b II,

ch. 21. "The *will* (without any metephysical refining) is, *that by which the mind chooses any thing*. The faculty of the *will*, is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of *choosing*; an act of the *will* is the same as an act of *choosing* or *choice*."—Edwards II. 15. When the herdmen of Abraham and the herdmen of his nephew had, by their strife, endangered the peace of the parties, the patriarch proposed a separation; and condescendingly offered the young man his choice of the whole land; "Then Lot chose him all the plain of Jordon." What did he? He took a view of the different localities. He observed the pasture lands, the hills, the vales, the springs and brooks of each—he weighed the motives—he balanced in his own mind the advantages and the disadvantages and as the most promising prospects were—as the motives were, so was his choice. This is volition—an act of the mind "directing the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest." and so Lot forthwith descended into the plain. Now we say that volition or choice, is necessary to constitute moral agency. If a man is compelled, by any force or physical strength, to do any act, good or bad, it is obviously not an act of his mind, and all men hold him irresponsible. For it is not any mere *physical operation* to which we attach the notion of right and wrong—of moral or immoral; but it is the act of the mind, which here is not expressed. Physical acts are spoken of as right or wrong, only as they are significant of mental operations. This distinction governs the practice of mankind in all civilized communities. Involuntary homicide is not murder. On the other hand, if a man waylay his neighbour with intent to kill him, and yet by his gun missing fire, he does not kill or injure him, all men admit, that, in the sight of God, he is a murderer. Because *there* was volition—the mind *acted*. Here *physical ability* is not necessary to moral action, nor connected with it. In the other case the physical ability existed and was exerted, and yet there was no moral character to it. Wherever no volition is, there is no accountability. Thus far only, it may be necessary for us to go, for our purposes, at least for the present. And

thus far there is almost no contrariety of opinion. Should the reader desire to throw in the question of freedom of will here, I would simply remark, with Edwards,—II. 38, and Locke,—b. II. ch. 21, and Dickinson,—p. 37, that freedom is not predicable of the will. The first says—"To talk of liberty or the contrary, as belonging to the *very will itself*, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words. For the *will itself* is not an agent that *has a will;* the power of choosing itself has not a power of choosing." So Locke, "The question itself, viz. *whether man's will be free, or no?* is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask, whether man's *will* be free, as to ask, whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square; *liberty* being as little applicable to the *will*, as swiftness or motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue."—II. 24, 14.

Edwards states the Pelagian notion of liberty thus—vol. II. 39. "1. That it consists in a *self-determining power* in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependant in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. *Indifference* belongs to liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be *in equilibrio*. 3. *Contingency* is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all *necessity*, or any fixed and certain connexion with some previous ground or reason of its existence." To refute this doctrine is the grand design of Edwards, in his treatise on the will. This, every *careful* reader of that treatise knows; and whether the first of the errors above, viz. that the will has a self-determining power—which is the chief and capital error—be not the radical principle of all the modern improvements in theology, the reader must judge. It is foreign to the plan of this work to enter into that controversy. Should the providential call for its discussion, exist, after this undertaking shall have been completed, as it does now, the writer purposes to turn his thoughts in that direction.

Volition is necessary to moral agency. But it is still a question, whether volition, and even this combined with rational intelligence, is sufficient of *itself* to constitute it. Are these *all* that are necessary to render a being morally accountable for his conduct? This is a philosophical question and yet an interesting and a profitable one. But brevity is indispensible. It will be agreed on all sides that reasoning is necessary to volition. There can be no choice where there is no thought and no capacity to compare one thought with another. The weighing of motives and the yielding of the mind to the stronger, implies and includes the exercise of reason. The precise question then is, whether in the act of choice there is any morality; that is, *necessarily*. Can there be volition,—an act of choice to which the terms right or wrong, moral or immoral *cannot* be applied? If there can, then volition and the measure of reason necessary to it, are not every thing required in a moral agent. Let it therefore be asked, whether the act of mind, which directs my lifting of this pen rather than that one, is necessarily moral. Would it have been sinful for me to have *chosen* that pen? Unless this last *act* of choice would have been thought wrong, or immoral, can it be said that the other was right and moral? But how can the idea of right and wrong exist, except in reference to a rule of right? And where is the rule in this case? Or rather how could I have the idea of a rule of right, if I possessed only reason and volition? Did not the dog, in the case alluded to just now, perform an act of reason—did he not exercise *volition?* Human language every where supposes that animals have a power of choice—they exercise volition. Are they moral agents? Something more is requisite.

SECTION VII.

A Moral Sense is necessary to a Moral Agent.

That the properties and powers of our animal nature are most intimately connected with the intellectual, is most obvious to our consciousness. Yet are they very

distinct and separable. So, the intellectual powers are distinct from the moral, but more intimately connected than the preceding. Still it does not appear to me that they are necessarily blended and confused. A capacity to be influenced by motives presented through the reasoning faculty, does not involve accountability, independently on the character of the motives. "To moral agency," says Edwards, II. 40. "belongs a *moral faculty*, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty." A little below he observes, "The brute creatures are not moral agents,"—because—"they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements." To all this I heartily subscribe, except that, probably reasoning and choice, which are here denied to brutes, are taken in, notwithstanding, under the general term *instinct*. What is *instinct*? Is it not simply that measure (undefined, perhaps undefinable) of reason and choice which the Creator has allotted to brutes?

The time has been when the doctrine of a moral *sense* was controverted on philosophical grounds. Its advocates were challenged for proof; and proof of such kind was demanded, as was utterly inconsistent with the nature of the subject. Mathematical evidence, on a moral subject! Mathematical evidence that man has a conscience! You might as well demand mathematical evidence that Brutus' dagger pierced the robe of Cæsar —that Arnold attempted to betray his country! What then is the proof of the existence of a moral sense—a conscience—a faculty or power in man of perceiving right and wrong, and feeling the force of moral obligation? I answer, 1. The very existence of these terms; if they express any ideas at all, these ideas or thoughts must have an existence in the human mind. If all hu-

man languages have terms expressive of these very thoughts, it proves the universality of the principles or powers of mind, by which alone the thoughts themselves can be perceived. 2. The ideas of right and wrong can be traced universally among men, by their other language and the customs and manners connected with criminal jurisprudence. But 3dly and chiefly, The internal and irresistable consciousness of every living man. And here moral science stands on lofty ground. She is not dependent on any external powers. She carries with herself and in herself, as it were, the very evidence for which many other sciences are dependant. She appeals directly to the present witness in every man's bosom. True, under peculiar circumstances, the testimony of the witness may be confused and undistinct, and unavailable; but not more so than the witnesses at any other tribunal: nor in greater numbers. Exceptions there are a few, where the internal consciousness is not satisfactory; but in the immense majority—the almost universality of cases, conscience is her own vindicator. The moral sense speaks out with a voice that must be heard. If insulted and abused, she may modestly retire from the tribunal; but only for a time. Soon she rallies and returns, and will command attention.

Or as a Scottish writer has beautifully expressed the thought: "It is no induction of logic that has transfixed the heart of the victim of deep remorse, when he withers beneath an influence unseen by human eye, and shrinks from the anticipation of a reckoning to come. In both, the evidence is within,—a part of the original constitution of every rational mind, planted there by him who framed the wondrous fabric. This is the power of conscience; with an authority which no man can put away from him, it pleads at once for his own future existence, and for the moral attributes of an omnipotent and ever-present Deity. In a healthy state of the moral feelings, the man recognizes its claim to supreme dominion. Amid the degradation of guilt, it still raises its voice, and asserts its right to govern the whole man; and though its warnings are disregarded and its claims

disallowed, it proves within his inmost soul an accuser that cannot be stilled, and an avenging spirit that never is quenched."

"If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things. Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God." —1. John iii, 20. Here the moral sense—conscience, is clothed with a species of judicial power. And so Job xxvii, 6. "My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go, my heart shall not reproach me so long as I live." Here the same principle or *moral sense* is set forth under the same name, *heart*,—conscience. Nor is there perhaps a single instance in the bible wherein the existence of a moral faculty is formally affirmed. It is every where assumed; just as the being of a God is every where assumed. Nor are we to be distracted or disturbed tho' men may throw metaphysical difficulties in the way. What is this moral faculty? If it is not reason—nor volition, nor a mere bodily organ; what is it? where does it reside? We can just as easily retort, what is reason?—what is the will? what and where understanding? &c. &c. Nay, but let us dismiss this folly and rest in the broad, undeniable *fact* —men do have and exercise continually a *faculty* of perceiving and feeling that there is a right and a wrong —they have a sense of guilt or liability to punishment for some actions; and a feeling of approbation and sense of desert of reward for others. Now it is this MORAL SENSE, connected as it is with *reason* and *volition*, and some others to be mentioned, that constitutes man a *moral agent*. This presents moral motives. How man should feel any power in motives to right action or any repulsion or aversion from wrong actions, without it, is, I suppose inconceivable. Take away this and all talk about the rewards of virtue is absurd, for all distinction between virtue and vice must cease. "The moral maniac pursues his way, and thinks himself a wise and a happy man; but feels not that he is treading a downward course, and is lost as a moral being."

SECTION VIII.

Self-love, or the desire of happiness, implied in moral government.

The sacred scriptures have prescribed love to ourselves, as to manner and measure, as a rule in reference to others. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Love is the principle of communicative goodness—the principle of diffusive benevolence—that disposition and feeling in us which leads and prompts us to do good to the loved object. All living beings desire to be happy. This has been appropriately styled the first law of nature—a law indispensable to the continuance of life. "No man ever yet hated his own flesh, but loveth it and cherisheth it." From the minutest insect to the mightiest angel, love of happiness is the law of life. Efforts towards self-preservation are but the actings of this law.

Self-love is an original and essential ingredient of our being—in itself a holy and right feeling. Its corruption and degeneracy ends in selfishness, which makes its own supposed enjoyment the supreme object of pursuit, irrespective of the claims of our fellow men or of our Creator. True self-love, on the contrary, is perfectly consistent with both. Indeed, it necessarily involves both. For our highest enjoyments lie in communion with men and God, which communion consists in the full and fair discharge of the relative duties we owe to both. As therefore self-love leads to self-preservation and the utmost possible extension of our own happiness; so are we bound to exercise the general principles of love in promoting, to the utmost possible degree the happiness of all our brethren of the human race. The strength of obligation in the latter is inferred, in the rule, from the force of the principle in the former. How this becomes important in morals will appear in the next section.

SECTION IX.

Rewards and punishments are addressed to the principle of self-love and are essential to the idea of moral government.

A reward is some good conferred as a consideration for right action. When a child has been obedient to his parent, something is given to the child or done for him, which affords him happiness; and this, as an expression of the parents approbation of his conduct. On the contrary, if the child's conduct has been wrong, the parent withholds the expression of satisfaction; he inflicts some privation or pain, as an expression of his disapprobation. This is *punishment* and whether it consists, simply in the withholding of a benefit, or the positive infliction of pain, it is addressed to the principle of self-love: and when held up before the mind, previously to the perpetration of the deed, it constitutes what is called a *motive* to action. It is so called because of some suitableness or adaptation in it, to move the person to act. "By *motive*," says Edwards, "I mean the whole of that which moves." Now the hope of happiness and the fear of pain have their common origin in self-love. Every thing therefore which is done to alarm our fears and to excite our hopes, derives from this first law of nature its entire moving force. Take away from the human bosom the love of happiness; and hope and fear are terms without meaning. If pain and pleasure were matters of perfect indifference, how could the one or the other influence to action? But as the law exists in every man's consciousness—as we feel it impossible to throw off the fear of pain and to extinguish the lights of hope, we experience continually the repelling influence of the one, and the attracting force of the other.

If we look narrowly into these things, we shall find that the precise design of the Creator in furnishing us with such a constitution, is to make us capable of being influenced by motives, that we might be under moral

government: and that the design of men in applying reward and punishment, is to connect most intimately in the mind, upright action with happiness, on the one hand; and wrong action with pain on the other; and all with the same view of bringing motive to act upon self-love. Two remarks, of very considerable importance to a right understanding of the nature of moral government and of the great doctrine of justification, it may be as well here to present more distinctly to the readers most serious consideration, viz:

1. *The precise object of reward, is right action.* No parent feels that he ought to reward—that is, to bestow good,—to confer benefits, on his child as a consideration for nothing—for no action at all. No government holds out a premium for indolence, no more than for vicious conduct. The very idea of rewarding inaction is absurd. We have seen that the possession of faculties adapted to useful action is an expression of the Creator's will that we ought to exercise them. The possession infers the obligation to use. Inactivity is a sin. The burying of his talent or the hiding of it in a napkin was a punishable offence; a sin in itself, a resistance of his Lord's will who gave it. In other words, innocence is not meritorious of positive reward.

By innocence, I understand, the primitive state of a moral being, prior to his active performance of duty or actual commission of sin. Adam was innocent the moment of his creation, but was not entitled to heaven. Positive and perpetual bliss is the reward of perfect righteousness. Innocence is entitled only to exemption from painful endurance. "Adam was not to have the reward merely on account of his being innocent; if so, he would have had it fixed upon him at once, as soon as ever he was created; for he was as innocent then as he could be. But he was to have the reward on account of his activeness in obedience; not on account merely of his not having done ill, but on account of his doing well."—Edwards v, 396.

An objection will here perhaps occur to the readers mind—If innocence is not entitled to reward, can the moral being who has a corrupt nature, prior to his own

active sinfulness, be entitled to punishment? The answer to this must depend upon a previous question, viz: How came he into this state of sinfulness? Was it by a direct and immediate exertion of creating power? Then God is the author of this corruption, which to affirm is blasphemy. Was it a result of previous moral action with which the man was mediately connected? Then he in whom the corruption of disposition exists, is not innocent. His inclinations and desires after evil are consequences of sin, have their cause of existence in sin and are therefore sinful like their cause; and of course, are deserving of punishment.

"Activeness in obedience"—righteousness, is that to which alone reward—good, blessing is promised. The doctrine of the good and the great Edwards, of the bible and of common sense, ought to be a little farther illustrated. It is the fundamental principle of all morality and religion. Let us have distinct ideas here, or all will be obscurity. Let us know what *righteousness* is, and light will shine upon our path throughout. What then is *righteousness?* I answer, *it is doing right—right action—action according to the rule of right—conformity with law.* When a moral being has done, what the law under which he is placed, requires him to do, he is righteous. "The formal nature of righteousness, (says Edwards v. 397,) lies in a conformity of actions to that which is the rule and measure of them. Therefore that only is righteousness in the sight of a judge that answers the law. That perfect obedience, is what is called righteousness, in the New Testament, and that this righteousness or perfect obedience, is by God's fixed unalterable rule the condition of justification, is, from the plain evidence of truth confessed by a certain great man, whom no one will think to be blinded by prejudice, in favor of the doctrine we are maintaining." He then quotes Locke with approbation, "For righteousness or an exact obedience to the law, seems by the scripture to have a claim of right to eternal life;—Rom. iv. 4. To him that worketh, i. e. does the works of the law, "is the reward not reckoned of grace but of debt." "Such a perfect obedience in the New Testiment, is termed δικαιοσυνη which is translated *righteousness.*" "This

adds Edwards, is that which St. Paul so often styles *the law* without any other distinction;—Rom. II. 13. "Not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law are justified." It is needless to quote any more passages, his epistles are full of it, especially this to the Romans." Ed. v. 398.

Here I am in a strait. The vast importance of this principle in moral government, whether under a divine or human administration, strongly invites to spend more time in its illustration and defence. And this the more, because this fundamental principle is almost wholly lost sight of in a large portion of all that has been written and come to my knowledge in the nineteenth century, on the subject of religion and morals. It is amazing how the very foundation on which all government rests, or rather the essence of the thing itself, can be kept out of sight, whilst a vast amount of commotion exists all around it.

On the other hand, the heavenly simplicity of the principle—its inexplicability because of its elementary simplicity, seems to me to foreclose description and frown upon all attempts at explanation. To save himself from the labor of reading page after page of attempted illustration, where the subject is, at the outset, intuitively true—rather, where its truth is intuitively perceived, will not the reader agree and pledge himself *never* to forget, that RIGHTEOUSNESS IS CONFORMITY WITH LAW; *and the only proper object of reward?*—that there is, in the government of God, *an eternal connexion between upright action aud the happiness of the actor.*

Presuming that you are perfectly satisfied with these terms, I offer the 2d remark, which is counterpart to the former, viz. That there exists an indispensable connexion between wrong-doing and suffering—that neglecting to act rightly and acting wrongly are to be followed by punishment.

Punishment is the pain, whether of privation or of positive visitation of wrath—the evil which is inflicted by the ruling power, as an expression of displeasure against sin. The infliction of such evil goes on the principle that it is right to connect sin and suffering.

The assumption of its truth will not be accounted improper here. We surely need no laboured argument to *satisfy* us that it is right to punish sin—to visit evils upon men proportional to the magnitude of their offences.

We have the evidence within ourselves—we feel, even, when the evil comes upon ourselves, that it is right. We have the evidence of its correctness in the universal consent of men, as that is expressed in all the governments exercised by man. We have the evidence in the whole of God's visitations upon human folly and crime. "Though hand join to hand the wicked shall not go unpunished." It is therefore utterly unnecessary to delay for the purpose of proof. Penal evil is essential to moral government; prior to the act of sin, as motive operating by fear; posterior to sin, as a vindication of the justice of the government and of the holiness and truth of the governor.

SECTION X.

A *Brief Summary.*

No man can form a notion of moral government, of which rewards and punishments does not constitute a leading part. The hope of happiness, as an inseparable accompaniment of upright conduct, and the fear of punishment as a result of unrighteousness, are addressed to the principle of self-love. Thus motive is brought to bear upon choice. The desires of the mind have for their direct object apprehended good, these desires operate an influence upon the will, and the object of the mind's contemplation, when about to make a choice, is its own acts. Two or more objects are presented under circumstances inviting to choice; which of the two shall the mind choose? In all its actings or movements toward answering this question, the qualities of the things presented are the subjects which the mind is examining. In the choice itself, the precise object is the action to be performed. I am offered an apple and an orange, with the privilege of taking one. I perceive them and know their qualities. Therein I exercise intelligence. I compare their qualities together and those with my own

taste and relish for them respectively. Herein I reason —in weighing motives. I feel that I ought to take the one which will afford me the most happiness on the whole. This is my rule of judgement—my law. The qualities of the fruits are the objects of my mental action. These operations over, the act of choice, or the volition follows. This act of choosing or willing moves my hand &c. to take and eat. These last acts are the direct objects of the act of will or of volition; and the act of volition was produced by the previous acts of reasoning in weighing the motives; and these motives have reference to the laws of self-love; as the greatest apparent good, so was my choice and consequent action. It is perfectly obvious then, that the state of the body, its taste, its habits previously, its present appetite, whether sated with this fruit or hungry for it, &c. &c. have an overpowering influence in the choice.

Now let the objects between which the mind is called upon to make a choice, be the happiness connected with a moral act on the one hand; and the misery connected with an immoral act on the other. The law prescribing duty is the rule of judgment: and *the moral sense* decrees that I ought to obey the law, whilst various temptations operate on the other side. Here the process is similar. The intellectual powers are exercised in perceiving the rule and its transgression and the consequences, viz.: the reward and the punishment. The reasoning faculty is exerted in comparing together the things perceived. The principle of self-love is active in drawing toward that which according to the present aspect, will make me happy; which may be in opposition to conscience or the moral sense. Volition is the mind's last act preceding the performance of the deed; reward or punishment follows the act. This is moral action, and he who enacted the law, who regulates motives and sees to the business of judging and administering the reward or the punishment, as the case may be, is the Moral Governor.

God reveals his will, "*Thou shalt not murder.*" He states the consequences of acting contrary to it. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."

The consequence of obedience is inferred. If a man love his neighbor he shall be happy. The mind looks at the sin of murder, in connexion with its threatened punishment; it looks at the duty of loving and doing good to man, in connexion with its reward. A feeling of desire for the reward and a feeling of aversion from the pains of punishment, exist in the mind. These feelings, which are simply the action of the principle of self-love, immediately tend to move the will; reason, meanwhile, is employed in comparing the different acts and their consequences; the mind wills the perpetration of the deed; and God visits with deserved punishment; or, it resists the temptation, wills a kindly act, and experiences the happy consequences.

Intelligence, then, and reason, and desire, and self-love, and volition, and a moral sense, and a law or rule of action, and reward and punishment to be administered by God whose law extends over man—are all included in the idea of moral government. They all exist in the case of man, and constitute him a moral agent.

1. Let me appeal to present witnesses for the truth of my doctrine. Is there not in the reader's bosom, a moral sense? an innate, involuntary, self-constituted tribunal and judge of the morality or immorality of actions.

2. This judge is incorruptible—you may suppose him blind, but you are mistaken. He will speak out in due time.

3. This judge is immortal as the soul.

4. I appeal to you to prove the principle of self-love. You desire to be happy. You dread misery.

5. I appeal to the immortal witness and judge within you, that you know and believe happiness to be inseparable from holiness, and misery from sin.

6. Will you peril your eternal interests, by continuance in sin?

CHAPTER II.

ON THE PARTICULAR MODIFICATION OF MORAL GOVERNMENT, AS IT WAS EXTENDED OVER MAN IN HIS PRIMITIVE CONDITION; OR, THE COVENANT OF WORKS.

SECTION I.

The primeval state of man, anterior to the formation of the covenant, considered intellectually, morally and legally.

It is not intended by the title of this section, to intimate, that man existed any considerable time, before God entered into covenant with him. The object is simply to present a view of his qualities, character, and condition, in the particular respects referred to, apart from the peculiar moral constitution, under which he was placed. This seems necessary in order to a right understanding of that constitution.

1st. Intellectually. He was endowed with a knowledge of things around him. He was not thrown into being, and into the midst of a countless number of fellow creatures, utterly ignorant of himself and of them; of his own capacities and powers, and of theirs; as the schemes of theorising philosophers, would seem to have it. In their speculations, men have been fond to account for the formation of language, spoken and written—of the manner in which man acquired a knowledge of his own soul, and of the Creator's being and perfections; of the relations that exist between man and his maker, and also between him and the creatures around him. Much has been laboriously written about the origin and progress of language—how, from the rude sounds in nature, names would be given to things, and these transferred to similar things, &c.

All such speculations are based on the false and misguided assumption, that man was formed capable of acquiring knowledge, but was not created "in knowledge."

The Bible presents a more rational account, and one which casts no such reproach upon the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. It assures us that "God created man after his own image," and that this consisted partly in knowledge—"Renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him;" which shows conclusively, that the image after which man was created, consisted partly in knowledge. And the manner in which God represents himself as conversing with man immediately after his creation, implies his possession of the faculty of speech, and of the art of reasoning, and of a language which formed the vehicle of thought. "The Lord God commanded the man." Will it here be pretended, that this does not necessarily imply a spoken language; it may only have been an impression produced upon the mind without speech? But of this there is no evidence, and we have indubitable evidence, a little after, that the man did speak of the woman, and to the woman, and to God; and there is the same certainty that the woman spake to the serpent and to her husband. Equally baseless is the hypothesis, that man was left to gather his knowledge of the creatures around him, from experience alone—that he was not indued with knowledge by the Creator. God told him much concerning them. He prescribed to Adam the limit of his authority over them, and the uses to which they might be applied.

Equally without foundation is the assumption, that man was left to decypher the Creator's being, attributes, and requirements from the creation around him. On the contrary, God gave him a law, and in this, communicated to him, a knowledge of his own will: as in the command to be fruitful, to use the creatures, under certain restrictions, to dress and keep the garden. And after the creation of the woman, a knowledge of her relation to himself was given to him, and of the obligations it involved. Indeed the idea of Adam's utter ignorance,

his being left to grope his way to knowledge, is so gross an absurdity, that I am aware the reader will not tolerate much delay in the disproof. He feels that it is a mere waste of time. But then, let him please to remember that on this very assumption, gross as it is, the enemies of revelation, and some of its misguided friends, have built their respective systems, the one to corrupt, the other to destroy all confidence in the Bible. If you concede, that man originally had no revelation from his Creator, but was left to discover the divine being and perfections, by reason, you exalt reason at the expense of truth, and give her a power which she never possessed. Hence the infidel gains his most plausible advantages against revelation. But, on the contrary, if you hold to the facts, as *inferible by reason*, and as taught in the Bible, you have the *necessity* of revelation established, prior to the fall of man. He never existed without revelation. God revealed himself to man—made known his own being and perfections, to a certain extent—man's own qualities, relations, and duties, at his creation, and before the fall.

If again, you concede this degree of ignorance—if you grant that Adam knew nothing at all, then the corrupter of Bible doctrine infers, that there could be no covenant of works, no representative relation of Adam to his posterity—no moral headship; and by good and necessary consequence, there can be no covenant of grace, no headship of a second Adam—no imputation of his righteousness, &c. Thus by this one rash admission, you put it beyond your power to defend the citadel of truth; you virtually abandon the Bible to its foes, and sport away the hopes of a ruined world.

But, whilst the truth is to be maintained, that man had communicated to him, directly from God, much valuable information before his fall, and the necessity of a revelation even then, and hence its superior necessity now; it is not to be affirmed that Adam possessed the knowledge of all nature, and of all art, and of all divine perfections. This absurdity, for sinister purposes, is attempted to be forced upon us, that by representing the doctrine of primeval revelation in a ludicrous

point of view, the true doctrine may be brought into contempt. We have not said that God revealed all things to Adam. But we do say that he communicated to him much knowledge, and furnished him with reasoning faculties, by the right use of which, he might indefinitely extend the range of his intellect and the sphere of his knowledge.

2. Morality—We have seen, that a moral sense is essentially necessary to a moral being. Man possessed this. He had a heart, as well as a head, to know good and evil, to judge of right and wrong. To this his Creator addressed himself, when he prescribed duty, and prohibited sin. But it is more important to remark, that these moral powers were in an attitude for right action. In other words, man was created in a state of moral rectitude.

This may be viewed in a two-fold aspect. He was, on the one hand, free from every corrupt principle, feeling, inclination, or disposition. This is what the old divines would call negative holiness. He was also positively inclined to right action—having the will and affections turned towards holy things. Both are included in the language of Solomon, "God hath made man upright." This moral rectitude may be most satisfactory proved, by reference to the doctrine of sanctification, which is spoken of, as a changing of his people "from glory to glory" into the same image. The image of God, after which man was created, consisted in holiness, or moral rectitude, "be ye holy, for I am holy" "as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." "Sanctify them through thy truth."

3. But the legal primitive condition of man is chiefly important to a right understanding of the covenant of works. He was under a law, bound to act agreeably to the will of God, so far as made known to him. To no truth does the human mind assent, more readily, than to the affirmation, that the rational creature is bound to obey the Creator. If the human mind can have no distinct perception of a rational, immortal creature, under no obligation of obedience to him, who sus-

tains its existence; at least I think it impossible to believe in the reality of such a state. If there is no necessary obligation, there can be no dependance, and we have the anomaly of an independent creature! On the contrary, if the notion of an independent creature be entirely unreasonable, then we must admit the existence of moral obligation lying upon man by a necessity of his condition. Anterior to all covenant transaction and relation, man was bound to perfect obedience to the divine will. In other words, he was under a moral government. For, as Witsius observes, "Adam sustained a two-fold relation. 1st. *As man.* 2. *As the head and representative of mankind.* In the former relation he was a rational creature, *under the law*, to God, upright, created after the image of God, and furnished with sufficient power to fulfil all righteousness." B. 1st. ch. 2d. sec 3d. Adam stood alone and was individually accountable to God. Should he act contrary to the divine will made known to him, he must abide the just consequences of his action—he must be punished as God might think suitable to his government to inflict. Should he obey, he must be rewarded accordingly. But in the results of his actions himself alone would be necessarily, or indeed justly involved. Such is supposed to be, and to have been the condition of the angels. It is not known to us that they have ever been on probation in any other respect than as individuals; each standing or falling for himself, each receiving the reward or punishment, allotted by the Creator to his obedience or sin, as the case might be. Had man been left to multiply and replenish the earth, whilst in this his strictly primitve estate, it may be conceived that some would have fallen, whilst others would have remained steadfast in their obedience, as it has actually proved with the angels. The fall of one might have affected the condition and standing of another, by way of example and through the force of natural connexions; still those maintaining their integrity, would have been retained in their state of blessedness. But I cannot see how and on what principle they could be *confirmed*, at any given period in that state, so as to be henceforth incapable of falling into sin. In

other words, I cannot see how there could arise any claim on the part of man, to any thing but present enjoyment, except from a special act of condescension and love on the part of God. Some gratuitous pledge or promise of God, must be necessary to produce and justify in man's mind, the faith of an endless life and blessedness. Until such a pledge or promise should be given, he could not conceivably have a claim of right in perpetuity of bliss. His continuance for a long time in a state of obedience, could create no obligation upon the Creator prospectively, so that God should be bound to secure him forever. But if at any period, no matter how far removed from his origin, he sinned, he must die. Or as Dr. Bates in his Harmony of the Divine Attributes expresses the thought,(vol. 1st. 189.) "Thus holy and blessed was Adam in his primitive state and that he might continue so, he was obliged forever to obey the will of God,who bestowed upon him life and happiness. By the first neglect of this duty, he would most justly and inevitably incur the loss of both." Again, "and from hence it follows that man only was in a state of moral dependance, and capable of a law."—"And as it is impossible that man should be exempt from a law"—190 Such was the strictly primitive condition of man—a state of moral dependance, a state of trial or probation, *individually* only, not *socially*—a state as far as we know, not necessarily limited, but capable of perhaps, interminable duration, in every stage of whose progress there was a possibility of falling and being lost—a state whose change for the better, must be a matter of pure benevolent gratuitousness on the part of the supreme governor.

SECTION II.

Of a Covenant in General.

One of the simplest ideas in the whole science of morals, is the general notion of a *covenant*, *compact* or *mutual agreement.* It includes three leading items, viz: the *parties*, the *terms*, and the *voluntary assent* or *agreement.* Blackstone, the great commentator upon Eng-

lish law, speaking of the parts of a deed, says "after warrants, usually follow *covenants*, or conventions, which are clauses of agreement contained in a deed, whereby either party may stipulate for the truth of certain facts, or may bind himself to perform, or give something to the other." vol. II; 20—7. Here are mentioned the *parties*, the *terms*, the *agreement*. These exist in the nature of the thing, and therefore all writers who treat on the subject must and do, either formally or inadvertently admit and recognise them. The great charter of England, in which she glories as the palladium of her liberties, is simply a *covenant* between the two belligerent parties, the king heading the interests of arbitrary power on the one hand; and the nation, the people claiming their rights on the other; the subject matter of the charter is the *terms* of the covenant: and its ratification is the expression of their *agreement*.

So treaties between independent nations are *covenants*, and, like other covenants, they may and often do exist between three or more parties.

So, the Constitution of our general government, is a covenant, between the states respectively, who are the parties to it.

Here it may be for edification to state a few things in regard to the parts severally. 1, As to the *parties*. They must be moral agents—intelligent beings, endowed with a moral sense by which to understand the nature, and feel the force of moral obligation. 2, They must have a right of control over all that which forms the terms of the covenant. A man cannot *rightly* covenant to do what he has no right to do. 3, The parties must have the exercise of *volition*. There can be no *agreement* where there is compulsion of the nature of coertion or force. And yet perfect freedom from all kind of coercion is not requisite in a covenanting party. Or 4, in other words, the absence of all coercion by moral force—the force of motives operating upon choice, is not indispensable. A nation may be vanquished, and compelled to make a disadvantageous treaty, and yet if that treaty do not involve the abandonment of moral principle, they may not violate it. And hence 5, per-

fect equality is not necessary, in the parties to a covenant. They may differ in intellectual, in moral and in physical power, and yet covenant with each other, and in fact this is always the case. There is never a perfect equality. The commonwealth has determined to take my land for a public use; and yet I as one party may enter into a covenant with the commonwealth as the other, and yet this inequality of our condition does not nullify the agreement. I have a choice still. I may agree upon terms, or abide the issue of a contest. If I sign an agreement, it is binding. "He sweareth to his hurt and changeth not." Psalms xv. 4.

As to the *terms*, 1, There is a stipulation of something to be done or given by the party proposing the covenant. 2, A restipulation by the other party, of something to be done or given in consideration. And 3, these two things are in *theory*, if not in *fact*, *equivalent*. 4. These equivalents must be in themselves lawful and right; for it never can be right to engage to do wrong. 5, There is a penalty included in the terms of a covenant. That is ,some evil consequence to result to the party who may, and shall violate his engagement. This very often includes more than a mere negative, more than the simple forfeiture or loss of all the advantages professed to be secured. It extends to the positive visitation of evil upon the covenant breaker. It is usual to place this as an appendage, but it certainly belongs to the terms, for the parties agree to the forfeiture conditionally. The *penalty* is added as a security, and the philosophy of the thing will appear, if you reflect, that the object of every lawful and binding covenant is to secure some good. Here the principle of hope is addressed, and the penalty is addressed to fear; and thus self-love is enlisted, by the strongest motives, to fortify virtue and to sustain truth.

As to the *agreement*, or voluntary assent to the *terms*, it implies 1, a knowledge of them; 2, a distinct comparison in the mind, of the equivalents contained in the *terms*—the probable advantages and the possible disadvantages. In short, all those processes of thought which present motives to the mind and operate upon choice.

3, Volition, the mind assenting to the proposition, and 4, the expression of that assent in the confirmation of the covenant. Such is the general substance—such the simple ideas included in the common notion of a covenant. Now you will observe, that these are among the original elements of that morality which constitutes the basis of all human society. Without these principles where were government? And especially where could you find free government—government founded on compromise—government where powers are balanced, and rights hedged around by the eternal ramparts of impregnable *truth*? Whose imagination can gender the conception of social organization without the essential elements of a covenant? Society necessarily implies a plurality of persons—and can even a bare plurality—"can two walk together except they be agreed?" No, not the tenderest and most endearing of all human societies—the loved relation which forms the basis of all others, can come into being, and exist without it. And the measure of perfection and of bliss in all other human associations, is determined by the reverence, and sanctity, and sacredness, and inviolability of the marriage covenant.

Without these principles, how will you organize government? How can you talk about it? How can you think about it?

Without these principles, how will you conduct business? How will you manage the commerce of society? —But I forbear.—All men every where, see and feel and know, that the doctrines involved in a simple covenant, are the intrinsic, innate, essential, and indestructible principles of social man. They are not separable from his nature, they are his nature itself, he would not be man without them.

SECTION III

Of God's Covenant with Adam.

We are next to inquire, whether God entered into covenant with man, and what its terms, effects, etc.

1. The terms Berith and διαθηκη translated in the Old

and New Testaments respectively, by the English word covenant, have not the same original meaning. The Hebrew word signifies *to cut*, and obviously is founded on, or perhaps more correctly, is applied because of, the ancient form of confirming a covenant, which was by cutting and killing an animal and dividing it into parts, between which, the covenanting parties passed. Thus Abraham divided the carcases, when God established his covenant with him.—(Gen. 15.) To which ceremony, there is also distinct reference in Jer. xxxiv. 18—19. "I will give the men that have transgressed my covenant, which have not performed the words of the covenant, which they had made before me, when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the parts thereof, into the hands of their enemies." This custom existed among the Romans in a later age, as is exemplified in the case of the federal compact between the Albani and them, in reference to the fight of the Horatii and the Curatii, on the issue of which, the fate of the two nations was to depend. In confirming this covenant, after the *terms* were repeated, the officer strikes a hog with a flint-stone, pronouncing the words of the imprecation, praying Jupiter, in case the Roman people should first violate the covenant, he would so strike them, and with so much more power as he is stronger than man.—(Livy, b. i. 24.) Hence the phrase extant among us at this day; *to strike a bargain*, is, to close a contract.

The term (διαθηκη) in the New Testament comes nearer the ordinary meaning of the thing; it is a *disposition* an *arrangement* of things—an agreement.

2. But after all, words are arbitrary signs of things, and we are never safe in trusting to a single term, as though from it *alone*, we could collect the right knowledge of the thing. Now our inquiry is into the thing itself. What are the matters of *fact* to which these terms are applied? Is there any moral transaction between God and man, wherein the principles above recited, are involved? Is there any proposition made, by God to man, of something to be done by the latter? Any restipulation of something to be done by the former? Any agreement of both? Any penal sanction?

To all such interrogations every superficial reader of the Bible—much more every accurate observer of its contents, must answer affirmatively. Let us look then into the detail.—And 1. As to the competency of the parties—God and Adam; both are intelligent moral beings, qualified to enter into any arrangement whose tendencies are to the glory of the one, and the happiness of the other; both in the exercise of volition, and neither coerced beyond the power of mere motives to choice.

God leaves Adam to choose his course—he does exercise volition and that, under no constraining perils calculated to interfere with his choice. This is perfectly plain and indisputable. For the objection, that Adam could not refuse—he dared not object to the terms; rests on a flimsy foundation: because it rests on a positive falsehood—standing out in bold opposition to the plain and undeniable fact. Adam did exercise his volition—he did dare to choose in opposition to God's will and that after he had at first acquiesced in it. The fact of his acquiescence will appear hereafter; but the fact of his choosing to act contrary to God's expressed will, "thou shalt not eat of it." is acknowledged by himself; and all his posterity do the same. Yet it is true, in one sense, that he could not object.—He could not without sin: still he did it. Hence it is undeniable, he did *choose.*

2. As to the terms. They are briefly related in, or inferable from the language of the Bible. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." Let us now see whether this language contains the five items of a covenant. 1. We have a stipulation of something required of Adam—in abstinence from the fruit of the tree, in obedience to divine will. The command is a positive law and a test of Adam's obedience as effectual and even more simple, than if it related to some general duty. For his way was hedged up, so that he could sin only in this one thing. All the principles and tendencies of his nature were accordant to the moral law of

his creation. This then was the only avenue he had to guard. And in narrowing down the field of temptation, God gave him the vantage ground over his enemy. 2. We see proffered to Adam, life, as the reward, or consideration of his obedience. For according to the simplest laws of construction, the threatening of death as a consequence of eating, involves the promise of life to obedience. So Adam understood it, so Eve understood it, "ye shall not eat of it—lest ye die." This is alleged as a reason for not eating. Life is desirable, and and we shall have *it*, so long as we abstain. In the laws of the commonwealth, which award death to the murderer, the principle is assumed that the enjoyment of life belongs to him who exercises the opposite feelings and the conduct to which they prompt. So here; the eating, or disobediedience is connected with death, and the not eating, or obedience is connected with life. 3. Here is the *theoretic* equivalent. The honor done to God and his moral government, He is pleased in condescension and kindnesss and love, to account as an equivalent to the felicity of man to the whole extent of that included in the term life. 4. These equivalents are in themselves right. Unfaltering compliance with the will of God in all things, even the most minute and apparently trifling, is infinitely proper in itself, and infinitely important to the moral universe. The proffer of eternal felicity as a reward for so poor a service as was required of man, was certainly not wrong, but altogether in keeping with the boundless benevolence of the everlasting Father. 5. The penal sanction is explicitly set forth in the language, and as to the reality there can be no doubt. Some questions we have to settle as to the extent of the blessing and the curse: but the things themselves are indisputable.

3. The *voluntary* assent of the parties; and as in every covenant, one party must make the proposition—God proposes the terms as an expression of his will, which is an assent or agreement. God's commanding man not to eat, is his consent.

As to man, it has been already observed, he could not without unreasonable opposition to his Creator's

will, refuse any terms which the wisdom and benevolence of God would allow him to proffer. Hence we should conclude, Adam must most cheerfully accede to the terms. But this the more readily, when their nature is inspected—when he should see in them every thing adapted for his advantage, and nothing to his disadvantage.

The same conclusion we deduce from an inspection of the scripture history. For 1, there is not a hint at any thing like a refusal on the part of Adam, before the act of violation. The whole history is perfectly consistent with the supposition that he did cheerfully agree. 2, It is evident that Eve thought the command most reasonable and proper. She so expressed herself to the serpent, giving God's command as a reason of her abstinence. This information she must have derived from her husband, for she was not created at the time the covenant was given to Adam. We hence infer Adam's *consent*. 3, Adam was, after his sin, abundantly disposed to excuse himself—he cast the blame upon the woman, and indirectly upon God, for giving her to him. "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." Now most assuredly, if Adam could in truth have said, I never *consented* to abstain—I never agreed to the *terms* proposed —I have broken no pledge—he would have presented this apology, or justification. But he was dumb: he offered no such apology. Can any reasonable man want further evidence of his consent? Even this may be had, if he will, 4, look at the consequences. The penal evils did result—sorrow and death did ensue; and hence, because God is righteous, we infer the legal relations. The judge of all the earth would not punish, where there is no crime.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE EXTENT OF THE COVENANT: OR, THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF ADAM.

It has already been remarked that the first man stood in a "two-fold relation, 1. As man. 2. As the head and representative of mankind." We have viewed the covenant in reference to the former only. Our attention must now be turned to the latter.

SECTION I.

The General Doctrine of Representation.

To represent is to act in the legal character of another —to sustain his relations in law—to act for him. The term is commonly used, in civil, as well as in religious things, to express in brief, the whole doctrine of principal and agent. And I prefer it to any other term, though it be not found in our English Bible; because there is no other term in the language, which, to a republican ear, sounds more harmoniously, or conveys the idea more clearly. All Americans are so familiar with it, and with the doctrine which it is used to express, that to their understanding it speaks a volume. Every American who is lifted above brutish ignorance, knows, that a representative is one who acts for others, in the making and execution of laws, or the transaction of business; and that, by consequence, those who are represented, are bound by the acts of their representatives, just as though they had been performed by themselves immediately. It has always therefore appeared to me futile in the extreme, to object to the word merely because it is not a Bible term. Hundreds of words are in constant use, by the very persons who raise such ob-

jections, which are not found in our English Bibles. Moreover, the inconsistency of such objectors is the more glaring, from the fact, that they are for discarding the use of the Bible term *Covenant*, yea, and the *thing* too, and for introducing a new nomenclature, such as "providential development"—"God's moral constitution"—"social organization," &c.

But let us hold to the doctrine. It can be expressed by a variety of terms. It is a *fact*, the evidence of which, is as long and as broad as civilized society, that one man performs moral acts, binding in right, and in law, by the agency of another. It is not the goose quill, nor the flesh and bone and muscle that hold it, which makes the contract contained in the deed; but it is the rational mind which acts by, and through them, as instruments. And it is a *fact*, that the same rational mind does make use of another pen and another hand too, to confirm and ratify a similar contract. Here there is no room for discussion, to elicit proof of the fact, or to throw light on the doctrine of representation. The only question that seems admissible, is the philosophical enquiry, *how* can this be? How can A transfer, as it were, his moral person into B; so that B's moral transaction with C, is not his own, and does not bind him, but is A's and binds him only?

Now if any man insist on a reply to this enquiry, and desire to make the inexplicability of the fact, an objection to the doctrine, I answer, he is no philosopher. For it is no part of sound philosophy, to make the inexplicability of a *fact* an objection to the doctrine which contains it. It is no part of philosophy to accommodate facts to a theory—but on the contrary, the glory of the modern philosophy consists in admitting facts, however inexplicable, upon good and sufficient proof, and building the theory and the doctrine upon them. Who does not know that the fact of gravitation is as yet inexplicable? Who does not know that the facts of magnetic attraction are unexplained? And yet does any philosopher deny them? Just so, who knows not the fact, that one man often acts by and through another? What then if we cannot explain the mode of the fact? It is undenia

ble, that I can transact business, that shall be binding in law and conscience, in a hundred different places at the same time; a hundred miles distant from each other, and not be present personally in either of them? Do you say "how can these things be." We testify things we do know, and the objector is just as much bound to explain the facts as we are.

The truth is, the doctrine of a moral unity between two or more persons, is an original element in the science of morals. An identity exists between the agent and his principal—they are one in law, to the whole extent of the agency; that is, to the whole extent of the representative authority. Now it is clearly manifest, that the actual existence of this moral unity is one thing. and the *manner* in which it is constituted is another thing. These two may obviously be viewed apart from one another. The former may be a subject of enquiry, and may be settled, and its settlement constitute the basis of the most important transaction; whilst the latter may be left entirely untouched. I am a foreigner, resident in your country. I find a body of men met together in a certain building—they pass laws, some of them affecting my dearest interests, and extending over me the fostering wing of their protection. It is important for me to know whether these men are really authorized to pass such laws. Are they the representatives of this nation? May I safely make purchases under their acts? Now here is a mere question of fact, and it is plain, I may obtain perfect satisfaction on this point; without at all going into the other questions, how did those men become representatives? What is the manner of election in each state? Were the elections all fair and just? &c. But we must defer this for the present, and proceed to consider the position that

SECTION II.

This doctrine of Representation is taught in the laws of nature, and is essential to man's social existence

Let history unrol her cumbrous volumes until the ample scroll shall extend over all time, and girdle the globe, and I challenge the line, which tells of a nation, where the principle in question has not been recognized: yea, where it does not form a prominent feature of national character. Take even savage men, and is not the wild leader of the roving clan, as he ranges mountain, hill, and dale, at once the lord and the *representative* of the train that follows him? Is not the tawny sachem the moral head of his tribe? Do they not look to him, to act for them?—To make peace or proclaim war? And in what does civilization consist? What constitutes the secret of its meliorating influence? Does it *reveal* the principle of representation? or does it only correct the manner of constituting the relation of representer and represented? Look at the condition of civilized nations, in connexion with barbarous nations; and where do you find the point of contrast in their social system? Not in the absence of representation from the one, and its presence in the other; but in the manner in which their leaders came to possess representative power. Just as nations approximate perfection in civilization and morality, and consequently, freedom; do they look well to the manner in which men come in fact to represent them. But the *fact itself* is indispensible to social men. There must be government, and therefore one or a few must represent, must act in many things, for the whole. Now, from this inevitable necessity we infer that such is the moral law of man's creation. God so created him that he cannot exist in society, for which he is obviously adapted, without the exercise of the principle of representation. Take away this, and where is government? Where your constitutions? Where your laws? Where your officers? Where your social system?

Hence, we should conclude, without ever having look-

ed into it, that the Bible,—supposing it to be a book intended for human good, must embrace and teach the doctrine of representation. To affirm this is the object of our

SECTION III.

Adam acted in the Covenant as the representative of all human persons: he was the moral head of the race.

For the proper illustration of this position, a number of distinct remarks are necessary.

1. Persons only are capable of being legally and morally represented. This will appear from a moment's reflection, upon the nature of the thing. A representative is one who stands in the legal relations of another, and acts for him; so that the act of the one becomes binding in law and morality upon the other. Now who can conceive of a moral obligation, lying upon any but a moral being? I am aware, however, that by a fiction of the law or a figure of rhetoric, we speak of representing property: and so we speak of property being bound. But no person supposes that a moral obligation can lie upon an inanimate substance, or that *it* is capable of acting through a vicarious substitute. All men know, that when we speak of representing property, we simply mean, the giving to those who hold it of an influence in appointing the representative greater than their due proportion, if numerically considered: and when property is said to be bound, it is simply meant, that the right to it has passed over, under certain conditions to a person different from the formal or reputed owner.

Neither can a *nature* be represented. Nature is the aggregate of properties belonging to any person or thing. When the apostle speaks of men being "partakers of the divine nature," he merely teaches the doctrine of sanctification; that they are accommodated to the moral likeness of God; made in a measure holy—have in a higher degree than before, some of the properties whose aggregate, in perfection, constitute our idea of God.

The notion we attach to the term *nature* is a mere

abstraction—it exists only in thought: there is no such thing as human nature apart from personal existence. It is not therefore human *nature* that Adam represented in the covenant of works, but the human *persons* who possess it.

2. The extent of every federal representation depends solely upon the covenant which creates it. That is to say, the number of persons which the representative *acts for*, and the identical persons themselves, must be determined by the covenant agreement by which he becomes a representative. Consequently, it is the will of the parties to a covenant which determines the amplitude of its range. Of this we have abundant examples in our federate system of government. In some departments, and for specified purposes, a single individual represents the whole American people. In others, one represents twenty, thirty, forty thousand. This depends upon the will of the parties who enter into the national covenant. There is nothing else to limit and define it. For it is perfectly obvious that the action is the same, whether one man, or one million are to be affected by it. The humble representative of the humblest freeholder in the nation, may meet the authorized representative of the whole nation; the two may make a contract for the sale and purchase, or exchange of property; which contract is equally binding upon the nation on the one hand and the individual on the other. Numbers do not affect it. The same principle you find in the criminal code of all civilized nations. An individual meets his neighbour and murders him; the law hangs him. A dozen of individuals associated together, meet a man and murder him—one murders him—the law hangs them all. Here the thing done is the same, but the persons affected by it are as one to twelve.

The commerce of society too, deals largely in this principle. A commercial agent is despatched to a distant port, and negotiates a heavy contract. Now, who are to profit by the speculation? How many mercantile houses shall share in the spoils of victory? Why, simply those whom the agent represented—for whom he acted. And is not the action the same, whether one or one

hundred are benefitted? But now, on what does the extent of the negotiation, as to the persons affected by it, depend? Manifestly, on the fact of their being represented by the agent. Every man to the whole extent in which he is so represented, must profit by the adventure; and this is fixed and determined by the compact, which created their agent.

Thus also is it in the great and momentous concern before us. There is nothing to limit and bound the covenant of God with Adam—nothing to determine whether Adam only; or Adam and Eve; or Adam, Eve and the whole race, shall be affected by it for good or ill, as the issue may prove, but the *will of the parties*. If God so willed it, and Adam so agreed to it,—that he should act for all human persons—should represent the race; then so it was and so its effects are, and must be. The moral body is one. The head and members go together: their destinies are the same. The question before us, therefore, is a very simple one. It refers to a mere matter of historical fact. Did Adam act for all men?

3. Let us see to the scripture proofs. And as we have the history of the world's creation, and its government for more than sixteen centuries summed up in the first five brief chapters of Genesis, it would be unreasonable to expect much detail concerning this covenant: and this especially, seeing it endured unbroken perhaps not a single week, or even day. Our proofs therefore of Adam's representative character must be almost wholly from other parts of scripture.

1. The first class of proofs shall be taken from the other covenants which God made at different times with man. Of these, three may be mentioned, viz:

The covenant with Noah, Genesis IX., which guarantees to mankind, exemption from destruction by a flood of waters, the succession of seed time and harvest, and the use of animal food.

The covenant with Abraham, by which the visible church, strictly so called, is constituted; and the possession of Canaan is pledged, and also a limiting of the great promise of Messiah to his descendants.

The covenant with Israel at Sinai, which restricts for

a time, the blessings of Abraham's covenant, to the nation of Israel.

It will be observed that in all these, not the persons immediately present alone are concerned; but they extend to vast multitudes; to generations yet unborn. They, therefore, contain the principle, which we contend prevails also in the original covenant after which they are modelled. Moses records it in Deut. xxix. 14, 15. "Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but with him that standeth here, with us this day, before the Lord our God, and also with him that is not here with us this day." The Sinai Covenant, and all the others, included generations of generations, who were to be affected by them, for good or for ill. Thus a presumption arises, that the Adamic covenant was to affect his posterity. This is strengthened by all his history. "For it was not said to our first parents only, (observes Witsius i. 69.) *Increase and multiply;* by virtue of which command the human race is still continued: Nor is it true of Adam only. "*It is not good that man should be alone:* nor does that conjugal law concern him alone, "*Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh;* which Christ still urges."

2. But we rest not on presumption, however strong. We refer to the facts of scripture: and among these we find that the penal consequences, the melancholy evils of the breach of the covenant by Adam, fell upon his posterity as well as upon himself. We find also that the Bible refers all our woes to Adam's act as their origin. Through him as the door, they all flooded in upon our wretched world. "By one man sin entered into the world and death by sin." Rom. v, 12. Here is the fact: and from it we argue the preceding cause of it. All the race of Adam suffer. This is a moral effect and must have a moral cause. For, as before hinted, in the government of a perfectly holy being, the suffering of holy beings unconnected with sin, is an impossibility. The human mind is so constructed, that it cannot believe God would impose pain and anguish, where there is no

sin. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" If therefore, death came upon all men by the act of the first man, it is undeniable that his act stands in the relation of a moral cause to the universal fact. But now it is impossible that Adam's sin could be the cause of death passing upon all men, unless all men were morally connected with him. If he did not act *for them*—if he did not represent them, they could not justly be exposed to suffering and delivered over to death, on account of his sin. The moral sense of all men revolts at such an idea. What! shall men suffer who have not sinned! Shall God be charged with inflicting pain and even death, where there is no transgression!! Who is this that sits in judgment and condemns the Governor of the universe!!!

3. But passing all that remains of the context, Rom. v, 12—20, whose strength we will have occasion to bring out hereafter; let us advert to 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. "Since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead: For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." This text relates to the resurrection of the body, and only affects our argument, by confirming the same point as the passage from Romans; whilst it contrasts Adam and Christ, and shuts us up to the necessity of either rejecting the covenant representative character of Christ, or of admitting the covenant representative character of Adam. If Adam is not a public moral head, neither is Christ. If the latter be, the former must have been.

4. A similar contrast is found in the 47th verse of the same chapter, "The first man is of the earth, earthy, the second man is the Lord from heaven." Now, wherefore this bringing together of Adam and Christ? It cannot be because of any personal qualities, either of resemblance or of disparity. For in Adam there is nothing peculiar, that he should be thus compared and contrasted. Nay, but the point of similarity is in their official relations. Both are heads, moral heads of distinct moral bodies of men, whose destinies are connected in law with their conduct respectively. Hence in Romans. v. 14, he is called "the figure—*the type* of

him that was to come," that is of Christ. Adam was the type of Jesus Christ, who is the anti-type to him. In their legal relations, they were like to one another. As in the Printer's art, the letter is the exact resemblance of the type ; so the representative character of the Redeemer is exactly like the representative character of Adam.

From this branch of the subject, there arises a question or two, more curious perhaps than useful, to which however, a moment's attention may be given. What position did Eve occupy ? Was she an original covenanting party ? Or was she represented by Adam ?

Doctor Ridgely, who briefly but candidly states the arguments in favour of the man alone being the covenant head, to the exclusion of the woman, yet gives his own opinion in opposition to it. It appears to me his objections are not valid, and that Eve was not a representative, but was represented in Adam. Because,

When God gave Adam the covenant, as formerly remarked, Eve was not created. It is true, that the term Adam, means the race: it is a generic term, as well as a proper name : and that in Genesis II. 27, 28, it is said —" in the image of God created he him ; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, be fruitful and multiply," &c.; and that the covenant is not mentioned until the 16th verse of the II. chapter. But it is also true that the II. chapter from verse 4, is an account more in detail of what is contained in general in the first. In verses 4—7, he gives an account of the creation, especially of the vegetable, its want of cultivation, and of man. In verses 8 —17, the planting of the garden is described, the tree of life and of knowledge, the rivers, the putting of Adam into the garden to dress it and to keep it, and the command relative to the forbidden fruit. Then follows a notice of his loneliness, his need of a social companion, his inspecting the animals, and naming them, but finding no suitable help; and then the creation of the woman to supply this deficiency. It is manifest the woman was not created until after the covenant was given. "Adam was first formed, then Eve." Surely Paul did not mean

by Adam, here, to include Eve! Therefore Eve was not created when Adam was, but after the command relative to the forbidden fruit was delivered; and consequently was not a party to the covenant.

2. But if, because the word *Adam* sometimes means man in general, it is right to infer that Eve, who was taken out of Adam, was really a party to the covenant, which Ridgley seems to account the chief reason for his opinion—the same is true of Cain and Seth, &c., and they were parties also. I see no reason in the peculiarity of manner in her extraction, why she should be accounted a party, more than Abel or Cain. In truth, as I hope to show, the physical or material connexion has nothing at all to do in the matter—forms no moral connexion whatever.

Besides, this argument from the generic sense of the word man, would include Christ, for he is called the second man. "The first man is of the earth—the second man is the Lord from heaven." Now if *man* in the former case is generic and includes Eve, by what rule of criticism can it be restricted in the latter? I therefore think that when the apostle says, "By one man sin entered into the world": he does not mean— 'by one man and one woman!'

But moreover if Eve was a party *like Adam*, there must have been three parties to the covenant, or then Adam and Eve must have been, before its formation, a moral unity; which, that they were for any other purposes than those included in the marriage covenant, I think there is no evidence.

4. The truth appears to be, that God gave this covenant to the *person*, Adam—as indeed how could human nature, a mere abstraction enter into a covenant? not however as an *individual person only*, but also as a representative of all other human persons. The *individual* Adam and the *representative person*, Adam, was to stand or fall for *himself* and for his *representative body*.

But in this body representative, Eve was included, yet only until she should have a personal existence and capacity to assume for herself, her covenant liabilities.

Then she was under the covenant *for herself only*. Had she sinned and Adam retained his integrity, she would have perished and Adam and his representative body would have remained uninjured. Had Adam failed and Eve maintained her integrity, Eve would have survived the wreck of the race. When she sinned, she alone fell, the covenant was not broken until Adam, the federal head, had transgressed; then only "earth felt the wound,"

> "And nature, sighing through all her works,
> Gave signs of woe, that all was lost."

SECTION VI.

The mode of constituting the Representative Relation.

Official stations may be occupied by men whose labours may be useful to the public and honorable to themselves, and yet in whose appointment there may have been some irregularity. Paul himself was not called to the apostleship in the same way as were the other apostles. If therefore the question be raised, about the mode of constituting the relations official and moral of any individual, we shall find that great diversity exist, whilst the reality of the thing is acknowledged. The social and moral system of even our country is susceptible of considerable variety. In our own State, for example, the Governor, who represents the whole commonwealth, is appointed by the bare plurality of qualified voters who may and shall choose to vote, though that plurality may be a minority of all the votes polled, and may not be one-twentieth part of the entire population. And yet no man who did not attend the election—no woman or minor or foreigner, or other disqualified person, thinks of challenging the Governor's authority, because he or she did not vote; or because he was not permitted so to do. In the state of New Jersey, the Governor is elected by the Legislature. The President of the United States is appointed in still a different manner. And thus it is in almost all depart-

ments of our political system. Different modes of creating the representative relation exist: different qualifications for office and for elector exist: but in all, women are excluded. The conditions also, of the term of office, both as to duration and extent of honour, are infinitely diversified. In some it is for a single year, or even less; in others for a term of years; in others for life.

Now, the point to which your special attention is invited, is this, viz: that no diversity as to the manner of constituting the relations of representer and represented, destroys or invalidates the acts of the representative. A notable instance of this has recently occupied the world's attention and received its sanction. The late French indemnity, the refusal to pay which, had well nigh lighted up the torch of a bloody war, was for acts of violence to American property, under the reign of Napoleon. In pressing our claims, it was alledged, that the imperial government, however irregularly constituted, was in fact the representative of the French *nation*, and therefore, that nation was bound to pay for all its spoliations on American property. The voice of reason and the force of truth, more resistless than the swords of Napoleon and Wellington both, prevailed. The French government and people, and the world confessed, that even great irregularity in constituting the representative, did not nullify his acts.

With these views before us, we may meet the question of mode, as to Adam's becoming the representative of the race. And we see, 1, at once, it was not by a popular election, wherein a bare plurality of votes decides the question. When this arrangement was entered into, there was no man upon earth but Adam; there could be no such election.

2, Yet no doubt, had God withholden this covenant until the race had been developed, so that the globe should have been covered with the sons and daughters of Adam, all living in perfect holiness and harmony and love: and had God then made proclamation to the race and proposed to grant them confirmation in eternal felicity upon the simple condition, that one of their number should stand such a trial as he would prescribe; and

had there been a general election and every son and daughter of Adam been called on for his vote, the venerable Father of the whole, would have been unanimously chosen. Without one dissenting voice, no doubt, the exclamation would have been. Who so fit for such a trial and to secure such glorious results as the Father of us all? But not thus did God proceed: he chose himself, the representative of the race; and what would have been wisdom in holy men, cannot be folly with God.

3, Hence we see, the unreasonableness of objecting to the doctrine of Adam's representative character, because we had no voice in his appointment. If I am not mistaken this is one of the most serious objection to the whole doctrine. We feel it to be hard, men say, that a man should act for us before we were born, and that for his acts we should be exposed to suffering and death, when it was impossible, and accordingly, we did not appoint him, and gave no expression of consent to his deed. To which objection we present three distinct replies; 1. Had you been present and been called on for your vote, you would undoubtedly have appointed Adam to act for you; your objecting now, is therefore unreasonable, and is a result of your sinfulness. 2. God knows better what is good for man than he does himself. He lacked neither wisdom nor goodness to direct his choice of a representative to stand or fall for the race. 3. Your not having an actual and personal choice in appointing Adam as your representative, is no valid objection to that doctrine, and that it is not, is evident from the general practices of the freest people on earth. Do not the laws of our country bind all our citizens, whether they have voted for the representatives or not? Are not all minors, and all women, cut off from the elective franchise? And do not they feel the binding obligations of our laws? If arraigned for any offence, can they plead in bar, that they never gave their consent to them—they had no voice in choosing the representatives who enacted them? Clearly, there exists no government, however democratic, wherein, every individual's personal assent is essential to the existence of the representative relation

and to the authority of the law. On the contrary, the most determined opposition to the law and the man who made it, does not free men from its obligation. Suppose the Pennsylvania internal improvement debt to remain unliquidated, for a hundred years to come; and the stock wholly, as now in the hands of foreigners; could the generation that will then be, object to its payment, on the grounds that their fathers were opposed to it, or that they themselves never voted for the men who contracted this debt? If you may not be justly bound by the act of Adam, because you did not appoint him to act for you, how can you be bound by the act of the men who contracted this debt? How can you be bound by the act of the men who signed a treaty a hundred years before you were born? Thus you see the principle which subverts the covenant of works, subverts also, the entire commercial and political foundations of human society.

But let us not be understood in these replies, to rest the cause on their efficiency. By no means. It rests on the broad foundation of God's truth. He chose Adam to represent his whole race, and Adam wisely acquiesced in the choice: nor did opposition to his election ever occur until sin produced it. Had Adam stood and all the race been at this moment basking in the sunshine of heaven's love, not a tongue had till this hour moved; not a voice had been lifted in opposition.

SECTION V.

The moral relation of Adam to his posterity, viz: as head of the covenant, is principal; and his physical relation, viz: as natural progenitor, is subservient thereto; and not vice versa.

If I am not much mistaken, a frequent mode of speech on this subjet, conveys the idea, that the moral relation of Adam's posterity to him is dependent on the physical connexion by natural generation. There was a seminal inhering of all men in Adam; as the future oak is wrapped up in the acorn; and this acorn, with its contained miniature tree, and all the other acorns produced

from the same oak, were seminally in the acorn from which that oak sprang; and thus, all trees were seminally in the first acorn. So with Adam. Hence we hear of all human beings, as merely "Adam developed," unrolled as it were. Now to this theory, in itself considered, it is not necessary here to raise objections. Its application in morals, is that to which I object. It is supposed that this seminal or germanic unity, accounts for the moral relations of the covenant of works and the doctrine of representation. All men were present in Adam, and hence can be held responsible for his acts. To this it may be answered, that it would require the theory to run a little farther, viz: that all souls of men were in Adam's body— a dream of the theorising fraternity which has had its day, and like the baseless fabric of other visions has passed off. So far, however, from explaining representation, this theory destroys the doctrine altogether. For if all souls were in Adam and acted in him, then there could be no federal representation; because each man being present, there was no room for another to act for him, he acted for himself. Hence it is obvious, that the theory of all souls and that of all bodies, and that of both souls and bodies, being present in Adam, are as inefficient towards accounting for the sin and misery of his race, as they are visionary, and without foundation in themselves.

In opposition to these, I maintain, that the moral connexion with Adam is the principal, both in the order of importance and of nature—that God first determined to create rational souls, who should be for a time connected with bodies material—should then be tried, and being left unrestrained by divine power, should fall—that they should be put under a remedial law, and a part of them be recovered to a state of holy and gracious acceptance with Him, and taken from the body to heaven, and subsequently the body should be raised, and the entire redeemed persons, be made the instruments of reflecting the glory of God's mercy forever—that this last, is the main design of the creation of our world, and peopling it with life, vegetable, animal and rational. Now, I believe that the soul and its relations are paramount—the

moral connexion of all men with Adam is the principal, and the mere physical and animal connexion is an incidental circumstance—no more than the incidental matter of scaffolding to the building. The building rests on its own foundation, and the scaffolding is necessary in its place. God's moral creation, and the great moral constitution, viz: the covenant of works is the building, whose entire body consists of all human persons. These human persons are the component parts of the structure, and the great builder sees proper to bring each to its position by the material mechanism according to whose laws the human race exists. Hence, I infer, that to make the *natural* connexion with Adam, the basis of the moral, is to found the building upon the scaffolding —to make the mere physical connexion the reason of the representative relation, is to interchange the cause and effect. A few distinct remarks seem necessary to illustrate my meaning.

1. The soul or spirit is of more importance than the body. The redemption of the soul is precious, and its value is seen in the ransom that is paid for it. Ye are not redeemed with corruptible things, such as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ.—The infinite price bespeaks the estimate of the soul, in the mind of him who paid it. What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? It is entirely superfluous to occupy time in proof of this remark. Its truth is readily conceded by all who feel that they have souls to be saved or lost. How far a correct belief prevails in practice is another thing; but in the theory, all except atheists and materialists agree. The spirit is valuable above the flesh.

2. The soul will exist, in a state of blessedness or of misery, apart from the body. "This day thou shalt be with me in paradise." It is therefore not dependent on the body either for its existence or for the consciousness of that existence. Its moral relations therefore do dot depend absolutely and necessarily upon its material connexions. Those exist after these have ceased. The soul apart from the body stands in the same relation to Adam and to Christ, as when connected with it. Why

then should it be supposed that the moral connexion with Adam is dependent upon and results from the natural? Why not rather believe that the natural relation results from and is dependent upon the moral?—That the body is produced, and lives and dies and will revive again merely to subserve the interests of the soul?

3. The principle of these remarks is applicable to the whole material fabric of the world.

All things are yours—the whole structure is adapted to the developement of the intellectual and moral powers of man, and for this end are they put under his government. He is Lord of all below, that by a right use of them he may expand the powers of his immortal part, and fit it for its permanent state of residence. True, the material universe contains much beauty and order; many manifestations of the divine power and wisdom, and may be said to have had this in view. But the powers of mind and heart which can discover these beauties, and kindle to devotion, belong to the soul only, and make their approaches to perfection by the legitimate use of all things placed within our view. "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handy work," but to whom? to mere animal nature! It is manifest that the soul only is capable of perceiving their beauties: and if so, they were surely created for its advantage.

Thus, from the analogies of the case, we conclude, that all material things, animate and inanimate, are subservient, and ought to be subservient to the interests of the soul. In very deed, the grand purpose for which this world exists, is to display the glory of God's mercy. The Bible represents God as having purposed, before creation, such a display. Speaking of God's believing people, the great Apostle informs us that God the Father gave them a high character among the heavenly inhabitants, and *that*, before the creation of the world.—"Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly *places*, [among the heavenly inhabitants.] According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world." This eternal purpose or

decree, in the order of nature, is anterior to its execution; and between the purpose and its fulfilment, in the actual sanctification of his people, lie the creation and adjustment of the whole material system, including the bodies of all men. All this must be a means towards the accomplishment of the grand end. Other worlds display the wisdom, power and goodness of God, and these less or more shine forth from the ball we inhabit. But *mercy*—boundless benevolence toward sinful creatures—this attribute was unknown, for aught we know, in all creation. To reveal this, this world was spoken into existence—man was created—the covenant was made with him—he was permitted to fall—the gospel was preached to him—and the entire system of divine truth and ordinances was established. No man, I apprehend, has or can have just and adequate conceptions of the condescension and benevolence of God, and of the scheme of his providence and grace, who does not transport himself in imagination away back beyond the period of the world's creation, and there contemplate the councils of infinite wisdom planning the whole. In such exercises was the enraptured prophet engaged when he exclaimed "O Lord, thou art my God; I will exalt thee, I will praise thy name: for thou hast done wonderful things; thy councils of old are faithfulness and truth." Isa. xxv. 1. And when he introduces God as exhibiting the same views. "I am God and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my council shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." Isa. xlvi. 9, 10. And again, "I am the first, and I am the last, and besides me there is no God; and who, as I, shall call, and shall declare it, and set it in order for me, since I appointed the ancient people? And the things that are coming and shall come, let them shew unto me." Isa. xlv. 6, 7. Thus transported beyond the period when time began and motion first measured it, you behold the councils of infinite wisdom, devising the glorious scheme for the display of mercy, and selecting its objects, "according as He hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world,"—you

hear Jesus, in that blessed council, offering himself, "Lo I come—to do thy will O God, I take delight;" you see his appointment by the Father; you hear the eternal word pronounced, and see the world of matter spring into being, as the instrument and means of displaying mercy; as the theatre on which is to be acted the splendid drama, whose middle scene you witness on Calvary, and whose closing act you will witness, when in the light of this flaming globe, you shall behold the judgment set, and the books opened. You see the mortal, and yet immortal race of man, "midway from nothing to the Deity," "a worm, a God,"—waking into life under the breathing of the spirit, pressing onward in a long succcssion of ages towards his destined abode. You see his living spirit—a being entirely distinct, like Adam, from the fleshy tabernacles, connected for a time with its earthly house and then pass onward toward the divine throne. For the accomplishment of this glorious display—for gathering in the hosts of God's people over all the world, you see nations rise and fall; continents and islands discovered and peopled and Christianized; peace and war; agriculture and commerce; literature and science; arts and manufactures; the entire frame of human society and all its complicated machinery running their perpetual round. All—all these are to terminate; they are all to work in the hands of God our Redeemer, to the one grand and glorious end—*the display of divine mercy*, to the admiration of the intelligent universe.

Now with such views, is it possible for a man to cherish the belief, that any real or supposed natural, physical, material identity or oneness with Adam, can account for our being affected for good or ill, by his first act? Is it credible, even supposing the ineffable absurdity, that there is a certain germ or particle of matter in my body that was in Adam's body when he sinned—suppose this absurdity to be true, is it credible that this is the reason why I am morally accountable for his acts!

Take the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, and let Adam be so divided as to give a particle of his

material essence to every one of his descendants to the end of time, can any man found his belief of the moral relations upon the physical connexion? Is it the physical unity between a man and his children, that makes him in a certain respect, their representative? Can there be pointed out a single case, in all the moral arrangements of human society, in which such unity is the basis of representation? Who believes that his representative in Congress, in the state Legislature, in all the departments of government, in church and state, is such because of a material unity!

But I forbear. The absurdity sickness our imagination, and reason flouts it. And yet notwithstanding, grave theologians have spoken of the physical or material connexion with Adam, as constituting the basis of our moral relations; and attempts are made to fasten this absurdity upon no less a man than President Edwards.—This attempt you may see refuted in "The Vindication" which I published some time since, on pages 80 and 81, where the references to Edwards, will direct you to the parts of his work which bear on the subject. You will see that the identity which he maintained, to use his very words, is "in relation to the covenant"—"there being a *constituted oneness or identy*,"—"that God, in his institution with Adam, dealt with him as a *public* person—as the head of his species"—"as the moral *head* of his posterity." These *italics* are Edward's own, and unquestionably they, and the phrase "moral head," were designed to point out a covenant, a federal, or a moral headship, in contradistinction from the natural headship or physical connexion as the parent of their mere animal nature.

In conclusion, to sum up and apply; we see, that the general doctine of representation is indescribably simple; that it involves, or rather is founded on the doctrine of a moral unity between distinct persons; that this is a simple and original element in morals; that it is contained in the essential law of human nature, and in the Bible; that human society of no description could exist without it; that, especially, does it pervade all departments of our free institutions, and is essential to their freedom;

that Adam was in fact, the moral head of his posterity, representing them, and acting for them; that this moral headship was created by a divinely instituted covenant, in concurrence with human volition; that this federal representative relationship of Adam to all human persons is the principal, and his physical or natural headship is subservient thereto; that indeed our whole material world, including the bodies of all men, exists in subserviency to our moral world, which was brought into being for the grand and glorious purpose of holding up the illustrious attribute of Divine MERCY, to the wondering gaze of the intelligent universe.

We close the chapter, with two reflections.

1. The great principles of religion, morals, and politics, are not diverse but identical. In God's covenant with Adam, commonly called "the covenant of works," are contained and taught, the great substance of all politics, morals and religion, so far as natural religion—or the religion of man's primitive state is concerned.—And we shall see hereafter, if God will, that the covenant of grace introduces no new moral principle, but merely applies those of the other covenant in a new case.

2. Mark the condescension, and wisdom, and goodness, and love of God, in making the principles on which our eternal salvation must be secured, essentially necessary to our social existence, our civil and political well-being. How ought we to wonder at such condescension? To admire such wisdom? To melt in view of such goodness? To kindle in rapturous devotion and unfeigned thanksgiving, at such *love*.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DEFINITION OF LEADING TERMS—JUST, RIGHTEOUS, RIGHTEOUSNESS, JUSTIFY, AND JUSTIFICATONN.

Due weight has perhaps never been given to the common remark, that much controversy would be saved by an accurate definition of terms. Words, with all the pains that have ever yet been taken to settle their meaning, are still very imperfect representatives of thoughts. It becomes therefore necessary to advert to the leading terms in this discussion, that their import being accurately determined, we may be protected from the vexations attendant upon vacillation.

But here it is necessary to premise, that, although I have placed the English words at the head of this chapter, yet it is really the meaning of the original terms of the sacred writings, after which we must inquire. Our ultimate appeal is to the language used by the Holy Ghost; and the true and correct sense of that must be attached to the words of our English translation, however unsuitable these may be to express that sense. The translation is admirable, but in hundreds of instances, it is not possible to express the exact meaning of a word by any one word in another language. Such are the changes incident to human affairs, that language too must change. The merely English scholar will percieve the difficulty of translating the words, *cotton-gin*, *steam-engine*, *republican*, into the language of a people who have no such things, and consequently no words to express them. So in morals, the shades of meaning often cannot be expressed.

This remark is true in reference to the word *justification* and its affiliated terms. *Justify*, though not strictly and purely a latin word, yet has a latin origin, and means *to make just*. So sanctification is *the mak-*

ing holy. Hence, viz: from the similarity of the terms and their composition, the Romanists, ignorant of Hebrew and Greek literature, and building up a system of self-righteousness, maintain, that justification includes the same things in a good degree with sanctification, that is, it comprehends the making of the person upright; so that personal rectitude, inherent, infused grace belongs to it and is the ground of it. And this notion, if I am not mistaken, has not a few advocates at the present day in some Protestant Churches of our country. It is therefore the more important for us and imperative upon us, to derive our ideas from the inspired sources of the Bible, and to attach to the half latin, half English word *justification*, exactly that meaning which the Spirit of God attaches to the words for which it stands. Our inquiry is therefore continually after the meaning of those words in the original scriptures, for which the terms *justification*, *righteousness*, &c., stand in our English Bibles.

As to the manner of prosecuting the inquiry, it may be observed, that no satisfaction is attainable in such a case, without a patient examination of many places where the words in question occur. Use alone is the law of language. Words—mere sounds or marks have no fixed meaning in themselves; they are *conventional* signs of thought, and we must inspect their actual use to ascertain what sense men have agreed to attach to them. By this means criticism even in a language which men do not understand, may be made intelligible to them, in a considerable degree. How this is, will be best explained in practice. Let us therefore proceed to the detail, and the mode I propose, is to quote several passages and to number them 1, 2, 3, &c.. for convenience of reference: then state the true meaning of the terms, referring by number, to the passage for proof.

1. Gen xliv. 16. "And Judah said, What shall we say unto my Lord? What shall we speak? or how shall we *clear (justify)* ourselves?

2. Exod. xxiii. 7. "Keep thee far from a false matter: and the innocent and righteous, slay thou not: for I will not *justify* the wicked."

3. Deut. xxv. 1. "If there be a controversy between men, and they come into judgment, that the judges may judge them, then they shall *justify* the righteous and condemn the wicked."

4. 2 Sam. xv. 4. "Absalom said moreover, O that I were made Judge in the land, that every man which hath any suit or cause might come unto me, and *I would do* him *justice*"—*justify* him.

5. 1 Kin. viii. 31, 32. "If any man trespass against his neighbour, and an oath be laid upon him to cause him to swear and the oath come before thine altar in this house: then hear thou in heaven, and do and judge thy servants, condemning the wicked, to bring his way upon his head; and *justifying* the righteous, to give him according to his righteousness."

6. 2 Chron. xix. 5, 6. "And he set judges in the land, throughout all the fenced cities of Judah, city by city; and said to the judges, take heed what ye do: for ye *judge* not for man, but for the Lord, who is with you in the judgment."

7. Psal. cxliii. 2. "And enter not into judgment with thy servant: for in thy sight shall no man living be *justified*."

8. Prov xvii. 15. "He that *justifieth* the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord."

Prov. xxiv. 23, 24. "It is not good to have respect to persons in judgment. He that saith unto the wicked, thou art righteous; him shall the people curse, nations shall abhor him."

9. Isa. v. 22, 23. "Woe unto them that are mighty to drink wine, and men of strength to drink strong drink. Which *justify* the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousuess of the righteous from him."

10. Isa. xliii. 26. "Put me in remembrance: let us plead together: declare thou that thou mayest be *justified*."

11. Isa. xlv. 23, 24, 25. "I have sworn by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, that unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear. Surely shall one say, in the

Lord have I righteousness and strength; even to him shall men come; and all that are incensed against him shall be ashamed. In the Lord shall all the seed of Israel be *justified* and shall glory."

Rom. xiv. 10, 11. "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, as I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God."

12. Isa. liii. 11. "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant *justify* many; for he shall bear their iniquities."

13. Math. xi. 19. "Wisdom is *justified* of her children."

14. Math. xii. 37. "For by thy words thou shalt be *justified*, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned."

15. Luke, vii. 59. "And all the people that heard him, and the Publicans, *justified* God, being baptised with the baptism of John."

16. Luke x. 29. "But he, willing to *jutify* himself, said unto Jesus, and who is my neighbour."

17. Luke xvi. 15. "Ye are they which *justify* yourselves before men, but God knoweth your hearts."

18. Luke, xviii. 14. "This man went down to his house *justified* rather than the other."

19. Acts, xiii. 39. "And by him all that believe are *justified* from all things, from which they could not be *justified* by the law of Moses."

20. Rom. ii. 13. "For not the hearers of the law are just before God; but the doers of the law shall be *justified*."

21. Rom. iii. 4. "That thou mightest be *justified* in thy sayings."

22. 1. Cor. iv, 4. "For I know nothing by myself; yet I am not hereby *justified;* but he that judgeth me is the Lord."

I cite all the remaining cases in which the word is used in the New Testament. Rom. iii. 24, 26, 28, 30. iv. 2, 5. v. 1, 9. vi. 7. viii, 30. 1. Cor. vi. 11. Gal. ii. 16, 17. iii. 8, 11, 24. v. 4. 1. Tim. iii. 16. Tit. iii. 7. Jas. ii. 21, 24, 25. Rev. xxii. 11.

With these passages before us, we affirm,

1. That the original words of scripture, for which the word *justify* is used in the Bible, are forensic terms; that is, they are used in connexion with the proceedings of courts—they imply a process, more or less formal, of investigation and of judgment. Their proper application is to judicial matters.

2. That they, the Hebrew word particularly (from which the Greek borrows its meaning, so far as the New Testament is concerned) signify, to pass a sentence of judgment in favor of a person—to declare him just—that he has the righteousness of the law—his conduct has been as the law requires it to be.

Both these will appear true by a reference to the above quoted texts.

1. Judah and his brethren were arraigned before the governor of Egypt, on a charge of stealing the silver cup. It is a judicial business; and he asks how shall we clear ourselves? How shall we *justify* ourselves? How shall we procure a sentence in our favour?

2. This case is a rule prescribed to the judges in Israel, and God supports it by warning the judges that He will not justify—pass a sentence in favor of the wicked.

3. Here are mentioned "a controversy between men," "they come to judgment," before "judges," who are appointed for this express business; and who are bound to pass a sentence according to right; that is, in favour of the man who has done right, and against the man who has done wrong. The former is to *justify*, the latter is to *condemn*.

Let us take in connexion with this the 5th case, where Solomon speaks of condemning the wicked, and justifying the righteous and also the 8th, where Solomon again contrasts the two kinds of sentences, viz: *for* and *against*, and calls the former a justifying and the latter a condemning, and the 9th, Isaiah speaks of justifying the wicked as an enormity on which a man is denounced, and by constrast, of taking away the righteousness of the righteous, or not giving him his just reward; and 14th, where our Lord in like manner, uses the terms

justify and condemn, as expressing the opposite judgments.

Here we have five instances of this contrast. Now it is undenied and undeniable, that the plain meaning of condemnation, is the passing of a sentence against a person, by which the punishment prescribed by law is awarded to him, and ordered to be inflicted upon him; therefore justification is the passing of a sentence in favour of a person, by which the reward prescribed by law is ordered to be given to him. Nothing can be more conclusive than the evidence of these two positions. If then the term to justify is judicial, and means simply to pass sentence in favour, it follows, that to infuse grace, to make the person just or holy, to change his moral character is no part of justification. It is simply and solely a declarative act, and only affects the legal relations of the person. Before the judge pronounces the sentence against a man, he is wicked and deserves to be punished, just as much as after: yet there is no person entitled to inflict the punishment, until the judge hands him over. But in condemning him, the judge does not infuse wicked principles into him, he does not make him deserving of punishment; but simply declares the fact. So, before the judge pronounces in favour of a man, he is, as the law requires him to be, upright; the judge simply declares the fact, he does not at all alter the moral qualities of the man. *Justification* therefore is entirely distinct from *Sanctification*, which describes the whole work of the Spirit of God in changing a sinner into the holy image of God. The one refers simply and only to the legal relations; the other to the moral qualities; the former is the work of the judge, the latter is the work of the Creator; that gives me legal security forever; this qualifies my heart for its enjoyment.

Another inference from this settlement of the term justification, is, that the idea of pardon is not included in it. Pardon, as we shall see more fully hereafter, is the passing by of a condemned person, so as not to inflict just punishment on him; it releases him from the bonds by which he was bound to suffer. It changes his relation to the penal sanction of law; it does not at all suppose

the person's fulfilment of its preceptive claim. "But this we may lay aside," says Dr. Owen, (Justification p. 118) "for surely no man was ever yet so fond as to pretend that δικαιοω did signify to pardon sin; yet is it the only word applied to express our justification in the New Testament."

Having determined the sense of the principal terms, it remains to examine the other two; viz: *Righteousness* and *Just*.

Righteousness is simply straightness: and figuratively expresses the correct notion of the thing. It suggests the idea of the law being a right, a straight line, and the accommodation of a person's conduct to the law, is *righteousness*. But the original expression in the Old Testament, which, be it remembered, must ever determine the meaning of the phraseology in the New, is very nearly allied to the word, to *justify*. It is indeed the same, or rather, there are two words, or two forms of the same word, translated *righteousness*. And I venture the criticism with diffidence, not having full time for a sufficiently extended examination; that one of them (tsedek) signifies all that which the law requires of positive compliance with its precepts, in order to secure a sentence of justification; the other *(tsedaukah)* all that which the subject of the law has done, how far soever it may fall short of the full requisition. My diffidence refers to the latter; as to the former I feel confident. Tsedek, *righteousness*, is all that to which the promise of the covenant is made; the entire required sum of positive obedience to the precept. So in Jeremiah xxiii. 5, speaking of the Messiah, the prophet says "This is the name whereby he shall be called THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS." The Lord our Redeemer is to us the fulfilling of the whole law; he is made of God unto us wisdom and *righteousness* and sanctification and redemption. Therefore he replied to the Baptist's objections against baptising him; "thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness." The Mosaic law, in reference to the high priest, required him to be washed previously to his entering upon the duties of his office. Exod. lx. 12. "And thou shalt bring Aaron and his sons unto the door

of the tabernacle of the congregation, and wash them with water." Hence as Christ came to fulfil all law, as he is the end of law for righteousness, he must be washed. Hence some, ignorant by the blinding zeal of party, suppose that Christ submitted to Christian baptism, which was not yet instituted and that he was submerged. Were Aaron and his sons submerged in the wash bowl? But we may not digress. The Saviour's reply shows, that to do what the law requires, is righteousness.

Deut. vi. 25. "And it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to do all these commandments before the Lord our God, as he hath commanded us." Action according to the requirement of law—doing the commandments, is our righteousness.

Psalm cvi. 3. "Blessed are they that keep judgment, and he that doeth righteousness at all times." Active compliance with the rules of right, is always accounted the sum and substance of righteousness.

Prov. xiv. 34. "Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." Here, as in multitudes of cases, righteousness and sin are brought into contrast; and therefore the one, becomes expository of the other. Now "sin is the transgression of the law" —the action of the moral being in opposition to the law. For even in those which are denominated sins of omission, there is mental action. Because when the law's requisition is pressed upon the mind's attention, by the incidents of Providence, and the man does not act according to it, this not acting of the hand is a result of a decision of the mind not to direct the hand to act, in which decision the mind itself is active. So that sins of omission, are so called, only in reference to the overt or external bodily action; not in reference to the mind. If therefore sin consists in action contrary to law; and if it be the opposite of righteousness, righteousness must be action according to law.

It does appear to me superfluous to dwell upon this branch of the subject. All men, one would think, must admit the correctness of our definition. Let us then account this question as settled: its practical value will appear hereafter.

The term *just*, must be accounted in our discussions, equivalent to *righteous*, for the very cogent reason, that they are used interchangably as a translation for one and the same word. For example, Noah is called *a just man*, Gen. vi. 9; and in vii. 1, God says to him, "for thee have I seen righteous before me," whereas in the original, the same word occurs in both places; and many more such cases might be selected. The equivalency of the terms is therefore indisputable.

Nor can the general meaning detain us. The original expression is the same on which we have dwelt so long. It is here, what grammarians would call a participial adjective: that which expresses the quality of the verb, as existing in the person who performs the action which the verb describes. He is a just or righteous man who has done only the things required of him by the law under which he exists. "He that doeth righteousness is righteous."

To sum up the whole matter—there is a law given, which prescribes to man what he ought to do: it requires the active use of all the talents entrusted to him. But the prescription of duty, the investment with a talent, implies a day of reckoning for its use: and a judge to agitate and decide the question whether it has been used aright, whether the actions required by law have all been performed. This judge is to pronounce upon the case and declare the facts as they really are. If he find the person to have acted in all respects as the law prescribes, he simply declares the fact. This declaration of the fact is *justification*. The ground of it is the upright conduct of the man, to which upright conduct the reward is promised. This is the man's *righteousness*. His being in possession of this, in other words his having acted rightly, makes him a *just* or *righteous* man: and the judge's declaration makes him a *justified* man, and as a matter of mere justice and right may and must claim the rewards of obedience.

In conclusion let us remark,

1. The identity of the very terms, and also of the things signified by them, in this great question of human destinies for the world beyond the grave and for the life

that now is. All human jurisprudence, and the application of its principles in the judicial affairs of men on earth, rests on the broad basis of God's eternal truth. How dignified then the study of the law? What a noble science it is, when not prostituted to the love of money? It has its moral rules of right: its rational agents; its accountability; its judges and advocates; its justification or condemnation. It borrows its principles from religion and its sanctions from God; whilst it lends its terms to theology and leads its subjects from reflections upon an earthly and fallible, to a heavenly and infallible tribunal. For

2dly. The whole of our ideas about justification must have reference to a process of judgment. From this the language is borrowed, and is well adapted to carry our thoughts forward, toward that grand assize—that awfully solemn and magnificent scene, when the universe shall stand before the great white throne of our Redeemer and give in their last account. Oh what a vast assemblage! What a stupendous scene!! How all the pageant of earthly tribunals sinks into insignificance before its dazzling splendours! How all bosoms become transparent in that light, and all the secrets of all hearts lie open to public view. You my dear friends will be there, and I. How important then, that we have the righteousness of the law! "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart. He that doeth these things shall never be moved." He who can in truth say, in the Lord have I righteousness.

CHAPTER V.

ADAM'S JUSTIFICATION.

The Requisites to Adam's Justification by the Covenant of Works.

We have examined into the nature of moral government, in general. We have enquired into the peculiarities of that institution which was given to man immediately after his creation, as it involved the great essential principles of moral rule. We have discussed the extent of the covenant, and the representative character of Adam. We have settled the meaning of the term Justification, and those allied to it. Out of these views naturally arises the enquiry, What must Adam do, in order to his justification by the terms of the Covenant under which he was placed ? What is indispensible before God the Judge, can pronounce him a just man?

The obvious and only correct answer to this is, Righteousness—action according to law. He must *do* the things required of him, before it is possible that God should declare him just. The law must be fulfilled before it can confer the reward proffered to its fulfilment. The work must be performed or it would not be right to give the wages.

The truth here will be clearly perceived by adverting to three particulars, viz : Innocence, the positive requirement of the covenant, and the necessity of a limit to probation.

SECTION I.

Innocence.

Innocence, we have already seen, is as it were, a negative virtue. It implies freedom from positive evil : a

harmlessness, rather than any positive action. This simply entitles to a negative reward—the absence of penal evil. The innocent ought not to suffer. So long as Adam shall remain free from sin, he shall experience none of its evils. And this is the utmost he can expect. Unless we have been entirely mistaken in our exposition of the general nature of moral government, exemption from sin is accompanied by exemption from punishment. The essence of moral government consists in linking indissolubly together sin and suffering: freedom from sin and freedom from pain: positive compliance with law and positive enjoyment of happiness. To multiply words here were to darken counsel.

SECTION II.

On the positive requirements of the Covenant.

In treating of the covenant given to Adam we saw, that under the prohibitory clause, regarding the fruit forbidden, there was contained a positive requirement of action in the case. The mind of Adam in view of the fruit must decide either to eat or not to eat: and it is not conceivable that this decision involves no activity of the mind. A choice cannot be made without mental action. Had Adam determined not to eat, that determination would have been as really an *action*, as what occurred when he determined to eat.

We also saw that under the commination, "Thou shalt surely die," was presented the opposite alternative as a consequence of the opposite course of conduct. "Thou shalt surely live" was as really held up before his mind as a motive to obedience, as the threatened death was as a dissuasive from disobedience. As with the people of Israel when God set before them life and death, cursing and blessing, so life was promised to Adam as the reward of obedience, and death was threatened as the consequence of disobedience. To obtain life, he must not only avoid sin, he must also perform duty. If then Adam will have life, he must keep the commandment given to him. If he do this, the promised blessing

must be conferred. Faithfulness on God's part secures this. Here then is the simple requisite to Adam's justification—he must do what God enjoined upon him—he must obey God—he must keep the commandment—he must fulfil the covenant engagement. Should he do this, all that is right, and holy, and just, and true, in the character of God, is pledged to secure him in the enjoyment of the promised life: and the declaration of his having so fulfilled the law given him, is his *justification.* Hence it is evident, that the only requisite to Adam's justification under the original covenant, was *obedience, righteousness, conformity with that law.*

SECTION III.

The limit to probation.

There is a third element here, viz: the limit to probation.—Probation is trying, proving, testing a thing to ascertain whether or not, it be what it professes to be. A state of probation or a probationary state is a state of trial. Adam under the covenant of works was in a state of probation. The whole period between the time of a moral creature's being ushered into existence, and the time when he passes under the judgment of the law, and is condemned or justified, is *probationary;* and to this period the word *probation* has been generally restricted. Recent writers and preachers have indeed, with characteristic laxity of thought and expression, applied it to the present state, under the gospel: and if due care were taken to limit and define its meaning to the testing, proving, trying, of men whether they will hearken to the invitations of mercy, or reject them, little or no injury would result. But it is much to be feared, that the very use of the word in application to our present state, gives encouragement and strength to that pride of heart, which, amidst all its defects and corruption, still looks to the old broken covenant, and vainly hopes, by enduring a probation of works, to establish its own righteousness.

Now the point to which our attention must be given,

is the high probability that in the nature of moral government, there must necessarily be a limit to probation —a point of time at which trial ceases and the rewards of virtue or of vice are conferred. For our purposes, it is not indispensable to maintain the essential necessity of such limit, in order to the full idea of moral government. All that our cause requires is, that such limit must be, in every case, where the universal principles of morals are modified by a special covenant. Where specific terms are prescribed and a reward promised upon the fulfilment, there must be a limit as to time; otherwise the reward never could be claimed. If the probation is eternal, it never can be completed; and if the reward is conditioned on the completion of the service, the proffer of it is mockery. If, therefore we have been correct in our exposition of those scriptures which teach the doctrine of the covenant of works, there must have been a limit or period of time up to which, if Adam had maintained his integrity, he would have been confirmed and established and secured forever in the enjoyment of life. After the precise period, it is in vain to enquire. The scriptures are silent, because it is not necessary for us to know it; seeing that Adam violated his covenant engagement, and put an end to the state of trial. Probation ceases, as soon as the person fails who is under trial—the trial is then over; it only remains to let the law do its duty, in condemning and executing the offender.

SECTION IV.

Righteousness the grand Requisite.

Hence the general conclusion, that compliance with the terms of the covenant—in other words, obedience to the command of God for the time allotted him—in other words, *righteousness*, was the only requisite to Adam's justification according to the covenant: "for if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. But the scripture hath concluded all under sin." Gal. iii. 21,

22. Had Adam possessed the righteousness of the law, he would have been justified, and life been awarded to him. But inasmuch as he acted contrary to the law, he and all his are under condemnation ; being delivered over by the law, to its just punishment, according to the express terms of the covenant.

Let us treasure up for future use, then, the important truth, that to secure, for himself and his posterity, a sentence of justification by the covenant, it was necessary for Adam only to *obey:* the righteousness that must justify him, includes not in it, but manifestly excludes the idea of suffering. Adam's active obedience to law, for the proper period, would have entailed eternal life upon the entire race.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE BREACH OF THE COVENANT AND THE CONSEQUENT ADDITIONAL REQUISITE TO ADAM'S JUSTIFICATION.

SECTION I.

God's condescension calculated to secure man's affection.

Never can we sufficiently admire and adore that condescension, in the Most High, by which he bowed the heavens and came down to familiar equality with man, and made with him a covenant, so admirably calculated to secure his everlasting well-being. No hard terms were prescribed: no complicated and difficult duty, no additional burdens were imposed. A single instance of restriction from an indulgence of sense, is the whole matter. All creation lies before him. Every luxury of new-born nature courts his enjoyment. The virgin blushes of a finished creation attract his eye; and the ambrosial fruits of an enchanting paradise regale his taste. His unclouded intellectual powers too, fit him for scanning the beauties of surrounding nature, and the still more enchanting glories of the starry firmament. His moral powers, undefaced by lust, fit him for holy intercourse with angelic hosts and with the Lord of all below and all above. Thus made for happiness, and replenished with all the means of its present possession and enjoyment—his mind and its desires unrestrained in their range, except in the single matter of the fruit forbidden; and even this restraint the easy condition of everlasting security in bliss; it were marvellous indeed, if man's conformity with God's requirement did not give the rivet of eternity to human happiness and transform Eden's bloom into the unfading glories of the heavenly paradise.

Marvellous and unlikely, however, as it must prospectively appear, all this has happened. Man transgressed and by transgression robbed Eden of its beauty, dimmed the lustre of the starry firmament, and shut out the light of heavenly joys from his own benighted soul.

SECTION II.

The mysterious fact, man's fall, occasioned through false views in the mind.

The fall of man is among the dark rolls of historical record.—The evidence of it quivers in every nerve, and thunders in bursting sighs from every heart of the race. How it was or could be, philosophy cannot tell, and the Bible is silent. I mean the manner in which the pure spirit of Adam could be induced to believe the devil rather than God—how our first parents could be made to put good for evil, and evil for good, we know not. Only this is certain, that the mind cannot choose evil *as evil*, for its own sake. The law of universal life is, that every living being desires happiness. This law is irreversible even in hell. Devils damned and forever lost, can, no more than men on earth, desire pain and anguish for their own sakes. Before evil can be chosen, it must *appear* to be good. A man may choose that which causes pain, as a means of greater, and more permanent happiness, as when he takes a sickening potion of medicine; but the act of choice is produced by a balancing in the mind, between present temporary pain and future permanent pleasure. In this process, whenever the mind perceives the happiness of restored and permanent health, and apprehends its reality attainable by means of a temporary sickness and its attendant miseries, the attracting influence of the former overpowers the repulsion of the latter, and choice preponderates in favor of receiving the nauceous medicine. The enterprising mariner *chooses* to brave the perils and to endure the pains of a tempestuous voyage, not for their own sake, but because of the wealth and means of happiness that lie beyond the boisterous ocean. Evil must assume in the

mind's apprehension the appearance of good, before it can be deliberately chosen. And this theory corresponds with the historical fact; our first mother "being deceived was in the transgression." 1. Tim. i. 14. "And when the woman saw the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eye, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat." Gen. iii. 6. Apprehended good, and that only, can lead the mind to a deliberate choice: and where the thing chosen is really evil, there must previously exist some deception—some false view of it in the mind as the moving cause of the choice. In point, then of veritable fact, sin entered into the world by and through the door of a deluded understanding, a fact this to be carefully treasured up, for it will be found of no small value in our future discussion on the second covenant.

SECTION III.

A loss of confidence in God led to the fall.

Another aspect of this transaction it may be well briefly to notice, *viz*: the withdrawal of confidence from God, and the exercising of it upon Satan. God had declared that death would follow eating the fruit, Satan affirmed the contrary—"ye shall not surely die."—Here are counter assertions, and the faith of our first parents failed in reference to God's testimony, and passed over to the credence of the deceiver and tempter. Hence, it is manifest, that *unbelief* is implied in the very nature of sin. The law says, ruin will follow transgression; the the subject of law says, no—I cannot believe it—I shall be wiser and happier after transgression. If a man really believes that a certain action will ruin his reputation disgrace his family, and render him permanently wretched, can he will its performance? Or is it the hope of escaping detection and punishment, that emboldens crime? Unbelief, therefore, in the truths of the testimony borne by the law, is involved in every sin.

SECTION IV.

The effects of sin upon the legal relations and liabilities of Adam.

And here the mere statement must suffice, because an enlargement would anticipate an allotment of another chapter. It is only necessary to say, that the moment sin is committed the perpetrator is condemed by the law. In human administrations of law, indeed, time and formal processes are necessary, before a sentence of condemnation can be regularly pronounced; but the individual mind forms its decision as soon as it becomes acquainted with the fact that the law has been transgresed. And with God, forms of process and examinations of witnesses have no place. His sentence falls as soon as sin is committed, and, as we shall see hereafter, Adam sunk under the power of death the moment he sinned. The penalty of the law then seized him, "thou shalt surely die."

This point, is so obvious, it is so perfectly accordant with the common sense of all men; and so plainly assumed in all the Bible says on the subject, that I am not aware of its having been seriously controverted. Certainly it needs but be stated, to be believed. All the world believes, that the covenant breaker must abide the penal sanction of his covenant. Adam by sin incurred the punishment of death.

But here a question meets us, of considerable practical importance because of its bearings upon the grand doctrine of justification, *viz*: does the great moral principle, involved in the covenant continue to bind Adam after his transgression? Is he under obligations of universal obedience to the will of God made known to him? Has the law a claim upon him still, notwithstanding his rebellion? Can both its penal and preceptive claims bear upon the same person? And at the same time? Can a man be bound both to *do* and to *suffer* the will of God?—*See Owen on Jus.* 240.

It is more than likely your minds are already made

up. Your answer is at hand, and that an affirmative. Well, but whilst decision is a virtue, rashness is a vice. Look well; think closely; mark consequences before you commit yourself. Among these, if you affirm, are the difficulties, because of the penalty, which lie in the way of fullfiling the precept. If a man steal, and be incarcerated for his offence, how *can* he actively labor to make reparation, by fulfilling the laws of honesty. If he murder and be executed, how *can* he fulfil the law of love? If he sin against God and be cast into the prison of despair and die under the curse, how *can* he glorify the law by a holy obedience? Would it not be unjust to demand of the imprisoned thief, or murderer, or rebel against God, a hand and a heart actively employed in the holy duties of love? How *can* they perform them? If both the precept and penalty may hold a man, is he not bound to impossibilities? And *can* a man be bound by impossibilities?

On the other hand, if you deny that the penal claims of law upon Adam are additional to the pre-existing preceptive claims. In other words, if you maintain that when the penalty seizes him, the precept lets him go—that he cannot be held by both at the same time; then among the troublesome consequences are—

1. Release from moral obligation by its infraction. Sin itself releases the sinner from the obligation to obey. Consequently,

2. The moment transgression cancels the obligation to obey, there can be no farther transgression, because there is no law requiring active obedience, and where there is no law there is no transgression. Sin, after the first sin, there can be none.

3. Therefore no moral being can commit any but one sin. Consequently,

4. There can be no gradation in criminality, except as to the magnitude of the first offence; for there can be no multiplication of offences.

5. Consequently, the devil is no more vile and guilty now, than at the first moment of his fall; and his interminable advancement in wretchedness is impossible; for it would be obviously unrighteous to increase the misery

of a criminal whose criminality was not increased.—Consequently,

6. Satan and all his friends are in a state of sinless perfection—for generations of generations they have existed without violating the law of God; for there is no law over them, requiring their active obedience. For,

7. The penalty is mere suffering, inflicted by the law as its expression of hatred against sin, and the suffering soul cannot be willing to suffer, for the obvious reason that it is contrary to the law of its nature; and, moreover it is a contradiction in terms. Because the very idea of enduring pain implies revulsion of nature; opposition of will. Should Satan yield up his will to the will of God and acquiesce in the torments of hell, is it not manifest that hell that moment changes its character and becomes a place of happiness.

8. But again, as to civil society, for you will still bear in mind that morality is still morality, whether in the government of God or of man. The religion of the Bible is the morality that must govern man here and hereafter —now and forever. The criminal on whom the hand of penal justice is laid, is lifted above all law, except, simply, the law which makes him to suffer. Whilst suffering for theft he cannot commit theft, because he is not bound *now* by the law's precept which forbids it. And so of all other offences. And so there is an end of all law and all government, human and divine. There is no difference between virtue and vice. Let us eat and drink and profane and blaspheme God, there's a jubilee in hell and to build a bridge across the impassable gulph is no longer desirable.

Such are some of the troublesome consequences of maintaining that the precept of law ceases to bind a man at the moment he falls under its penalty—that the moral precept and the penal sanction cannot run parallel with one another. Hence we conclude that moral obligation to holy obedience is eternal. Its cessation would make the sinner independent of God. This doctrine cuts a short way to heaven, right through the shades of hell. It is false, and the truth rises from its ruins. Adam and his tempter are now bound and were at first bound and

will forever be bound equally to obey God's will made known to them. Consequently, the penal obligation is additional to Adam. And if he could have been justified by the covenant before its violation, only by its positive fulfilment—by working *righteousness*—he can afterwards be justified only by *working righteousness*, and exhausting the whole curse of the law—satisfying its *penal claim*. Before he can come up to the law in its covenant form and claim the promised life, he must fulfil precept and penalty both. Before God can declare him a just man, that is, justify him, he must be just indeed. These two things are indispensable to Adam's obtaining life by the covenant. He must exhibit a righteousness as long and as broad as the law, and he must endure the wrath of God.

Upon the whole subject, let us remark, in closing,

1. The understanding of man failed him—he was foiled by the tempter, before sin enfeebled his powers; much less now, when the soul is in ruins, can man's wisdom adequately direct him in the path of duty and qualify him to withstand the wiles of the devil. Therefore

2. He who trusteth to his own heart is a fool; pride of intellect shuts the door of heaven, and a haughty spirit goes before a fall.

3. Sin does not diminish our moral responsibilities. It always increases them.

4. Hence the inevitable necessity of eternal torment to the finally impenitent. The fires of the second death burn upon the lost spirit. It rises, writhes, and resists. Its anguish and maddened resistance, burst forth in fiercer and still more fierce enmity against God who taketh vengeance. This increase of virulent wickedness, calls down renewed expressions of divine wrath, and thus the breath of blasphemy fans the flames of everlasting death.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN, TO HISMELF AND TO HIS POSTERITY; PHYSICALLY, INTELLECTUALLY, AND MORALLY.

To believe that effects proceed from causes, is an original, and I am disposed to think, an inexplicable law of the human mind. If I am seized with a sudden and violent pain in my head, I infer instantly, that it proceeds from some cause; and though I may not be able to trace the connexion and to ascertain satisfactorily what the cause is, the belief still remains fixed in my mind, that this violent pain is consequent upon some other violent change in the system—some stoppage of some blood vessel, which does violence to some nerve—and this is called the cause: and its eluding my search, does not in the least degree, shake my belief in the reality of its existence.

Now though I use the word *consequences* at the head of this chapter, yet you are not to expect me, even to attempt here, to show the connexion—to display the manner in which the antecedent, *sin*, draws after it the consequences or effects. The design is cherished, simply to deal in the facts of the case, viz: to shew that consequent upon the sin of Adam—subsequently thereto, certain facts took place in our world, and do take place. The question, in reference to the alleged facts, shall still be the simple and very proper enquiry, proposed to the first Christian martyr, by the chief justice, when presiding in that court, which was to pronounce upon his life or death—"Are these things so?" Certain positions will be stated on the three points, respectively, and this question will be answered in reference to them. As to the legal relations of the facts we may discover—how, and how far they are connected with the conduct of Adam, viewed as right or wrong—as a fulfilment or

breach of the covenant under which he was placed; that belongs to the great doctrine of original sin, to which our attention will be called shortly. Then, it will be in point to raise the question—is man's bodily infirmity connected with his sin—is it a penal evil?—With his intellectual imbecility? his moral depravity? Now, let the enquiry be simply, "Are these things so." And I affirm, that *the physical constitution of Adam, and of his whole race, is deranged, injured, and enfeebled by sin.*

Whether the body of Adam, was rendered immortal by the use of the tree of life, and subsequently rendered mortal by the physical operation of the fruit forbidden, is a speculation, more curious than profitable. We are certain however that death is the wages of sin. Nor should there be any doubt, as to the nature of that death. It did, undoubtedly, include the dissolution of the body. "Dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return." That bodily dissolution was to be, and is, brought about by moral evil, is not difficult to perceive. The first death that transpired in the family of Adam teaches us to refer bodily dissolution very directly, to moral depravity.—Corrupt passions wrankled in the heart of Cain and led to the death of his brother. The same corrupt feelings now tend directly to derange the system of the individual in whose bosom they are fostered, and to enfeeble, by deranging the action of its parts, the power of that action. Just as we see its operation now, so was it from the beginning. Moral turpitude shortens human life and renders that short life wretched. It is matter of every day's observation, that the victims of vice do not live half their days. And hence we should expect that such as experience the power of religion and lead lives, in the main, virtuous, other things being equal, would live longer than wicked men. And observation upon the the facts, abundantly confirms the theory here. So the scriptures, which refer to the pure state at which the church shall arrive, represent it as characterised by an extension of human life. "There shall be no more thence an infant of days nor an old man that hath not

filled his days: for the child shall die an hundred years old: but the sinner being an hundred years old shall be accursed," Isa. lxv. 20. "There shall yet old men and old women dwell in the streets of Jerusalem," Zech. viii. 4. Whether then it be directly, or indirectly, sin undoubtedly has operated most injuriously upon the physical constitution. No man can make himself believe, that pain, disease, feebleness, and death temporal, are unconnected with sin.

But there is one aspect of the subject, to which more particularly our attention ought to be directed viz,: that these ruinous effects did not fall upon Adam, peculiarly in his own person. Indeed his life is among the longest in the human annals; and the presumption is, that it was not particularly burdened with sickness, pain and anguish. Whereas in later periods, the duration of life has dwindled to less than one-tenth of his, and even these few days are full of evil. Here, every man carries the evidence of the fact in his own consciousness: he feels it, and knows that his bodily constitution is in a corrupt and feeble state. That it is so, as a result of moral evil, will farther appear in the sequel. Let us meanwhile remember, that the first parent and all his descendants participate in those physical defects which lead to death and dissolution.

SECTION II.

Adam and all his children have suffered in their intellectual powers by the fall.

That our first parents were omniscient; or that they made a very close approximation to omniscience, we have not maintained. But that they became wiser by sin we must deny. To lead the mind to the conclusion, that sin has darkened it, the following considerations will probably suffice.

1. Our first parents vainly attempted to conceal their degenerate and fallen state from God. This they did by sewing fig leaves together, and by hiding "themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of

the garden." A sense of guilt led to folly, but the folly is not therefore the less manifest. Did innocent Adam ever betray such ignorance as to think he could conceal himself from the searching eye of his maker? Did ever that pure and holy being, who had heretofore delighted in the presence of God, display such ignorance of his character?

2. The same is evinced by the attempt to deceive God by a false, or, at least, an unkind and disingenuous excuse. "The serpent beguiled me and I did eat—the woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the fruit and I did eat."

3. What is true of the father is also true of the children. The intellect of man is enfeebled—his understanding is darkened: he knows not the things of the spirit of God. As this is a controverted point—as some Christians *seem* to maintain the doctrine that sin has not enfeebled the powers of the human intellect—and as their doctrine must be refuted and rejected, or the doctrine of spiritual illumination cannot be maintained, it will be necessary to look a little more in detail into the scripture testimonies here. These may be classed into such as directly affirm the blindness of the mind, and such as indirectly teach it.

I. The mind is often represented as *blind*. "The Lord shall smite thee with blindness—and thou shalt grope at noon day, as the blind gropeth in darkness" Deut. xxviii. 28. Here is reference to blindness of mind: as a curse for sin, God would withdraw his light: or which is the same thing, he would not strengthen their minds and enable them to comprehend his truth.

"So Isaiah vi. 9, 10. "Hear ye indeed but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not, make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert and be healed." Here is a mixture of figurative and plain language, and it forces its own interpretation upon us. What is this? Did God create ignorance—mental blindness! Create—a negative!! What then? Can it mean any thing more than God's withholding

those influences of his spirit which alone can give clearness and strength to the intellect, and enable men to comprehend things heavenly and divine? Assuredly the Saviour's application of this passage Math. xiii. 13, plainly demonstrates a deficiency "in the faculty of understanding."

The same thing is taught in those numerous instances of our Saviour's restoring sight to the blind. It cannot be reasonably doubted, that his holy providence refused, at the first, to give natural vision to the man born blind, in order to afford an opportunity to the Saviour, of displaying his own sovereign and almighty power in giving him the faculty of vision; and therein teaching the doctrine of spiritual illumination by a supernatural influence. So he often speaks of the natural state of the soul or mind, as a state of darkness and blindness; and Paul speaks of their "having the understanding darkened." "Blindness in part is happened to Israel." From a portion of this nation God has been pleased to withhold the spiritually illuminating influences of his grace. They are left in their native darkness.

II. The doctrine of the Spirit's illumination, implies, the soul's previous darkness. Every passage of Scripture, therefore, that inculcates the fact, or the necessity of such illumination, teaches also, the doctrine, that man's intellect is degraded, darkened, and enfeebled by sin.

Now Paul, Ep. i. 17, prays, "That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the father of glory, may give unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him; the eyes of your understanding being enlightened,"—and again, iii. 17—"That Christ may dwell in our hearts by faith, that ye being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all saints, what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and to know the love of God" Jeremiah xxiv. 7, says concerning those, whose blinding, Isaiah described, "and I will give them a heart to know me"—and to this accords the Saviour's declarations, Matt. xi. 27, "and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the son will reveal him." And those to whom he

does not reveal him, know him not; as Christ says, Jo. viii. 55, "ye have not known him." Christ also promises the Holy Ghost to "teach you all things"—to take of mine and shew it unto you—and ye need not that any man teach you, for the same anointing, viz: the spirit, teacheth you all things"—and without this teaching, the "natural man understandeth not the things of the spirit of God, neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned." All these and many more passages of scripture, carry home to the mind, unsophisticated by a metaphysical theology, a full and thorough conviction, that the understanding of man needs to be enlightened, and is therefore darkened, and unable without this supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit, to comprehend divine things. The powers of the mind—the faculties of the soul are not annihilated, but deranged in a degree, enfeebled so that they do not in fact, nor can they, until renovated, reinvigorated, discern holy things. The mental eye is not indeed entirely destroyed, but so distorted, its fluids so displaced and mixed up, that no clear and distinct vision is possible; until the good and the great Physician shall have operated upon it; restored its deranged parts, and ensured their right action, towards one another, and let in upon it, according to the strength of its resuscitated powers, light from the sun of righteousness.

It is objected to all this, that the eyes of the understanding, unaided by the Spirit, do not indeed comprehend the truths of religion, in a right and saving manner; but this is not owing to any defect in its powers; but to a deficiency of light, because of some external hindrances. Spiritual truth does not enter the eye of mental vision and hence cannot be understood; but the powers of perceiving remain undiminished, and all that is necessary is to remove the film or external hindrance; the light enters and the man knows the things of the Spirit. Those external hindrances are the lusts and corruptions of the flesh, which blind the eyes of the understanding by preventing the light of truth from entering. In conversion these lusts are removed, and the light enters and men see clearly.

To this I answer, 1, There is here a little false philosophy. It is *assumed* that the lusts which prevent spiritual vision are external to the understanding—in fact, that they exist out of the mind. They are like the wall of a contiguous house, which darkens my window, but forms no portion of my house. Or at least it is *assumed* that the understanding is one part of the mind, and the corrupt affections another part, and this latter part still throws its opaque mass before the other and intercepts and turns into its own dark bosom, the rays from the sun of righteousness. Now this I suppose, is false philosophy. For the mind is a simple substance. It does not consist of parts. The understanding is not one part of the soul, and the lusts, or affections, another part. The understanding is the mind itself, perceiving and comparing things—reasoning; and the lusts or desires are the mind itself, desiring. The understanding has no existence apart from the mind; the corrupt affections or holy affections, have no existence apart from the mind; and therefore, all that language which goes to represent the sinful desires, as standing outside and preventing religion from entering into an apartment of the mind already well disposed to receive it—all swept and garnished for its reception, is well adapted to lead to deception, and must be utterly discarded.

2. The very reason of the objection admits a fact fatal to the objection, viz: that the corrupt lusts prevent the understanding from seeing spiritual things aright. We agree in the fact. But now these lusts are as much in the mind as the powers of understanding. The deficiency, therefore, is in the mind, and we cannot look beyond itself, for the causes of this deficiency. If you conceive the understanding to be one part of the mind, and the lusts another part of the mind, standing between the former and the sun of Righteousness; I ask, why does not the understanding remove the obstruction? If it cannot remove the obstruction, it must abide in darkness. And this is the evidence of its imbecility. But I am not now to discuss the doctrine of *ability*, and the preceeding, will, I hope, satisfy you as to the humbling fact in reference to the whole race of Adam, that by rea-

son of sin they have "become vain in their imaginations, and their foolishheart was darkened"—"professing themselves wise, they became fools," "darkness covered the earth, and gross darkness the people."

SECTION III.

The moral affections of Adam and his posterity became depraved by his sin.

Few men have been so left to the unrestrained dominion of sin, as to have denied altogether its corrupting influences on the heart—as to have maintained that the feelings and affections of the race are, and always have been such as became the Creator originally to produce. Rarely has the effrontery of infidelity so run riot, as to charge upon the Creator, the folly and the crime of creating man as he is, with all his wickedness in him. On the contrary, it is generally agreed, even by the open neglecters of religion, that man was originally created holy and upright—that his corruption did not originate with his maker, but had its origin in his own voluntary action. All, it appears to me, who admit an essential difference between virtue and vice, go thus far in the way of truth.

The bible account of man's corruption is simple. He disobeyed the command of God, and God left him, in a degree, to the desires of his own heart. Previously to this dereliction from the path of duty, the divine power sustained and directed the action of human affections towards himself; but afterwards God withheld, to some extent, those influences by which the heart of Adam was drawn toward himself, and a consequence was, alienation from his maker; Adam's feelings and affections wandered after forbidden joys. He sought his happiness, not in the delightful communion of God; but in intercourse with the creature. Like his children in a distant age, he loved and served the creature more than the Creator. His conduct in hiding from God, to which we have referred for another purpose, is also available here. It shews an alienation of affection. Had his de-

light been in God as the chief good, this desire for concealment could not have possessed his mind. Of his moral feelings we have not another exhibition in the bible history; but the course of God's dealings plainly shows that man's heart was not upright in him—he sought out many inventions. "Adam being in honour abode not."

Now "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." Consequently as was the parent of the race so is the race. Many a proverb expresses this general truth. "The stream cannot rise higher than the fountain." "Men do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles," "Every tree is known by its fruit." The parent stock of the race, must send forth scions according to its own nature. Such is the judgment of common sense; that is, of mankind in general, as expressed in the proverb—like begets like. Such also is the plain declaration of the Bible. "Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth." That his first son was morally depraved, his conduct testifies; and that his second was so also, Abel's sacrifice, which he offered to God, fully acknowledged. "And Abel he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof." Here was a bloody sacrifice, wherein there is set forth and confessed, on the part of the worshipper, desert of death.

The history of the race from that period until Noah's mission, a space of more than fourteen hundred years, brief as it is, affords sufficient evidence on the point of moral character, greatly to strengthen our position. And at this period, the testimonies are exceedingly plain and as pointed, as plain. For "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." "The earth also was corrupt before God; and the earth was filled with violence: And God looked upon the earth, and behold it was corrupt, for all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth." Gen. 5, 11, 12. Hence the flood of waters. But not all the billows of the deluge could wash away the pollution of the earth. We see the foul stain immediately

after its close. The vineyard of Noah, the tower of Babel, the plains of Nineveh—the wars of the kings, the life even of Abraham and Isaac, of Jacob and of the twelve patriarchs, do they not all testify to the truth, that the whole race is corrupt? What is history, but a criminal record? What are chronological epochs and eras, but points rendered illustrious by some splendid result of immorality?

Shall I spend your time and my labour in making more evident, the truth of a position, whose truth burns in every sting of a condemning conscience; as it throbs in every sally of unholy desire? Must the forms of argument be followed up, when you can no more doubt of the truth to be convinced than you can doubt of your own existence? Is it possible, in the entire compass of human thought, to select a truth more thoroughly riveted in the convictions of the race, than this very truth, that the earth is corrupted before God—the thoughts of man's heart are only evil continually—the heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked? Surely not, and therefore I forbear. But let us remember distinctly, the matter before, as merely a matter of fact—such is the moral character of the race. This is the fact. The *mode* as to its *legal bearings* is not before us. We have seen, indeed, how it follows Adam's sin; but the nature and necessity of this consequence will appear in our next. Let us close this with one or two reflections.

1. We are mortal. Our bodies are infected with the virus of corruption and tend rapidly to decay. Death will soon shut our eyes on all that earth holds dear to us. A century hence, and this living earth, we call ourselves and which we cherish so tenderly, will lie undiscriminated in its kindred clay. What a fact, this for the contemplation of the rational mind! How humbling to human pride! How instructive to the wise in heart!!

2. "Vain man would be wise, though man be born like a wild ass's colt," Pride of intellect! how presumptuous! Let us remember that our intellectual strength must come from God.

3. Who of us can wash his hands before God, and

say I am clean? Yea, let us hide our heads in the dust before him. Our first father became corrupt and we are unclean. Let each one for himself confess, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Yet let us not faint, but pray. "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow."

CHAPTER VIII.

ON ORIGINAL SIN.

SECTION I.

The Definition of the term.

"Sin is the transgression of the law." With this definition of the Apostle, I am content. A better I am persuaded no man will ever present in so few words. That it covers both the negative and positive precepts we have already seen; or, to speak with more precision, it extends to all the acts of mind, whether such as occur when it *determines* to obey God, in his command to abstain from bodily action; or when he directs to perform it. The body is the mere index to the mind, like the face of a clock, shewing its internal action; but with this exception, that like the hands of a clock which are too loose on their axis, it often fails to point out the movement of the mind within. Now we are not up to the line of truth and duty, when we look merely at the external face; we must have regard to the inward movements: the mind itself—the soul is the moral being, it alone is capable of committing sin. And with Paul we have seen, that sin is the mind's acting contrary to law. The theory therefore, which makes sin a mere negative is to be discarded as mere theory, inconsistent with scripture language and with the truth and facts of the

case, and at variance with sound philosophy, that is, with common sense. *Sin is the transgression of the law.*

Original sin must then be the original transgression; or the transgression at the origin or beginning. And it is obvious, the term must be attached to some person or persons before it becomes expressive of any particular sin. A sin which occurred at the origin or beginning of what? or whom? The sense of the phrase, *original sin*, must materially depend upon the response to this enquiry. Should it be answered: at the origin of moral beings;—then, as the angels were created and some of them fell, perhaps before man was created, certainly before he fell, original sin must mean the sin of Satan—the first sin of which we have any knowledge. But in this sense the word is not at all used by Theological writers: and, as it is not a Bible expression, we must ascertain its right meaning from those who do use it. To this we may be aided by contrast. The Westminster divines, and others, use the phrase, *original righteousness*, to signify that *uprightness*, *holiness*, *rectitude* of moral character, which Adam possessed at his creation and before he sinned: and this they bring into immediate contrast with the sin in question. "By this sin [original sin] they fell from their original righteousness." And so, in the IX Article, the English establishment says of original sin, it is that "whereby man is very far gone from *original righteousness*." In this, which I think is the primary, though not the chief application of the term, it is not restricted to the *act* of Adam and Eve. For we find it extended by almost all writers and in almost all evangelical confessions, to the immediate effects of the act upon the persons of the actors. Thus, in the two confessions just mentioned, they speak of man's loss of "original righteousness," and of his being "of his own nature inclined to evil;" of destitution of holiness and of communion with God and so he became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body."

But in the same confessions, and in very many other writings, the phrase is applied to the act of Adam, in-

clusive of its immediate consequences *to his posterity* also. Hence they speak "*of original or birth-sin*," and after mentioning "the guilt of Adam's first sin"—the want of righteousness, corruption, inability, opposition to all that is good and inclination to all evil, they add, "which is commonly called *original sin*." We have therefore this two-fold practical definition of the phrase *original sin*, in both of which there is a departure from the strict signification of the terms respectively, viz: *the first act of Adam's disobedience and its effects upon himself;* and, *the same act with its effects upon his people.*

Should it be objected that this is a very vague definition, it makes nothing precise and certain. I answer, let us ever be on our guard against the supposition that the definition of mere terms or phrases, can ever give us an accurate idea of the things. This is not at all the design of defining *terms*. The definition of a *word*, simply, and only, points out to what *thing* we apply it. The precise explanation, exposition, or if you will, definition of *the thing*, is a subsequent matter, in comparison with which, the former is a mere trifle. To know that men have agreed to apply the name *limestone*, to a certain solid substance, is not without some advantage; but to know what are the properties and uses of that substance is quite a different thing, and of infinitely greater advantage. To know that theological writers apply the phrase. *original sin*, first to Adam's first offence and its effects upon himself personally, and also, in the second place, to Adam's first offence, and its effects upon his posterity, will be found useful; inasmuch as it will enable me to turn your attention toward the thing, in either case, by the simple utterance of the words. But to understand the thing—to comprehend the relations of Adam and of his people to God and his law; their liabilities in consequence of that act, and its effects upon him and them;—this, how different and how infinitely more important?

SECTION II.

The definition of the thing.

Now the explanation of the thing, to which the phrase *original sin* is applied, is already in part, before you. The effects of his act, in some degree, immediate and more remote upon Adam, and also upon his people, in reference to their physical, intellectual and moral constitutions formed the subject of the last chapter; and yet they are intimately connected with this discussion, and indeed form a part of it. We felt ourselves obliged to anticipate a little, the question concerning the legal relations of Adam. The fact, that the precept of the law holds him responsible; and the fact, that superadded is the penal claim, were distinctly stated. The reasons why it must necessarily be so, were also exhibited, at least so far as to point out the ruinous consequences of maintaining, that the precept and the penalty cannot both simultaneously hold the subject of law.

The action of charging upon Adam his sin; and the action whereby its legal consequence is declared, next claims our attention, The former of these is called *imputation;* the latter *condemnation.*

SECTION III.

Of Imputation.

The Hebrew word (Hashab) for impute, occurs with great frequency and is variously translated. It signifies that operation of the mind, whereby we form a judgment. It is often difficult to discover and lay open this sense; but I think it always includes the notion of comparing two things together and marking their agreement or difference. This is the leading idea—this operation of the mind is what the Hebrew word is designed to express. Hence it signifies to think. Gen. xxxviii, 15; "And Judah saw her, and *thought* her to be an harlot." Gen. L, 20: "But as for you, ye *thought* evil

against me, but God *meant* [*thought*] it unto good." 1. Sam. i. 13.—"Eli *thought* she had been drunken." The word is sometimes translated by *esteem*. Isa. xxix. 17. "Your fruitful field shall be *esteemed* as a forest." —liii. 3, 4. "He was despised and we *esteemed* him not —we did *esteem* him smitten of God." In all which cases it is not difficult to perceive the operation of mind, or process of thought to which I have alluded. Judah compared in his mind the appearance of Tamar, with the idea and dress of a harlot, and perceived their agreement. Here the judgement was in default, but the process did take place and he was of opinion, they agreed. Joseph's brethren compared their distorted ideas of his conduct with their notions of what he ought to be, and they perceived a disagreement; and therefore connected him with evil. But God, who seeth things as they are, thought otherwise. Eli compared Hannah's behaviour to a drunken person, and perceived an agreement—he imputed drunkenness to her; just as his brethren imputed evil conduct to Joseph, and as Judah imputed unchastity to Tamar. So the fruitful field of the Israelites should be compared to a forest and perceived to agree—so Jesus appeared as a root out of a dry ground—they compared him with their ideas of Messiah and they found a difference; and he was esteemed to be smitten of God. The unbelieving looked upon the suffering Saviour; they compared him with such as are under God's judgements and seeing the agreement, they so considered him. They imputed to him the character of a malefactor.

There is therefore a judgement of the mind in every act of imputation. "To impute," says Dr. Owen, "unto us, that which is really ours, *antecedently unto that imputation*, includes two things in it, 1. An acknowledgment or judgement, that the thing so *imputed* is really and truly ours, or *was*. He that imputes wisdom or learning unto any man, doth in the first place acknowledge him to be *wise* or *learned*. 2. A dealing with them according unto it, whether it be *good* or evil. So when upon trial a man is acquitted because he is found righteous; first he is judged and esteemed righteous, and then dealt with as a righteous person, his righteousness is imputed to him." Justification, p. 148.

So Adam in the case before us. His conduct is compared with the law under which he was placed: it is perceived to disagree; unrighteousness is seen to be in him: and accordingly he is *thought* to be—he is *esteemed, unrighteous*: his unrighteousness or sin is *imputed* to him.

The term is applied to express the keeping of pecuniary accounts; wherein there is a debtor and a creditor.—Some things are set down against, and some in favor of the person; these are compared together, and as the agreement or excess is, so is the balance a debt or a credit. 2. Kin. xii. 15, "Moreover they *reckoned* not with the men into whose hands they delivered the money to be bestowed on the workmen; for they dealt faithfully." And xxii. 7—"there was no *reckoning* made with them." Here they kept no *reckoning*, no account of receipts and expenditures. Lev. xxv. 50, "And he shall *reckon* with him that bought him, from the year that he was sold to him, unto the year of jubilee: and the price of his sale shall be according to the number of years."—And xxvii. 18,—"then the priest shall *reckon* unto him the money, according to the years that remain." He shall adjust the account and strike an equable balance. Here again, we have the process of comparing the things together and marking their agreement or difference. It is the plain and simple operation which a judge performs in the discharge of his official duty. He sets down, all the items presented against the person to be judged. He marks his entire conduct: compares it with the law's prescription and declares the difference or agreement, and holds him to the legal consequences. This process is *imputation:* and the *imputation* is just only when these items really belong to the individual. Should the Judge put down, for, or against a man, any thing that was not really and truly his, it would be an unjust imputation; and judgment founded upon it would not be according to truth. The thing imputed must, as Owen says, be "really and truly ours, or *in us*." Adam must have actually sinned, he must have stood to the law in the relation of a sinner, or sin could not be imputed or set *down* against him. But he did eat the fruit

and his sin is imputed to him: and he is held to its just consequences.

You will observe then, that a man's own acts are imputed to him, and *because* they are his own. So Lev. xvii. 4,—"blood shall be imputed unto that man, he hath shed blood" If he had not shed it, it would not have been set down against him. So the person who improperly sacrifices, "it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be *imputed* [set down to his benefit] to him that offereth it;"—Lev. vii. 18. In like manner Shimei (2 Sam. xix. 19) "said unto the king, Let not my Lord *impute* iniquity to me, neither do thou remember what thy servant did perversely." He acknowldges his offence and it was impossible the king should not think that Shimei had committed the offence. What did the offender desire? Simply that the king would not so set it down against him, as to hold him responsible for it —to fasten upon him the just and lawful consequences —the punishment deserved. It is perhaps impossible to find a plainer illustration of the force and meaning of *imputation*, than we have here. This man had compared his own conduct, in cursing David and casting stones, with the law, by which he was bound to obey the king, whom God and the people had placed over him. He saw the disagreement, and knew the king saw it too. His eye glanced at the just consequences, and to avert it, he makes suit to his restored monarch. The precise object of his anxious desire, is, that the punishment he deserved might not be inflicted—that the king would not hold him to the legal and penal results of his own acts. To impute a man's iniquity to him, is therefore, nothing more or less, than to set it to his account and to hold him liable to punishment for it. Can any man suppose that Shimei wished the king to believe that he did not curse him and caststones? Why does he confess it? The thing is utterly absurd. It was no part of his expectation to make the king believe that the offensive acts were not his. But now, if the imputation of righteousness means, that the righteous acts of one man become the personal acts of another man—or if the imputation of one man's sin to another, means that the sin-

ful acts of the one person become the sinful acts of the other person, then the non-imputation of Shimei's iniquity must mean, that he did not do the acts—that in not imputing them, the king should really believe he never did perform them! On the contrary, if the imputation of iniquity is simply the seting of it down and the holding of a person responsible for its legal consequences; viz, its just punishment; so the imputation of righteousness, is—not the thinking that the person did the act; but the setting of it to his account, the holding of him liable to its legal consequences; viz, its just reward. Thus "Phinehas stood up and executed judgement: and so the plague was stayed: and that was *counted* [*imputed*] unto him for righteousness."—Psa. cvi. 30, 31. God viewed the act of Phinehas; compared it with the holy law; found it agreeing therewith; set it down to his account; and held him to its just consequences; viz: he rewarded him. "The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him." There are therefore, as before stated from Owen, these two things always in the act of imputation, viz, 1, The perception and accounting of the thing imputed, as belonging to the person to whom it is imputed; and 2. The determination to give to him the just and legal consequences of it. The commendable act of administering summary justice in the case, is seen and accounted as belonging to Phinehas. The act of eating the forbidden fruit is seen and accounted as belonging to Adam. This is the first part of imputation. The purpose or determination is conceived, to give to Phinehas the just and lawful results of his act, a suitable benefit or reward. The purpose of letting the just and legal effects of his act fall upon Adam is entertained—he shall be punished. This is the second part of imputation. The absence of either of these will destroy the true idea of imputation. To view and account any act or thing as belonging to an individual, where it is not, is plainly to violate the law of truth: and to follow that up with the legal consequences, is plainly to violate justice. To account truly an act as belonging to a person and yet not to append to that act its rightful results, is equally to sin against the laws of justice. But

when both exist—when, upon an inspection of the case, it is seen, that Adam did the act—it is his; truth is maintained in this part of the imputation: and when the purpose is entertained to let things be connected in fact, which are connected in law; viz: the sinful action and its punishment, justice is upheld.

Thus far *imputation*, both as to the *term* and the *thing*, in its primary application; that is, its application to individuals and their own personal acts. We reserve its application to other cases for another chapter.

SECTION IV.

Of Condemnation.

The action of declaring the legal consequences of imputing to Adam his own sin is *Condemnation.*

In defining the term Justification, we had occasion to see, that it stands in contrast with condemnation. That describes the act of a judge in passing a sentence in favour; this, the act of passing a sentence against a person. Now before either can righteously occur, the operation covered by the term *imputation*, must take place; and the parts of it be conducted respectively under the auspicious administration of *truth* and *justice.* For no man can be justly and truly *condemned*, until an unlawful act shall have been truly charged to him, until the determination be passed, that its legal consequences shall be connected with him. The former of these occurred in the case of Shimei. King David charged him with the crime. The latter did not take place; for the King, being sovereign, as well as judge, determined, not to allow the law here to do its full execution. Had Abishai killed Shimei, he would have been guilty of murder. The sovereign interposed and averted the tongue of the judge, and, of course, the sword of the executioner. The judge did not pass a sentence of *condemnation* and the executioner dared not strike the victim of justice. In the case of Adam, both parts of imputation occurred. His act is charged upon him and the purpose is conceived and entertained of treating him ac-

cordingly. Here you have the full idea of imputation. But you have more than this. The purpose to let the act be followed by its just consequence is also expressed. "Cursed is the ground for thy sake—dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return." Now this expression is *condemnation*. This is the last act of the judge directly toward the individual offender. It only remains for him to turn the executioner and bid him to do his duty.

Such was the unhappy condition of the parent of the human race. He had acted contrary to law. The judge had compared his conduct with the law, and marked their contrariety. He had entertained the purpose to deal with him according to his deeds—had *imputed* to him his sin. He had declared this purpose—had *condemned* him. Adam therefore is *guilty* of death.

SECTION V.

Of Guilt.

Let us settle the meaning of this term. This is the more necessary, because its theological sense is different; in some degree from the sense in which it is often taken in common conversation. We use it simply to describe the state and condition of a person who has passed under the law's condemnatory sentence. It is generally true, that he is *deserving* of punishment: but this idea is expressed in either terms; and guilt implies simply, the persons exposed to punishment, because the law has pronounced upon him its sentence of condemnation.

In theological discussions we ought to adhere to scripture usage, in the meaning of terms which are used in the Bible: and generally, where words are used often in both the Old and the New Testaments, the usage of the former ought to govern: just as the meaning of a word in the English Bible, is never to be settled by a reference to English authorities, but to the original scriptures. Let us therefore appeal to the Old Testament. And here we find the term *guilty* used as a translation for a single Hebrew word, but seventeen times. One of these

occurs in Numbers xxxv. 31. "Ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, which is *guilty* of death; but he shall be surely put to death." Here the word rendered *guilty* (Kashang) means ill desert, and this is the only instance where the word is so translated. In the other sixteen, cases, the Hebrew word (asham) signifies simply obligation—or liability to the penal claims of law. Of these sixteen it is used (Lev. iv. 13, 22, 27, and v. 2, 3, 4, 5, 17.) eight times in reference to the sins of ignorance, whereby ceremonial guilt is contracted. In Lev. vi. 4, it is applied to sins of moral turpitude knowingly committed, such as lying, deception, false swearing. But a careful inspection will shew that in every case the *sin* and the *guilt* are distinguished from each other. "If the whole congregation of Israel sin through ignorance—and are guilty." "When a ruler hath sinned and done somewhat through ignorance—and is guilty." "If any one of the common people sin through ignorance—and be guilty." Here it is manifest the term sin, expresses the *wrong-doing*, and the term *guilty* expresses the *liability to penal* consequences: and accordingly, the law proceeds to affirm the ceremonial penalty. In Gen. xlii. 21, Joseph's brethren "said one to another, we are verily guilty concerning our brother—therefore is this distress come upon us." They felt some of the penal evils of their sin and confessed their *liability* to suffer—their obligation to penalty. In Judges xxi. 1, the people had sworn "There shall not any of us give his daughter unto Benjamin to wife," but relenting afterwards, some of their leaders laid the plot to let the Benjamites steal their daughters, and should the parents complain, they privately assured the Benjamites, they would not be rigid in holding them to punishment for violating their oath—"we will say unto them—ye did not give unto them at this time, that ye should be *guilty*." That is—that your oath should bind you to its punishment. Those who had married strange wives, Ezra x. 19, "put away their wives and being *guilty*"—obnoxious to penal evil—they offered a suitable atonement. Pro. xxx. 10, "Accuse not a servant unto his master, lest he curse

thee, and thou be found *guilty*"—liable to suffer. Ezek. xxii. 4. "Thou art become *guilty* in the blood which thou has shed."—Here again the wrong-doing, is distinguished from the exposure to penal suffering on account of it. Zech. xi. 4, 5, "Thus saith the Lord, my God; feed the flock of the slaughter; whose possessors slay them, and hold themselves not *guilty*:"—not liable to punishment, because the laws are prostrated and unable to execute just vengeance.

The term occurs once as a noun. Gen. xxvi. 10. Abimelech complains that Isaac's conduct might have brought guiltiness upon us"—exposed us to penal evils as did Abraham's on a former occasion.

Dr. Owen, after a very clear statement of the case, says, "*Guilt* in the scripture, is the *respect of sin unto the sanction of the law*, whereby the sinner becomes obnoxious unto punishment. And to be guilty is to be ὑπόδικος τω θεω, liable unto punishment for sin, from God, as the supreme law-giver and judge of all." Justi. 178.

On this point, the Princeton Repertory, vol. 2. 440, quotes Owen, and Grotius, and Edwards, and Ridgeley, and quotations might be greatly extended; but the Bible is the best authority. Such is the Bible meaning, and ought to be the theological meaning of the term *guilt*.

In closing for the present let us remark.

1. God's imputations are according to both truth and righteousness. If you sin, be sure your sin will find you out. God will reckon it to you and hold you responsible for its legal consequences. Men indeed may, through want of knowledge, not impute your offences to you; or imputing them, may, through want of regard to righteousness, refuse or neglect to hold you responsible; but not so God—"Shall not the judge of all the earth do right." And if he will impute iniquity, who can stand before him?

2. The annunciation, by due authority, of the act of imputation, is a condemnatory sentence. And this follows the other, in every righteous government, by an inevitable moral necessity. It is not a moral possibility to withhold the declaration, when the facts exist. It would be to connive at sin, and become partaker in its

iniquity. Condemnation must therefore pass upon every sinner.

3. How mournful the fact before us! The great progenitor of the human race, a condemned malefactor, at the bar of his Maker! A little time previously, high in favour with God—holding familiar intercourse with him as a man converseth with his friend—now alas, fallen—degraded—condemned! How is the gold become dim! How is the most fine gold changed!

4. Mark, once more, the intimate connexion between religion and that moral government which constitutes civil society. Their principles are identical. Their doctrines are the same. A truly religious man, who believe the doctrines of the Bible, must necessarily be a good member of society—a good citizen—a patriot—a lover of his country, and of mankind.

SECTION VI.

"*The sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity.*"

This language I have borrowed from Stapferus, through Edwards, who quotes it with approbation vol. II. 545; because it accurately expresses the next topic of our discussion. To evince its truth, it will be necessary to recall and apply some of the first principles of morals already settled. We must ever bear in mind, that our discussion is upon a question of legal relations—a question of right.

And one of the truths most important in this case, is, that every moral head, or federal representative, binds, by his action, the moral body of which he is the head—the persons whom he represents. The destinies of the head and body are the same. They are a moral unity. Whatever be the number of persons represented, whether ten, or ten million times ten millions, it is the same; the act of the one is the act of the whole. I trust we have settled this principle. We have seen, that either it is true, or there neither is, nor can be, moral government in the universe, nor human society in this world.

We have also enquired into the matter of fact and found it so to be, that Adam was appointed of God, head of the whole human race—a representative, who acted for all human persons. There existed a moral unity. "I think," says Edwards II. 542, "it would go far towards directing to the more clear conception and right statement of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: That God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being *one with him.* And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the *head* of the whole body, and the *root* of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root."

"From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity, just as they came upon him—" ——"I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a *constituted oneness or identity* of Adam and his posterity in this affair."

——"The *guilt* a man has upon his soul at first existence, is one and simple, *viz:* the guilt of the original apostacy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God."

If the fact be so—if Adam did represent—did act for his people, then they acted through him and by him, just as we republicans act through and by our representatives in Congress. Consequently, his act is as rightfully imputed to us as it is imputed to him. Why is it rightfully imputed to Adam? Because it is his, and in accounting it his, God sustains truth: and in purposing to deal with him accordingly, and holding him responsible for its legal consequences, he acts according to justice. Why is it rightly imputed to his posterity? Because it is theirs—not indeed personally, but morally, legally—just as the acts of every agent or representative, are the acts of his principle, and binds him:—and when God accounts it theirs, he sustains truth, and when he holds them to the legal consequences, he sustains justice.

The first words of Edward's treatise on original sin,

are these, viz: "By *Original Sin*, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the *innate sinful depravity of the heart.* But yet when the *doctrine* of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, which includes not only the *depravity of nature*, but the *imputation* of Adam's first sin: or, in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgement, to partake of the punishment of that sin. So far as I know, most of those who have held one of these, have maintained the other; and most of those who have opposed one, have opposed the other:" II, 310.

This extract gives us the true definition of guilt; it is the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgement, to partake of punishment; and the rendering of this sentence, is imputation: whereby his posterity is exposed to punishment on account of Adam's sin.

1st. Having thus recalled the first principles from which the result follows, and presented anew the distinct idea of imputation, let us open the sacred volume and see whether cases do exist, wherein the acts of one person are reputed in law, the acts of another—are imputed to another—i. e. are so accounted to another, that he is held responsible in law for them—i. e. is *guilty*—is liable to the legal consequences. A few cases only may be cited.

1. The league, covenant or treaty, which Joshua made with the ambassadors of the Gibeonites, is a case in point; Joshua IX. Here was a covenant entered into by the ambassadors on the one hand; and by Joshua and the princes of Israel an the other hand. But neither of the high contracting parties acted for himself, simply. They all felt that they acted for their nations respectively: and although there was deception on one side, yet because the league was confirmed by an oath: it was held to be binding, not upon the ambassadors and representatives simply, but upon the nations, whom they represented: and that even tho' the people of Israel murmered much against it. Here is a clear case, wherein the act of one set of men passes over and binds others.

And why? simply, because it was their act, performed by them in their representatives. And thus it is with all treaties between nations.

2. In like manner, in the covenant at Sinai, to which we have already had reference, not the persons who were present, and they alone were bound by the act—but it extended over the nation and bound them all, even until the days of Messiah's flesh. Deut. v. 3. On the same principle, the sin of David in numbering Israel, was a national sin—it was committed by the head of the nation and the nation was held liable to its consequences and suffered grievously.

3. So, the whole business of suretyship, rests on the same foundation. A man voluntarily becomes responsible, for his friend; so that in case of his failure, his acts in contracting a debt comes upon him as surety, he is bound in law to make it good. "Be not one of them that strike hands, or of them that are sureties for debts. If thou hast nothing to pay, why should he take away the bed from under thee." Pov. 22, 26. Thus "Jesus was made surety of a better testament," Heb. 7, 22. and the responsibilities of those, for whom he was surety, lay upon him—he was bound, just as his people were bound. This suggests a 4th Instance—viz: that of Paul, when he assumed the debt of Onesimus. Philemon's servant had run off from his master and perhaps purloined his goods or money; he fell in with Paul and heard the gospel of his salvation; it was blessed to him and Onesimus became a good man; Paul sent him back to his master, though he had a desire to retain him to wait upon himself, "But without thy mind, would I do nothing." In sending back this runaway servant, Paul tells the master, "If he have wronged thee or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account; I, Paul, have written it with mine own hand, I will repay it." Philem. 18, 19. The word translated "*put* that on mine *account*," is the same as found in Rom. v. 13. "sin is not *imputed* where there is no law." "Put that on mine account" charge it—*impute* it to me.

Here is the principle for which we contend. Whether the imputation of it to Paul ever took place, we

know not; nor is it a matter of any consequence. The apostle recognises the correctness of the principle. The acts of Onesimus in becoming indebted, pass over as to their legal and binding effects—not as to their moral character, this is absurd and impossible; but as to their legal obligation. If Philemon accepts the surety and transfers the debt to Paul, then is Onesimus set free. If he merely agrees to hold Paul responsible, in case Onesimus fail of payment, he holds both responsible. The *imputation* consists precisely in his holding Paul bound in law to pay the debt. And it is only necessary farther to observe, that the *imputation* here, as always, rests upon the previous moral union of the persons. Had Philemon, without any evidence of Paul's connexion with Onesimus, put his debt down to Paul's account, it would have been an unjust imputation and he could not have vindicated it in law. Hence the particularity with which the apostle specifies his signature: this is the legal evidence of his consent.

2d. Here we meet an objection against the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity: it is maintained by the entire Pelagian interest, that the sons of Adam are indeed responsible and do become guilty of his sin, so soon as they by *actual*, *personal* sin consent to Adam's deed, but not before. Hence the same parties deny, that original sin of itself condemns any one. It does not attach until after actual sin. A surety is not bound, say they, until he consents. To impute a debt to a man and hold him to payment, who has not given his personal consent to it, would be unjust; neither would it be just to charge the sin of Adam upon his innocent posterity. On this we remark, 1. To charge sin upon the innocent, would indeed be iniquity: but the question *in controversy* is, whether Adam's posterity are innocent—whether they are not justly under condemnation because of his sin; and this question depends manifestly upon the previous question, whether they acted in and through him—were they represented by him? If they were, then his act was legally their act; for he acted for them. 2. As to consent being necessary to create a moral union; the principle is sound

and true, but it has its limits and its exceptions. The consent of every individual person in a nation is not necessary to give validity to a treaty or a law, and yet they are all bound by it. The consent of Adam was not necessary as a pre-requisite to his creation ; or to his being placed under the law of God. True, he did consent to obey God; but I deny that the obligation is based on the consent. For if consent here was the basis of obligation, who shall say that the withdrawal of consent, does not put an end to obligation? On the contrary, the obligation to obey God is natural and necessary and can never cease, as we have seen, and therefore Adam could not withhold his consent without violating his obligation. No man's consent is *now* asked whether he will or will not be bound by the laws of God or his country. Every man is so bound, whether he consent or not. No man's consent is asked, whether he will or will not be a son of Adam either in a physical or a moral sense. God has made every man so, and it would be no greater absurdity to maintain the dependence of the physical relation upon the individual's own consent, than of the moral. The infant orphan's consent is not necessary to the validity of his guardian's appointment and the legality of his acts. We are therefore thrown back upon the mere question of *fact;* did God appoint Adam the representative head of his race? On this simply, depends the question of the imputation of his sin to them. If God did constitute them a moral unity, the question is settled: he sinned, and the guilt of this sin is imputed: they are held liable to its penal consequences—that is death.

3, This argument thus far, is what logicians term *a priori;* that is, an argument from first principles, or principles proved to be true, to their results. Having seen reasons to believe, that God entered into covenant with Adam, in which he appointed him the representative head of his posterity, we are thus shut up to the doctrine, that his sin is imputed to them—they are liable to its penal consequences. Let us now reverse the operation and reason *a posteriori;* that is, backward, from effects, to their causes—from the ruin in which we find

man actually involved, to the moral causes of that ruin. And,

1. There is here a resumption of a truth already recognised, viz: that human sufferings have their origin in human sins—that all the sorrows that flesh is heir to, are consequent upon dereliction of principle—that physical evils are connected with moral evils. The mind refuses to believe that a world of sorrows can be disconnected from a world of sins. The belief in a wise, holy, just, and good Being, who rules in the heavens above, and in the earth beneath; who regulates and governs the planets in their ceaseless round, and superintends all human affairs, so that an hair cannot fall from our head, without his will—the belief in such a Being, seems to involve the idea that suffering results from sin. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" "Hath there been evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it?" "Wilt thou slay the righteous with the wicked?" We set it down then as a moral axiom, that pain and anguish, distraction and turmoil, sickness and death, can exist under the government of a benevolent and righteous God, only as the just and necessary consequents of moral evil.

2. But that such do exist in our own world, is as evident as that the world itself exists. We can no more disbelieve the reality of our own being, and that of the earth, and the fullness thereof, than we can disbelieve the general prevalence of pain, and sickness, and death. Man is born to trouble as the sparks do ascend. Few and evil have been the days of the years of my life. No man needs proof of the fact, that earth has its sorrows, deep seated, and incurable by earthly means.

3. Hence the unavoidable inference, that earth has its sins. Man has violated the divine law, and hence the evils incident to his condition. These are simply a partial expression of God's displeasure against him for his transgressions.

This is a plain and simple and satisfactory way of accounting for the miseries of our own world; and in this there is a very general agreement. It seems to commend itself to the common sense of all men. The barbarous people of Melita, reasoned thus when they saw

the venomous beast fasten on Paul's hand. "No doubt, said they, this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the sea, yet vengeance suffereth not to live. This connexion between suffering and sin, we have seen, is indispensable in a righteous government. The latter named, must always be antecedent to the former, in point of fact. Here, there is no room for discussion and scarcely any for illustration. But again,

4. I remark, that guilt must precede punishment. A man must be condemned before he can be rightfully executed. The law must pronounce its sentence, before the officer can proceed to take vengeance. Consequently, in a perfectly righteous government, its execution is evidence of the justice of a sentence. Now such a government is God's. If therefore, men suffer under it, we may rest satisfied, they suffer in consequence of just liability to suffer. God does injustice to no man, and therefore we infer, that all suffering men, are sinful men—are condemned men—are guilty men.

These truths are so plain and elementary—these reasonings so common place, that we can scarcely bear their rehearsal. Who denies them? Who is ignorant of them? Who needs to have them expanded, illustrated, explained, enforced, in order to his reception and belief of them? It is with difficulty I have prevailed on myself to put them down here, even thus briefly. And yet they are momentous truths and have an overpowering influence in the discussion of this doctrine. Let the reader look again at them. Are they not true? May you not with perfect safety commit yourself to them; and abide the results?

5. We conclude, that, inasmuch as all men do suffer, all men were condemned—are guilty—are justly liable to suffer. From this conclusion there is no escape. If, in God's moral government, suffering is consequent upon guilt, and guilt consequent upon sin, then wherever we find the first, we must believe the others to be present, or we must charge God foolishly. The universal prevalence of pain and sorrow, and anguish, and death, proves either the universal prevalence of sin, and guilt; or that the universal Governor is not a regarder of justice.

To avoid this argument from closing in upon them and compelling their admission of the doctrine of original sin, some reply, that the universality of suffering must be referred to sin indeed; yet to no sin of Adam; but only to the personal sins of men. Each man suffers for his own acts and not at all for any participation of his in Adam's first transgression.

In view of this we admit, it is true, unquestionably, the personal acts of individuals, are sufficient to bring condemnation and death upon them.

But as to all sufferings which precede the personal, sinful acts of the individual, here is no explanation whatever. We have settled the moral principle, that sin and guilt must precede suffering. How then account for all the pains and sorrows of infancy? What personal acts, bearing a moral character, of the new-born—yea of the unborn babe, are these, to account for its excruciating agonies? Does moral agency commence prior to birth! Or will any man deny all connexion between the suffering of infant humanity, and a pre-existent moral cause? Let us look at these in order; for strange as it may appear to you, each has had its advocates.

(1) Unwilling to admit the pre-existent sin of Adam and the infant's participation in the act of its representative, as accounting for its agonies, some recent speculators have maintained, that infants begin to sin personally, before birth, and being actual sinners, their sufferings are thus accounted for! Well, if the position could be maintained, from reason and scripture, it would indeed invalidate our argument from effects to causes. Let us look into the Bible and see whether it throws any light upon this question of infants sinning before they are born. "When Rebecca also had conceived by one, even by our father Isaac, (for the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth) it was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger." Rom. ix. 10—12. Here is unquestionably a difficult passage for those who maintain the doctrine of actual, personal sinning before birth. The children (and that *just before* birth) had

done no good or evil. It would seem that Paul did not believe in this ante-birth actual sin. Moses, Deut. i. 39, speaks of the children of the Israelites in the wilderness, who "in that day had no knowledge between good and evil." Now, that the good and evil here, could be natural good and evil, is hardly credible, for the new-born bade desires the sincere milk, and will reject nauceous drugs. Undoubtedly, the common meaning attached to the words, is the correct one: viz. that their little babes could not distinguish moral good and evil—right and wrong. Now, if there was no capacity to know a right and a wrong in actions, there could be no right or wrong actions. Actual sin is impossible.

And this is in accordance with the general sense of mankind. Infants are not treated as moral agents, because they are supposed incapable of discerning right and wrong. It is therefore undeniable, that as human persons, they do not sin, and cannot sin, either immediately after, or before birth. If they commit actual sin before they see the light, it must be independently of the body, and how far this is different from the doctrine of transmigration of souls, I leave its friends to explain. Meanwhile, we rest in the confidence, that no actual sin of the infant exists, prior to its suffering, as the moral cause of that suffering. This christianized figment of pagan mythology, gives no substantial aid to the opponents of the doctrine of original sin. The facts remain unexplained by it. Infants do suffer, therefore they are guilty: sin they have upon them.

5. *Secondly.* The attempt to account for the sufferings of infants, by viewing them all as disciplinary only, is equally unavailing. The advocates of this allege, that God deals with infants as an earthly parent does, when he chastises his children. It is to teach them virtue—to induce them to shun vice: a system of discipline. To this we reply, that it is a virtual denial of the principle already settled, that the sufferings of moral beings, must have their cause in sin. Or if it is not a rejection of this principle, it makes the effect precede its cause. Infants are made to suffer, in the government of God, not on account of sin committed, but on account of sin to be

hereafter committed; or rather, on account of sin, the perpetration of which, is to be prevented by the suffering. But neither of these is practiced by any wise and upright parent. What father chastises an unoffending child, lest he may hereafter offend? What government punishes the innocent, lest they might become guilty? What sound philosopher puts the effect before the cause, and makes the effect, effectual in preventing the existence of that which caused its own existence?

We are thrown back therefore upon the sober fact of the case. Infants, *all* infants, and so *all the children* of Adam, without exception, do suffer—many of them, intense agonies and death—before they have committed in their own proper persons, any actual sin. If the sufferings of moral beings must necessarily be preceded by sin, as their moral cause, and if there is no actual, personal sin, we are forced back upon original sin, as that which creates liability to suffering, and affords a satisfactory solution to the difficulties of the case. The true and real cause of the sickness, pain, and death of infants, is their sin, committed, not by themselves, actually and personally, but *federatively*, in their first father Adam; who, appointed by his Creator for this end, acted for them, and they sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. Thus, we are led back from effects to their causes; just as we were before led from causes to their effects: we are irresistably borne towards the conclusion, that the sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity.

CHAPTER IX.

ON ORIGINAL SIN.—ARGUMENT—AN EXPOSITION OF ROMANS V. 12—21.

The reasoning in the preceding chapter, is substantially borrowed from the Apostle Paul: and I propose now, to present a brief exposition of that difficult, and very important passage, Rom. v. 12—21.

The general analysis given by Dr. Hodge, is undoubtedly the true one, and it is stated in those lines of light which always follow his pen: I therefore quote his summary, from the abridged commentary: viz.

"According to this view of the passage, it consists of five parts.

"The first, contained in v. 12, presents the first member of the comparison between Christ and Adam.

"The second contains the proof of the position assumed in the 12th verse, and embraces verses 13, 14, which are therefore subordinate to v. 12. *Adam, therefore, is a type of Christ.*

"The third, embracing vs. 15, 16, 17, is a commentary on this declaration, by which it is at once illustrated and limited.

"The fourth, in vs. 18, 19, resumes and carries out the comparison commenced in v. 12.

"The fifth forms the conclusion of the chapter, and contains a statement of the design and effect of the law, and of the gospel, suggested by the preceding comparison, vs. 20, 21."

1. A comparison is instituted between Adam and Christ, in regard to their *legal relations* and not to their personal, *moral qualities.* This comparison is begun in v. 12,* wherein it is affirmed, (1.) That sin entered

* I once thought the comparison full within the verse; but am now satisfied the general opinion is correct. See sermon in the Presbyterian Preacher.

through Adam upon the world, (2) That through sin, death entered, and (3) Thus death passed upon all men, *through* him in whom all sinned. Now, it is in reference to this last, that the parenthesis occurs. That part of the comparison, which affirms the points of resemblance in Christ's legal relations, to those of Adam, is postponed, until proof is offered of the position, "in whom all sinned:" then it is resumed and the comparison completed.*

2. This translation gives the literal and true meaning of the language—"death passed through the one in

* The point which I desire to establish by a critical examination, is, that ἐφ' ᾧ can be here correctly translated only *in whom*. For although it be true as Dr. Hodge remarks, that, "it is not necessary, in order to defend this interpretation, to adopt, the rendering *in whom;*" Yet if it can be shown that there are insuperable philological objections to the common reading, *for that*, or *because that*, the other rendering, *in whom*, because it will certainly strengthen and illustrate the doctrine for which we contend, ought to be adopted. Let us therefore endeavour to make this out. And (1) the verb διηλθεν translated *passed*, always requires a case expressed or implied, for the preposition, in composition, to govern: *passed through—through* what? My affirmation is, that the sentence is always imperfect, until a case is supplied; the grammatical construction indispensibly requires it. This compound verb occurs (see Schmidius) forty-three times in the New Testament, and any man who will take the trouble to examine the whole, will be convinced of the truth of the foregoing affirmation. Let us inspect a few of the passages, in the order of their occurrence. Matt. xii. 43, and Luke xi. 24. "the unclean spirit *walketh through dry places*." Math. xix, 24, and Mark x. 25, "it is easier for a camel to *go through* the eye of a needle." In both instances the preposition, including the word διὰ *through*, is repeated after it. Mark iv. 35, and Luke viii. 22. "Let *us pass over* unto the other side." Let us pass through [the lake or sea.] Here the governed case is understood, Luke ii. 15. "Let us now go over unto Bethehem"—Let us pass *through* [the *country* or *villages*—as Acts. ix. 32. Peter *passed through* all parts,"] Luke ii. 35. "a sword shall pierce *through* thine own soul also." Here is the accusative without the proposition repeated. Luke iv. 30. and John viii. 49, "passing *through* the midst." Luke v. 15. "So much the more went there a fame abroad"—did the fame *pass through* [all parts.] Luke ix. 6. "and *went through* the towns"—and v. 17, and John iv. 4.—he *passed through* the midst of Samaria—Luke xix. 1. "And Jesus passed *through* Jericho"—and v. 4. "he was to

whom all sinned." The affirmation of all sinning in Adam, is proved in vs. 13 and 14. The first point he takes toward the proof, is the fact, that sin was in the world before the Mosaic law—men sinned up to the time of the Sinai covenant—until the law.

(2) The existence of sin, proves the existence of a

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pass that way—*through* that place. In Acts the word occurs twenty-one times; In eleven of these, viz; IX. 32—XII. 10—XIII. 6—XIV. 24—XV. 3—41—XVI. 6—XVIII. 23—XIX. 1. 21—XX. 2, the case governed, is expressed without a repetition of the preposition, and is always the accusative; except IX. 32, where the proposition is repeated with the genitive: it is never repeated with the accusative. In the remaining ten, viz: VIII. 4, 40—IX. 38—X. 38—XI. 19, 22—XIII. 14—XVII. 23—XVIII. 27—XX. 25, the cases are not expressed, but the sentences are elliptical and can easily be filled up. Ex. gr. (case 1)—"they that were scattered abroad went *every where* [through all parts] (2) "Philip—passing *through* [all parts] —preached in all the cities."—(3) "desiring him that he would not delay to *come* to them, [to pass through the intervening regions,] (4) "who went about, [passed *through the country*] doing good"—(5) "went as far as to Phenice"—passed *through the country* to Phenice. And thus it is in every instance; there is an ellipsis which must be filled up to complete the grammatical construction and the meaning. For your more thorough satisfaction, I add the remaining instances in the New Testament, 1 Cor. x. 1—XVI. 5—2 Cor. I. 16—Heb. IV. 14. Convinced I am, that no Greek scholar can inspect them, without passing through to the conclusion, that the *medium* through which he passes must always be supplied, to complete the sense and the grammar of the text.

(2) This point established, our next inquiry is after the object of the compound verb—or rather, the medium or way through which the thing passes. For you must have observed there always is a medium, it is through something—*through dry places*—*through* the eye of *a needle*, *through* [the sea] *through* [the country]—*through* thine *own soul*—*through* the midst—*through all parts*—And thus, in every instance of the forty-three, there is a medium through which the passage is made. What is it? Let the text answer. "Wherefore as δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου *through one man* sin εἰσῆλθε passed in ἐις *upon* the world, and διὰ *through* sin death [passed in upon the world,] and thus ἐις upon all men, [the world] death διῆλθεν *passed through* [the one] ἐφ' ᾧ *in whom* all sinned."

That there is an ellipsis of διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς *through the one* is manifest from the 17th verse, where it is affirmed, that death reigned *through the one*, διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς, which is the identical idea expressed here.

law—for sin is not imputed—men cannot be held punishable for sin, who have had no knowledge of a law, for "sin is the transgression of the law." (3) Yet from Adam to Moses, during a space of twenty-five centuries, death swayed his iron, but righteous sceptre over the entire race of Adam. But death has no power to destroy, except as he derives his power from the law; because the law exists for the protection of innocence and for the punishment of guilt. Seeing therefore, that the punishment was rightfully inflicted, it is undeniable that sin was imputed, and the sinner held to be guilty before the law. But how does this prove that men sinned—all men in Adam? If they, in and by their own personal

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The phrase *upon all men death passed in through the one* is equivalent to the phrase "by one's offence death reigned through the one." The ellipsis in the 12th verse, of these words *through the one*, occurs simply because, the writer had mentioned, in the two preceding lines, that sin entered through the one man and death through sin. To avoid tautology, he omits, as unnecessary, the writing of the διὰ a fouth time in the same sentence.

3. Our next examination is into the scriptural meaning of the words ἐφ᾽ ᾧ translated *for that*. The position maintained is, that it is here correctly translated only by the words *in whom*, or *in which—by whom or which*. And let us pursue the same mode—let us refer to all the instances wherein the words occur in the New Testament.

(1) Matt. xxvi. 50, "And Jesus said unto him, Friend ἐφ᾽ ᾧ *wherefore* art thou come?" But the reading which many prefer—with Griesbach ἐφ᾽ ὁ—the accusative neuter which is correctly rendered *on account of what*, if doubtless, the genuine and true reading, Friend, for what—on account of what, art thou come? This must therefore be dismissed as not affording really an example. (2) Mark ii. 4, and Luke v. 25—"they let down the bed ἐφ᾽ ᾧ wherein, *in which*, he lay"—"he took up that whereon ἐφ᾽ ᾧ *in which*, he lay." Here, it cannot, with any tolerable sense, be translated as a causal particle—for, or *because*. And you see in the lattter case, just as in Rom. v. 12, the antecedent is to be supplied: it is not expressed in the text—he took up [the bed] in which he had lain—death passed through [the one] in whom all sinned.

(3) Philip iii. 12.—that I may apprehend that *for which* ἐφ᾽ ᾧ *in which* also I am apprehended of Christ." Here again the antecedent to ᾧ is omitted eliptically, and must be supplied to fill up the grammar and the sense.

(4) Phil. iv. 10.—Wherein, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ *in which* ye were also careful,

acts, sinned, must it not be imputed, and they die? Can the fact of death therefore, prove any thing but simply, that the soul which died, had sinned himself, personally? (4) But death exercised his kingly power, by right of law, over some—over multitudes who never had sinned in, and by their own proper, personal acts, like Adam. *He* was created in full maturity of mental and of bodily powers, and the law was given to him, and he wilfully transgressed it. But now, vast multitudes have died, who never had matured powers and a clear knowledge of the law. All the infants that perished in the flood, and all that have been cut off by disease and by violence, before and since, were not like Adam in this respect, and could not therefore, sin after the similitude of his transgression. How then did they sin? For that sin was imputed to them—that they were guilty—that they were held liable to punishment, is undeniably evident from the awful fact, that they did suffer death.

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(5) 2 Con. v. 4. "we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not *for that* we would be unclothed, &c." *For that*, is here the translation of ἐφ᾽ ᾧ. But if you substitute the literal rendering, *by which*, you will both improve the doctrine and state the meaning.—We groan, being burdened, by or in which [groaning] we do not wish to be unclothed—our groaning is not be considered as expressing a restive discontent and wishing for death.

(6) There is another case very similar to Phil. iv. 10, in Luke xi. 22. where the same preposition is connected with the feminine relative. "But when a stronger then he, shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour *wherein* ἐφ᾽ ᾗ *in which* he trusted."

Thus this form of expression *cannot* possibly be considered as a causal particle, in three of the five cases in which it occurs. It is not at all necessary to consider it so in any one instance. The plain and obvious translation,—that which the rules of grammar and the drift of the apostles reasoning both require, is, *in whom*, and I can see no good reason why we should abandon it, simply because it is excepted against by the enemies of evangelical doctrine, though, we ought never to build any important doctrine upon a mere verbal criticism. Nor do I propose it here. What I insist on, is simply that, inasmuch as sound criticism and the current of the apostle's reasoning, conspire to establish that translation which makes the truth most clearly manifest, we are bound in faithfulness to the text to receive and defend it.

Death is the wages of sin and they received them. They were therefore due in justice. On account of what sin? Personal sin? This is impossible, for there was none, nor could be. Nay but on account of their sin in Adam, "who is the type of him that was to come." Thus briefly but forcibly and clearly does the Apostle close in the argument for the truth, that all sinned in Adam.

In closing it, however, he intimates a similarity between Adam and him that was to come, i. e. Christ, as to certain points. A *type* is a *likeness*, *pattern*, *example*, prepared by *sculpture*, *drawing*, *impression*, with a view to be imitated afterwards. "See that thou make all things according to the *pattern*, *type*, shewed thee in the mount." Heb. viii. 5. This example gives the true meaning of the word, and accordingly, it is used to describe the resemblance, in the hands and feet of the Saviour, to the instruments by which he was fastened to the wood,—"the *print*, *type*, of the nails." "Ye took up the tabernacle of Moloch, and the star of your God Remphan, *figures*, *types*, which ye made to worship." Acts vii. 43. "These things were our *examples*, *types*." 1. Cor. x. 6, and v. 11,—"All those things happened to them for *examples; types*; and they are written for our admonition." And six other times it is used in the New Testament in the same sense. Christ and Adam then are alike—the latter was *a type*, *an example*, *a pattern*, *a print*, *a figure*, of the former.

3. But now it is obvious, that points of resemblance may be, and yet other points of dissimilarity exist too. Our printing types and the letters formed by them, are alike and yet very unlike. What are the points of likeness intended between Christ and Adam? What are the unlike points? Personal, moral character, is surely not intended: but legal relations. They both stand as covenant representative heads to distinct bodies of men, whose destiny is effected by their conduct, respectively. And, as resembling objects may have their points of resemblance made more prominent and striking, by bringing into view the points of difference, the Apostle suspends still farther the comparison begun in the 12th verse, that he may draw this contrast. "This he does,

says Dr. Hodge, principally by shewing in verses 15, 16, 17, the particulars in which the comparison does not hold."

Verse 15. "But not as the offence, so also is the free gift." The offence is Adam's sin imputed; the free gift is Christ's righteousness imputed: and these are opposites. Now if by the offence of the one, [Adam] the many [all, v. 18] died, much more the grace of God and the gift [of righteousness, v. 17] by grace, which is, or belongs, to the one man, Christ Jesus, abounded unto the many [the all of v. 18]. By the sin of Adam, the many died. Not, Adam *occasioned* their death, but he *caused* it: not as David *occasioned* the death of Ahimelech and the priests, but as Saul and Doeg *caused* their death. 1. Sam. xxii. 18, &c. By the grace of Christ, which includes the bestowment of all his merits, consisting of his entire acts of obedience and his sufferings—the many live—his grace abounds through righteousness unto eternal life. There is here a point resemblance; viz. in the federative or representative principle involved in both. There is also a point of contrast; viz. the action of the one is to death; of the other, to life. Hence, the emphasis of the sentence lies on the *much more.* If one bad act, brought death upon all represented in it; much more, shall innumerable good acts, bring life to all represented in them.

Verse 16 contains another point of contrast; viz. Not as [the offence] through the one sinning, [so is] the gift. For the judgment was from one [offence] to condemnation. By Adam's one sin, as the just and efficacious procuring cause, a sentence of condemnation (κατάκριμα) was brought upon all his people. But on the contrary, "the free gift," which was secured by Christ's entire life, consisting of innumerable acts of obedience and of all his sufferings, delivered his people "from many offences," and secures to them "a sentence of justification." (δικαίωμα.) Here, it is to our purpose to remark particularly, the *condemnation* is from one offence, viz: Adam's first sin. Language cannot express the thought more definitely. He does not say, the one offence of Adam opened the way for many

offences to follow in his people, and for those many offences—their personal sins—the condemnation comes. His language absolutely *excludes* this. He says, (ἐξ ἑνὸς) from the one, is the judgement to condemnation. No other sin is necessary to bring the sentence of condemnation upon men—no voluntary act of theirs, as an evidence of their consent—nothing but the one offence is concerned in it. The first, and main idea of original sin is the *guilt* of Adam's first sin. In other words, his posterity, by reason of his sin, are under *condemnation*, and consequently liable to suffer all that sin deserves.

Verse 17, is an enlargement of the 15th, with an additional illustration personifying death, borrowed from the 14th. For, if by the transgression of the one, [Adam] death obtained a rightful dominion, through the one [διὰ τοῦ ἑνός] and exercises it [ἐβασίλευσε, has reigned and is reigning as king,]; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life through the one, Jesus Christ. If the King of terrors received by the one transgression of Adam, his iron sceptre, for the destruction of men: much more shall the justified in Christ, live and reign with him. "As it was by one man, antecedently to any concurrence of our own, that we were brought into a state of condemnation, so it is by one man, without any merit of our own, that we are delivered from this state. If the one event has happened, much more may we expect the other to occur. If we are thus involved in the condemnation of sin, in which we had no personal concern, much more, shall we, who voluntary receive the gift of righteousness, be not only saved from the consequences of the fall, but be made partakers of eternal life." Hodge on Rom. p. 127.

Thus, in verses 13 and 14 is proved the truth of the affirmation in the close of v. 12—viz: that all sinned in Adam. Thus in vs. 15, 16, 17, is proved the truth of the affirmation in the close of the 14th verse; viz. that Adam was a type of Christ. Having proved the truth of his whole first branch of the comparison, viz: that sin and death passed upon all men, through him in whom all sinned, he proceeds in v. 18, to complete the comparison.

"In very deed, therefore, as through one's offence, [transgression] *it* [sentence] *came* upon all men unto condemnation: so also through one's righteousness [δικαίωματος, justification v. 16. εις δικαίωμα, a sentence declaring the person righteous] [it] *the free gift, came* upon all men, unto justification [δικαιώσιν, justifying, the process of judging] of life.

"Therefore, as by the offence of one, *judgement came* upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, *the free gift came* upon all men unto justification of life." As we are all condemned, through the righteousness of Adam—even so we are all justified through the righteousness of Christ. Condemnation is by Adam: justification by Christ. Death by Adam: life by Christ. Here we again remark, is the essence of our doctrine of original sin; viz. *guilt*—liability to penal evil.

But you see, the matter of the comparison is really a contrast; the resemblance is the *manner*. As by the offenee—EVEN so by the righteousness. It is the same in 1. Cor. xv. 22. "For as in Adam all die, EVEN so in Christ, shall all be made alive." The precise point of resemblance, or likeness, or type, as in v. 14, lies in the *manner* of becoming condemned, on the one hand, and justified on the other—of dying by Adam, and being made alive by Christ. The *manner*, it is affirmed, is, the same in both cases. And to perceive the resemblance, we must enquire *how*—in *what manner* did all become involved in condemnation and death, by Adam? *how*,—in *what manner* are all secured of justification and life by Christ? The answer here, is obvious enough, from the doctrine of federal representation and the consequent imputation of the guilt of the representer to the represented. *How* did all come under condemnation, and thus die in Adam? In what *manner?* On *what principle?* In this way; viz: He represented, or acted for them in the covenant of works; consequently, his act in sinning, was imputed to them; they were held liable to punishment for it, and thus died in him. *How* do all men come under justification, and thus become alive in Christ? In what manner? On what principle? Exactly

in the same manner; viz: He represented them, or acted for them, in the covenant of grace; consequently, his act in obeying, was imputed to them—they were held liable to reward for it, and thus live in him.

Thus, all whom Adam represented, were condemned and died in him. Dr. Hodge, in his incomparable comment on this passage, gives us the essence of the whole in three lines: "Paul's doctrine, therefore, is, 'As on account of the offence of Adam, all connected with him, are condemned; so on account of the righteousness of Christ, all connected with him have the justification of life.'"

This same reasoning applies to the comparison of the 19th verse: where it is affirmed, that by the disobedience of the one man [Adam] the many were made sinners, and that "by the obedience of the one [Christ] the many shall be made righteous. It is not affirmed that the many were put by Adam's act into such a state, that so soon as they would act for themselves, they would be sinners; nor that the many were put into such a state by Christ's acts and sufferings, that so soon as they would act, they would be righteous. The language is positive, and cannot be made to express such a meaning. By Adam's act, his people became sinners in the eye of the law, and were by it, held liable to suffer. By Christ's acts, his people became righteous in the eye of the law, and are by it, held liable to happiness. And in both cases, the *meaning* is precisely the same: it is by their sustaining to their respective federal representatives, the relations constituted by the covenants entered into by God, with the first and the second Adams, respectively.

v. The fifth division of the context includes vs. 20, 21, and seems to have some specific purpose, though brought in incidentally as it were, in connexion with the expansion and final statement of the comparison.

The specific, yet *apparently* incidental purpose, is, to forestall and foreclose the objection of the Jew, who still entertained the notion that the Mosaic law must have some essential agency in the sinner's justification. Whereas, the Apostle runs entirely beyond the days of Moses, and

comes down to a period after his law ceases. What then, the Jew asks, is the use of the law? If justification has no intimate connexion and no dependence on the law of Moses, "wherefore then serveth the law?" Of what use was it? The law here, is manifestly not the moral law, as it is set forth in many parts of Moses' writings; nor the gospel truths also exhibited in the same; but all that which became of binding obligation, because it is revealed by Moses. That is, all the *positive* rules, commanding as duties, things which were not obligatory as duties before. The moral law and gospel promises existed prior to the Sinai institutions, and really form no *peculiar* part of them. If therefore, reasons the Jew, justification and salvation took place, as you have proved, before, and after the law of Moses, and consequently, independently on it, I should like to know, of what use it is. "Wherefore then serveth the law?" Paul answers this question, Gal. III. 19. "It was added, because of transgression."—So here, "the law entered," it "was super-induced on a plan already laid," for this precise end, to increase upon the minds of the Israelites, a sense of the great evil of sin, by exposing them to a vast variety and number of dangers to sin. Transgressions are multiplied to them, and ceremonial purifications are perpetually required for these multiplied transgressions, and thus there is kept up a constant remembrance of their sinfulness; and thus the law of Moses was a pedagogue to lead these children to Christ. It had this important bearing upon the interests of salvation, that its yoke of bondage on their neck, made them feel the necessity of Christ's freedom; and its ceremonial purifications directed them to Him.

Thus, the practical effect of the Mosaic law is, to multiply transgression, and thus sin abounded: but another effect is to turn the mind, in multiplied proportion, to the source of pardon; and so grace did far more abound and overflow.

Having thus foreclosed the Jew's objection, the Apostle returns upon the general comparison, and resuming his beautiful trope, represents sin as a monster king, endued with legal power, and exercising it in and by his

prime minister death. He had in v. 14, represented death as the king who reigned over all men; now he enthrones sin, which is the cause of death—to which death is only ministerial; for the power to hurt, the *sting* of death is sin. It is sin therefore, that acts the part of a king, and death follows his train.

But grace too is enthroned; she sits a queen and exercises her sovereign power with an heavenly benignity. Majesty attends her steps; righteousness and truth go before her; not an act of her's sacrifices the interests of either; neither of them is crushed beneath her triumphal car, nor are they dragged in servile chains at her chariot wheels—they go before her, as heralds of the coming joy; they tell of a fulfilled law, of an exhausted curse, of a hell extinguished in the blood of calvary, of a heaven lighted up by the life of Jesus.

Application.—Come then, ye degraded, lost and ruined subjects of the King of Terrors, and bow before the majesty of our queen. In her hand is the golden sceptre, which if a man but touch, with the outstretched and trembling hand of faith, he shall live forever. "He that liveth and believeth in me, shall never die."

2dly. Who can but admire the profound simplicity of the apostle's reasoning? This is one of those splendid passages, which, whenever his attention can be arrested to the meaning of the language, compels the learned infidel to admire the power of Paul's logic, though he may despise the purity of his doctrine. You have here a splendid exemplification of the argument from effects, to their causes. You see also how much the power of argument depends upon the mind's capacity to trace resemblances.

3. Where men enjoy the gospel and its ordinances, the presumptions and probabilities are all favourable to them, and go to encourage diligence in the use of means. How much more abundant the grace of Christ, than the ruin of Adam! If unlike things may be compared in quantity, how much more of merit is there in the obedience of Christ, than of demerit in the disobedience of Adam. Hence the certainty of death by the one en-

hances, to every one that believes in him, the certainty of life by the other.

4. It does not however, follow that all men are or will be saved; but only that all whom Christ represented; just as all whom Adam represented die in him.

5. Who they are, whom Christ represented, can be ascertained to us, only by the evidences of true conversion. Christ represented all that will ever reach eternal happiness—all that will ever be qualified for its enjoyment—all good and true believers in all ages of the world, and to the end of time—all that immense multitude which no man can number, who shall sing the song of Moses and the Lamb. That we may be found among that countless throng, let us labor, and pray, and suffer with him, so shall we be glorified together.

CHAPTER X.

ORIGINAL SIN—PROVED FROM THE SALVATION OF THOSE THAT DIE IN INFANCY.

The limits of legitimate enquiry, it is of some importance to know. And it is not a little difficult to determine, in many cases, where they lie. Owing to this difficulty, and the consequent uncertainty, as to the limits of attainable knowledge, much labor, no doubt, has been spent in vainly attempting to pass beyond the barriers which divine wisdom has erected. "Secret things," it is admitted, "belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed, belong unto us, and to our children;" let us therefore, in our enquiries into the the condition of these immense multitudes of our race, who die in infancy, be peculiarly cautious not to overstep the boundaries of prudence and revealed wisdom.

In the preceding chapter, I have developed the argument for the doctrine of original sin, from the fact of in-

fants' sufferings. Now I propose to deduce another from the fact of their ultimate salvation. In its prosecution, a number of distinct remarks will be necessary.

SECTION I.

Infants go to Heaven.

It is not inconsistent with any doctrine of the Bible, that the souls of deceased infants go to heaven. And yet it is a doctrine taught only by implication, and learned only by inference. There is no direct and express declaration of scripture to this amount. The Saviour declares [Math. xviii. 3, &c.] "Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven——But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, &c." From the 3d. verse, we would incline to believe that infants, prior to moral agency and before actual sin, were intended;—but the 6th v. seems to exclude that thought; for they are such as are capable of exercising faith in Christ. And no doubt it is the simplicity of their belief that constitutes the point of the comparison. Except ye be converted and become as little children, whose leading characteristic is, to believe their parents, with a simple and unwavering confidence, ye cannot be saved. The persons spoken of, are little ones, yet so matured as to believe in Jesus: this context, therefore, says nothing on the question about infants who die prior to moral agency.

The case, [Math. xix. 14,] is not more explicit.—"Suffer little children and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." The kingdom of heaven here, is beyond question, the visible kingdom, viz: the church of God. The Master does not say the church, or kingdom consists of them; but only, that it is theirs, it belongs to them, [τοιούτων ἐστὶν] they have a right of possession in it. The question cannot be reasonably raised here, as to their moral character, but only as to there legal, or ecclesiastical rights. Under the old dispensation, they were recognised as belonging to the

church; and her spiritual care was extended over them and her seal was put upon them. The disciples seem not to have comprehended the genius of the new dispensation here, as in other things, and were for keeping back the little children; but the Lord asserts their rights, and encourages their approach.

The only thing in this context, that would seem to constitute a basis for the inference, that infants are saved, is, the fact of his laying hands on them, and blessing them. There is however, no ground to infer any thing in reference to those that die in infancy, for this is manifestly not the class of infants presented in the context.

In Rev. xi. 18, the prophet speaks of "them that fear thy name, small and great;" and in xix. 5, he exclaims. "Praise our God, all ye his servants, and ye that fear him, both small and great," and in xx. 12, he avers that he "saw the dead, small and great stand before God; and the books were opened."—The first passage may possibly relate to the same event as the last, viz: the process of judgement: but the second refers to the glorious of the millenial morning; and I doubt very much, whether the phrase, *small and great* has any reference whatever to size—to infancy and manhood; rather does it refer to the state and condition of men in society in this life. Princes and nobles, as well as the humblest of the race, are called upon to bow before the Lord, and to give in their account to our Redeemer. If this be the true view, then these passages say nothing on the condition of those who die before moral agency. Nor can I find any other passage in the sacred volume that speaks explicitly. God indeed does promise to every believer to be a God unto him and to his seed after him. This *may* include the children that die in infancy; but it certainly *does* include those, who grow up to man's estate.

On what ground then, do we rest our faith that our little ones, who are removed, are taken to God? How do we know, that these tender scions are transplanted into the paradise of God on high? The only true answer is, that we do not know it positively to be so. It is only a high presumption—an opinion rather that an

article of faith. There is nothing in the thought opposed to the general drift of scripture doctrines; but on the contrary, it is agreeable to the general spirit of the gospel and the particular passages above cited: and moreover, it is very agreeable to the feelings of afflicted parents.

If these things be so, it might repay for the trouble, to enquire, why such studied silence seems to pervade the sacred volumns? Why is no express mention made of the salvation of infants? Has God no wise design in it? Has he not given sufficient encouragement to the faith of true christians to sustain and comfort them in sorrow—whilst he has withheld from the unbelieving all the comforts of faith? To me this appears to be the state of the case. From the promises of the gospel, and our compliance with God's requirement to dedicate our infant offspring to Him, we who believe, have sufficient ground of encouragement; whilst to those who despise his grace, and reject his ordinances, there is no consolation ministered. Thus, in the silence of scripture, there is wisdom. Rebellious men, on the one hand, are not allowed to eat the fruit of the tree of life; whilst on the other, no flaming sword repels the children of the covenant. Besides, our opinions are utterly unavailing to the dying infant; he is beyond any agency of ours, but that of prayer, and to this, there is promise.

As to the opinion that *all* who die in infancy, both children of believers and unbelievers, christians and pagans, go to happiness and heaven, it may be harmlessly entertained: it may however operate an evil influence upon the minds of unbelieving and wicked parents; and that it does so operate, I have not the least doubt. Tell wicked, graceless and profligate parents, who despise Jesus and his religion, that their dead infant is gone to happiness, and you encourage them to continue in unbelief; for they can and do see that this is all you could tell the most pious, and devoted and prayerful believers, concerning their offspring. You thus, put no difference as to comfort in existing circumstances, between the precious, and the vile, and encourage a continuance in the wickedness and crime of despising gospel ordinances.

Whilst therefore, I have no objection to the opinion, that *all* who die in infancy. go to happiness; yet I must think, that, in reference to the infants of unbelievers, it is mere opinion; and not a doctrine taught expressly, or by fair implication in the word of God; and that, although it is in all probability an opinion according to truth; still, not having a divine warrant for it, and it being of evil tendency, we are not warranted in its unqualified assertion before an unbelieving world. For our purposes, and, it appears to me, for all the benevolent purposes of the gospel, it is sufficient to affirm, concerning the deceased infants of believing parents, that they are gone to glory.

SECTION II.

These infants come to eternal happiness through Jesus Christ, our Lord—they are saved and are indebted to Jesus for their salvation.

(1) In proof of this position, I adduce the case quoted above, where Jesus commands, "suffer little children and forbid them not, to come unto me."—and where all, both small and great are commanded to praise our God. True, I have set these aside as proof texts in the case, and I adduce them only as a bar to those who may feel disposed to demur at my interpretation. If they insist that these texts are applicable to the souls of dead infants, then I insist that they are pertinent proofs that such are saved through Christ.

(2) In the account given of the final judgement, Matt. xxv. the immense throng are divided into two parts, and into *two only*. In one or the other of these two, every individual of the human race is included. No third party or portion is ever mentioned—they are the *sheep* and the *goats*—the *righteous* and the *wicked*—the *children of God*, and the *children of the wicked one*—the *elect* and the *reprobate*. There are then but two classes, and consequently, one of these classes includes the happy souls of them that die in infancy. But now this immense throng, on the right hand, are the same

as the immense multitude mentioned in Revelations, vii. chapter, which no man can number, who shout "Salvation to our God, which sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb," "and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb"—the same multitude, mentioned in chapter xix. the voice of whose thunderings rolls along the skies, "saying, Allelujah; for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth; let us be glad and rejoice, and give honour to him; for the marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath made herself ready." Now, can any man, we ask, whose soul is sanctified by the washing of the Lamb's blood, affirm, that in this thundering acclamation of redeemed millions, there's not a single note from infant lips! From the grand choir which makes heaven's high arches ring, when the man of Calvary saith "Come ye blessed of my Father," must all infants be excluded! Must all the little mourners of Rama be cut off from rejoicing now!! Not an infant be allowed to tune its voice to praise redeeming love!!! Beleive it, if ye can, ye mothers in Israel! Believe it, ye who have closed in death the eyes of loveliness—who have deposited in clay the fragile forms which fade in immortality! Believe it, ye whose souls anticipate with joy, the promised morn, when *youth* and "beauty immortal shall wake from her tomb;"—whose ears hope then to hear, in clear and silvery tones, from lips denied such utterance here below, the song of Moses and the Lamb!

Ah! no! This ye cannot believe. For faith must have the evidence of testimony to rest upon: and God has recorded no testimony against the doctrine of infant salvation. No part of the Bible affirms, that they are received to eternal happiness, on any other grounds than through the blood and righteousness of your blessed Redeemer. Ah! no!—parental *faith*, and parental *feeling* unite in the blessed hope, that their dead infants shall live and reign with Christ, forever—that heaven's music would be incomplete without the symphony of their sweet voices—that until they strike their lofty note, half the praises of redeeming blood remain unsung.

Let it then be a settled truth with us, that infants who

die and go to heaven, are redeemed from death and hell, by the blood of Calvary—they are washed in the same fountain with their redeemed parents, and enrobed with them in the same garments of a Saviour's righteousness —their sin is pardoned through the same atonement, and they are justified by the obedience of the one Redeemer.

Reader, have I your judgement—I know I have your *heart*—but have I your *understanding*—your head with me in this conclusion? I scorn to take advantage of your tender feeling. Let reason and judgement be convinced. Before we proceed, let us be agreed here. For it may perhaps turn out, that from the inevitable consequences of admitting the above truth, you may wish to flinch hereafter. Hence my deep anxiety to carry your most deliberate and thorough convictions with me. Please to turn back and inspect afresh, the two preceeding remarks; if you are fully convinced of their truth, we shall proceed.

SECTION III.

Only Sinners can be saved.

Jesus Christ came to save sinners, and he finished the work given to him by the Father. "I came not to call the righteous, but *sinners* to repentance." "To seek and to save that which was *lost*." "I am not sent but to the *lost sheep* of the house of Israel." "They that are whole, have no need of the physician; but they that are *sick*." "This thy brother was *dead* and is *alive* again, he was *lost* and is *found*." No position can be laid down, more consonant with scripture and with common sense, than this. Let us look at it in a little of its detail.

(1.) Repentance cannot take place except where there is sin. The reason is plain. Repentence is the mind's turning from sin to God, with loathing and abhorence of sin, and sorrow for it; and love to God and holiness. If a being is holy and free from all sin, there *is* no room for repentance—the thing is impossible. A man connot repent of sin in which he had no participation.

(2.) Regeneration is that spiritual change which is effected by the Holy Ghost, in and upon the soul of man, at his conversion. It implies the soul's being in a state of spiritual death. That which is not spiritually dead cannot be made spiritually alive again. True, believers "have passed from death unto life." They were dead —so dead, that except they be born again—made anew to live, they could not enter into the kingdom of God. Jesus did not come to save, by the renewing of the Holy Ghost, those who were always alive and never were dead. As a saviour he has to do only with the lost. If any man be not dead in sins, he cannot be made alive in Christ. If there is no hurt in the daughter of my people, she has no need of the balm of Gilead, and the physician there. If there be no blindness, there can be no restoration of sight. If there be no disease in the feet and ancle bones, there can be no deliverance from that lameness.

(3.) Pardon of sin implies its guilt. Pardon is the lifting up from a person, of the punishment which he deserves—to which by a sentence of law he is exposed. It is an authorative removal of that punishment, so that it cannot be inflicted upon him. If no sin is justly charged upon a man, he cannot be pardoned. Pardon is an act of sovereignty; but even sovereignty cannot pardon, where there is no guilt. Let the sovereign of a nation offer pardon to a virtuous, upright citizen, who has offended no law, and what will he think? How will his indignation kindle? Pardon! for what? Forgivness! how insulting? No, even the sovereign of the universe, cannot pardon a sinless creature.

(4.) For holy beings who have never sinned, there can be no atonement rendered. He who has offended no law, has no restitution to make to an offended law: and he who has no restitution to make to violated law, can have no need and no room, for a friend to make restitution. Unless I am a slave to offended justice, no man can purchase my freedom. Unless I am a captive sold under sin, no man can pay the price of my redemption.

(5.) If any man have the righteousness of the law in himself, and of himself, he cannot be justified through the

righteousness of another. Whosoever of you are justified by the law, ye are fallen from grace—i. e. from justification by grace: this ye have renounced. Either the meritorious obedience of Christ, or that of the man himself, must justify him. Either, a man must wear the seamless robe of Immanuel's righteousness, or he must wear the tattered garments of his own. In this case, he is justified by works, and receives heaven as his own reward: in that, he is justified by grace, through faith in the righteousness of Christ; and receives heaven, as a gift of God.

From these particulars it is obvious, to a demonstration, that sinful, polluted, condemned, and guilty persons *only*, can be saved, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Consequently I remark,

SECTION IV.

Infants are guilty, condemned, polluted, and sinful beings.

(1.) If they were not made sinners by the disobedience of the one Adam; they could not be made righteous, by the obedience of the other. If we maintain their salvation through the righteousness of Christ; there is no alternative, we *must* maintain their previous sinfulness, through the disobedience of Adam.

(2.) Regenerated and sanctified, they cannot possibly be, unless they were previously polluted and dead. The Holy Ghost cannot remove from them pollution, if they have none. He cannot give them holiness, if they have it already. He cannot restore them to life spiritual, if they have never lost it—unless they were dead, they could not be made alive again—unless they were lost, they could not be found. Here, also, there is no evasion. Either, you must deny the doctrine of infant regeneration—you must deny that they are born of the spirit; or you must admit that they are by nature, dead in trespasses and sins. "There is no regeneration, or renovation," says Richard Baxter, "but from sin." On this point, the fact of infant circumcision and baptism, con-

stitute a cogent argument. It was pressed upon Pelagius and his followers, by Augustine and others, with overpowering effect. Pelagius denied the doctrine of original sin. "Therefore, we conclude," says his friend Julian, "that the triune God, should be adored as most just, and it has been made to appear most irrefragably, that the sin of another, never can be imputed to little children." And again, "Hence, that is evident, which we defend as most reasonable, that no one is born in sin, and that God never judges man to be guilty, on account of his birth." Pelagius was bearded with the fact that children are "baptised for the remission of sins," and he could never meet the argument, yet could he never escape from it. He expressed great indignation, nevertheless, at a report which took the air, that he denied infant baptism; affirming in strong terms, the falsehood of the report; and that he maintained the baptism of infants, according to the universal custom of the church. But now, if baptism means any thing at all, it means that those who are washed, were polluted. "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty—I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, my blessing upon thine offspring."—Cleansing, by the blood and spirit of Christ, is most unquestionably intended, in the ordinance of baptism. Most assuredly, therefore, the baptising of infants, which has been practiced universally by the church universal, from the beginning of the Christian dispensation, until since the reformation, teaches that infants need to be washed by the blood of Christ, and renewed by the spirit of our God.

3. Gratitude for pardon, no infant lips can ever utter, unless it has been condemned, and held liable to punishment. The fact of infant lips being engaged in praising redeeming love, is therefore conclusive evidence, that they feel themselves indebted to Jesus for their redemption—that they have received through him the remission of sins—that He suffered for them the pains of death—that He made for them an efficient atonement—rendered a full satisfaction to the injured law. Let me close this argument by a quotation from "the Vindication," 102, 103.

"Against this doctrine [which denies original sin] Richard Baxter directed his mighty pen. Works, Vol. xiii. 91, &c. "You cannot," says he, "exempt infants themselves from *sin* and misery without exempting them from Christ the Redeemer and the remedy." He then pours forth more than half a page of texts, and proceeds: "If infants have no *sin* and misery, then they are none of the body, the church, which Christ loved and gave himself for, that he might cleanse it." You will observe how specifically he fastens down *sin* as well as misery upon infants, and then he mentions the *guilt* and the punishment of sin in the case of infants. "But what need we further proof, when we have the common experience of all the world? Would every man that is born of a woman, without exception, so early manifest sin in the life, if there were no corrupt disposition at the heart? And would all mankind, without exception, taste of the *punishment of sin*, if they had no participation of sin, if they had no participation of the guilt? "Death is the wages of sin; and by sin death entered into the world, and it passeth upon all men, for that all have sinned." Rom. v, 12. Infants have sickness, and torments, and death, which are the fruits of sin. And were they not presented to Christ as a Saviour, when he took them in his arms and blessed them, and said "of such is the kingdom of heaven?" Certainly none that never were *guilty*, nor miserable, are capable of a place in the kingdom of the Mediator. For to what end should he mediate for them? or how should he redeem them that need not a redemption? or how should he reconcile them to God, that never were at enmity with him? or how can he wash them that never were unclean? when the whole have no need of the physician. Matt. ix. 12. He "came to seek, and to save that which was lost." Luke xix. 10. and to save "the people from their sins," Matt. i. 21. They are none of his saved people therefore, that had no sin. He came "to redeem them that were under the law." Gal. iv. 5. But it is most certain that infants were under the law, as well as the adult: and they were a part of "his people

Israel, whom he visited and redeemed." Luke i. 68. If ever they be admitted into glory, they must praise him, "that redeemed them by his blood." Rev. v. 9. [p. 94,] "Infants then, are sinners, or none of those that he came to save. Christ hath made no man righteous by his obedience, but such as Adam *made sinners* by his disobedience,"—"There is no regeneration, or renovation, but from sin," [p. 95] "If they think that any infants are saved, it is either by covenant, or without; there is some promise for it, or there is none." [96] He concludes. "By the fulness of this evidence, it is easy to see, that infants and all mankind are *sinners*, and therefore have need of a Redeemer."

Richard Baxter then, hath fully taught, 1. That infants are polluted and need regeneration. 2. Are dead spiritually and need regeneration. 3, are guilty, liable to, punishment, and can be pardoned.

Thus the salvation of infant humanity contains evidence irresistable, that it was lost. Thedoctrine of original sin, both as to pollution and guilt, is presupposed by the doctrine of infant salvation. They stand or fall together. He that denies the presence of the poison, must as a rational man, reject the antidote.

In closing this argument let us remark:

1. The whole question relative to the state of infants, is of importance chiefly—almost solely, because of its connexion with the more general doctrine of original sin, and so with the more general doctrine of legal imputation. As to those who die in infancy, it can only affect them so far as the prayer of faith and piety is instrumental in their salvation. Those who believe their infant offspring to be under the curse by nature, do also believe that the same principles of law, by which they were brought to this wretched condition, are applied in the covenant of grace, and do secure their redemption; a means towards which, is, diligence, faith and prayer, on the part of their parents. And hence, the general, and, as I suppose, *notorious fact*, that those parents who feel, that they themselves have been the means of bringing their dear babes under the curse, by being the connecting links between them and Adam, do also feel

an awful and solemn responsibility resting upon their souls, viz: the obligation to be the *means* of bringing their beloved offspring into the new covenant, that they may enjoy the blessing.

2. We see from this argument, the atheistical tendency of the Pelagian scheme, or that system which denies original sin—which denies that infants, before they sin personally themselves, are sinners under condemnation. I say, the *tendency* of the system is atheistical. To be convinced of this, you have only to sit down with these doctrines before you, at the cradle of expiring infancy. Mark there the inward struggle, the outward contortion, the deep heaving sigh of that tender bosom, the wild rolling eye, the quivering lip, the agonizing shriek, the dying groan, the parting breath; and tell me, is there a *righteous* God? This child has no sin upon him in any sense; wherefore these sufferings? If love and beauty, and innocence, and holiness can thus suffer, who governs the world? Who gives life and takes it *thus* away? Cruel monster! that can thus sport with agonies unutterable!!! Can spotless justice and almighty power dwell with him!!!

Either then, infants are justly liable to suffer pain and sorrow and death, or there is no God.

3. What a dreadful evil must sin be! which thus brings down the tokens of Heaven's displeasure, thousands of years after its perpetration! One single transgression of God's law, has brought an entire race—myriads of millions of immortal minds, under the vengeance of an Almighty arm! What then must be our final doom, seeing such effects follow from one sin; if we add thousands of actual transgressions to the sin of our nativity, and crown the whole by trampling under foot the law of God, accounting the blood of his covenant an unholy thing, and doing despite to the spirit of his grace!!

Forbid it gracious Heaven. Amen and Amen.

CHAPTER XI.

THE UTTER INABILITY OF MAN, IN HIS FALLEN STATE, TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW, AND THEREBY TO RESTORE HIMSELF TO THE FAVOUR OF GOD.

SECTION I.

The general notion of Ability and Inability.

These terms are of opposite significations, and therefore, the exposition of one, will afford the true idea of the other also. But there are few words so difficult to understand, as ability and inability; and that, because of the intrinsic difficulty of the subject. How do we acquire the idea of ability, or power? is a question which has vexed the world of philosophers no little. Toward procuring a correct response, let us remark, 1st. *Power* or *ability* (for I use them as synonomous) is a *relative* idea. That is, it has reference to something to be done, or resisted. We can have no notion of power, but relatively to action, for the accomplishment of something; or of passive resistance. Power, to do what? Ability, to resist what? Therefore 2. The notion of *power* seems to be derived from the perception of changes, occurring in things without us, and thoughts and feelings within us. This appears to have been the idea of Mr. Locke; and therefore he distinguishes it into *active* and *passive* power: or, as subsequent philosophers have improved the phraseology, into *power* and *susceptibility*. If this be correct—if our notion of power is relative to changes perceived by us, we learn 3. The notion of cause and effect.

Changes that are seen or felt, in frequent connexion with each other especially if they occur in the same order—are, by a very general law of the mind, deemed to have a necessary connexion; so that the one must be followed by the other. Whilst we are entirely ignorant

of what it is, yet we are necessitated to believe, that there is something in the one adapting, or suiting it to be the predecessor of the other. This adaptation, we call the *power* or *ability* in the cause, to produce the effect. For example, we observe a change takes place on the snow, whenever the warm sunshine lights upon it. It liquifies and runs off, in the form of water. This is the effect, and that is the cause. There is a *power* in the sun's rays to melt snow. A man stoops and grasps a fifty-six pound weight with his hand, and straightens himself up. The weight rises off the ground. He has *power* to lift it. But now the man grasps a ton weight, and endeavors to straighten himself, and does not; he is not *able*, he has not *power* to lift a ton. Again, he constructs a compound lever, or a pulley and tackle, and applies it to the ton, and lifts it: he has *ability* to lift a ton. Now these two propositions, viz: a man is able to lift a ton: and, a man is unable to lift a ton—both are true: and yet they appear contradictory. Evidently, therefore, the term ability, is used in different senses. In the former, it refers to physical ability, in the latter, to intellectual, so to speak, or mechanical, combined with physical ability. The particular kind of power, must depend upon the particular nature of the change effected. *Ability* is a relative idea. Causes and effects have a natural adaptation or suitableness, one to the other. If this could be kept steadfastly in mind, it appears to me, it would deliver us from a vast amount of confusion on this subject. All kinds of power or ability, imply some obstacle, opposition, or counterbalancing power, or force. I can form no idea, notion, conception, or thought of power, without having express reference to some kind, or character of resistance, or force to be overcome by it —some change to be effected. The attempt to form such an idea, is an attempt to conceive of a pair of balances, with but one scale. Now the denomination of the power, depends upon the nature of this related force —the character of the ability is ascertained, only from the nature of the change effected. If it be a change upon mere inert matter, as the change upon the snow, by the sun's action, it is mere physical power. If it be

a change upon mind, wherein ignorance has given place to knowledge, it is intellectual power. If it be a change upon the moral feelings, it is moral power.

Now these three are clearly distinct. That ability, or power, by which the man lifted the half hundred weight, is *physical* or *natural ability:* and no man can be at any loss to distinguish it from that *intellectual ability*, which is exerted in planning and calculating the power of a compound lever or tackle, or the distance of a planet, or the duration of an eclipse of the sun. And yet, in these latter operations, the former power is in requisition: for by it he makes the figures of his calculation. But surely no man will say that it was *physical ability* that calculated the eclipse, or *intellectual ability* that held the pencil, and marked the characters on the slate. Moreover, as we have seen, chap. I. sec. v. vi. rational intelligence, or intellectual power, may exist, and that in connexion with volition, apart from moral agency. There must be, sec. vii. also *moral power*—an ability to perceive a right and a wrong in intelligent action. Until the rational being, who has also physical power, possess this moral sense, having no moral power, he is of course not a moral agent. Animal appetites may operate as motives, leading him to act in the use of means to gratify themselves, but until he is *able* to distinguish a *right* and a *wrong morally*, that is, in reference to God's law, he cannot be influenced by motives of a moral nature. But as the Creator has endued man with such power, and as this, though in an impaired state, still abides with him, he, of course, is accountable for its exercise. Now, to the existence of moral power, intellectual power is necessary, and to the manifestation of each, physical power is equally indispensable. That is, a man must have *natural ability* in order, not to the exercise of *intellectual* and of *moral ability*, but to the manifestation of that exercise. The soul may reason, and its moral qualities be called into action, independent of mere physical power—as after death—but as its actions are made known in this state, only by the physical powers of the body, these are necessary to *communicate* the knowledge of its operations.

But their possession does not involve the other. It cannot be said of a horse, that he has physical ability to calculate an eclipse, or to obey the moral law of God. He has more natural ability than a man has, but physical ability cannot, without ridiculous absurdity, be affirmed to be the antecedent cause of intellectual or of moral effects. It is surely, no more absurd to affirm, that a horse has natural ability to calculate an eclipse; than to affirm, that a man has natural, or even intellectual, ability to obey the moral law of God. The horse has strength, more than need be expended in making the figures of the calculation; but then, the expenditure of this kind of ability, in no conceivable degree, could secure the effect required, viz: the calculation of an eclipse. The man has physical and intellectual ability, more than are requisite to be expended in keeping many of the moral precepts of the law, but no possible amount of expenditure of such power, could secure the effect required; viz: moral obedience. Nothing but moral power can be the antecedent cause of moral effects: nothing but intellectual power can be the antecedent cause of intellectual effects: nothing but physical power can be the antecedent cause of physical effects. To affirm that a horse has physical power to draw a train of cars on a rail road, is to speak truth and common sense. But to affirm that a horse has physical power to run a line of levels, and calculate the proper grading of the road, is to sin against truth and common sense. And why? Simply, because, it is asserting the connexion of things, as *cause* and *effect*, which are not so connected, nor can be. Now, I aver, that it is equally absurd to affirm, that man has natural ability to keep the moral law! natural ability to exercise moral causation!! natural ability to love God and man!!!

We are told, that it requires no more natural ability to love God, than to hate him. No truly; and it requires no more moral ability to be an ass, than an elephant: and it requires no more intellectual power to be a clod, than a paving stone. There is probably, less natural and intellectual ability in Gabriel, than in Satan. But what hence results? Why, this—that no measure

of ability can go beyond its own kind. If physical and intellectual power could secure moral results, the devil would probably be above the mightiest and the holiest angel in heaven. But, inasmuch as love to God, is a moral effect, it never can proceed from these powers of Satan, for they are not moral. The general notion of ability then, is, *that quality* or *those qualities in a cause which being appropriately used, produces its effect.* A man's ability to lift a stone, lies in the muscles and bones &c., of his physical frame. His ability to calculate an eclipse, lies in his intellectual powers, as developed by his education. His ability to love God and his neighbour, lies in his moral powers of perception and feeling, as developed and sanctified by the Spirit of God, who, therein, sheds abroad the love of God in his heart.

SECTION II.

The common distinction of natural and moral inability stated.

"We are said to be *naturally* unable to do any thing, when we cannot do it, if we will, because, what is most commonly called *nature*, does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. *Moral* inability consists, not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will; or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word; that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will, or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as being unable, through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views." Edwards'

works, II. 35. Natural inability, this great theologian divides into two parts, viz: "because nature does not allow of it," and "because of some impeding defect." But in breaking down the latter into the three particulars, he includes one, which, it appears to me, comes in under the prohibition of nature. The *impeding obstacle or defect* lies, either in the *faculty* of *understanding*, *constitution* of *body*, or *external objects*. Nature does not allow a man to live in water, or a fish on land. This is a natural inability. The natural man discerneth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, [καὶ οὐ δύναται γνῶναι] and he is not able to know *them*." I Cor. II. 15. This, according to Edwards here, is a natural inability: for it is the inability of a natural man: and it arises from "some impeding defect or obstacle, in the faculty of understanding." Mephibosheth was *naturally unable* to go out and meet David, because of bodily constitution —he was lame. Saul was unable to seize David and put him to death, because of external hindrances.

Moral Inability Edwards makes to be simply the absence of a will—it "consists in the opposition or want of inclination"—unwillingness. "A drunkard, he says, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink"—he is unwilling to abstain —because of the "prevalence of contrary motives." If the writer does not labour under a *natural inability* "in the faculty of understanding," this distinction simply is, that, *moral inability is a want of willingness; and natural inability is opposition of nature rendering the thing impossible; or defect in our intellectual, or bodily powers, rendering it impossible to us.*

This distinction has been thought of great importance in treating of man's moral agency in his present fallen condition. It is often maintained, that man has a natural ability—that is, he has all the powers of body and mind—(not the faculties simply, but the power of exercising them) necessary to enable him to fulfill all moral duty; he lacks only the moral ability—the will: and if he had this moral ability or will, he would have all that is necessary to fulfil the whole law of God. This, it is

thought, indispensible to maintain, in order to sustain his agency. It is feared, that if the total inability of man to save himself and lead a holy life, is set before him, it will discourage effort, and seal him up in a state of antinomian fatalism: hence some kind of ability must be asserted in order to encourage to effort and counteract the tendency to apathy. If this be not the historical fact, as to the distinction, it is at least unquestionably the present use of it. Men are told that they are able, whensoever they will, to make them a new heart, and to lead a life of holy obedience. This suggests.

SECTION III.

Objections to the natural ability and moral inability doctrine.

1. To speak of inability of will is an abuse of language. Edwards felt and acknowledged this, [ii. 37.] For after stating the distinction he says, "But it must be observed concerning moral *inability*, in each kind of it, that the word *inability* is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposeable." He proceeds to show the impropriety of predicating inability of the will. And,

2. The absurdity of this is my second objection against the doctrine. And this absurdity no man has better exposed than Edwards himself, ii. 38. Having defined freedom and liberty to be "*The power, opportunity or advantage that any one has, to do as he pleases*," he says—"then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called a will. For that which is possessed of no *will*, cannot have any *power* or *opportunity* of doing *accord-*

ing to its will, nor be necessitated to act *contrary to its will*, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty or the contrary, as belonging to the *very will itself*, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words.—For the *will itself*, is not an Agent that *has a will:* the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of."

These sentiments Edwards borrowed from Locke, whose doctrines ought to have prevented much controversy and contention. He had perceived the confusion resulting from our speaking of the faculties of the mind, by a kind of personification—intimating "that this way of speaking of *faculties*, has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command and obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings"—B. 2. C. 21. s. 6. Whereas the truth is, the *will* of man, is the mind or soul exercising choice, and the whole action of the mind in thus choosing, is called *volition*. Hence Mr. Locke, shows, as Edwards above, that "Liberty *belongs not to volition*."—"Suppose," says he, "a man carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he wakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, *i. e.* prefers his staying to going away: I ask, is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it; and yet being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that *liberty is not* an idea, *belonging to volition*, or preferring, but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct." II. 21, 10. And in 14, he rejects the question *whether man's will be free or no?*

as unreasonable and unintelligible—like the question whether a man's sleep be swift or his virtue square—"*liberty* being as little applicable to the *will*, as swiftness or motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue."

It seems then, that neither ability nor freedom can, with any propriety, be predicated of the *will*. They are both attributes of persons and not attributes of attributes. But if freedom and ability cannot be ascribed to the will, neither can bondage and inability be so predicated. What could be meant by a bond or enslaved will? What by a will disabled? Hence to call the mere absence of choice—the want of a preference in the mind, by the name of *inability*, is at once to abuse language and to introduce confusion of thought, to the great perplexity of the subject, and the injury of truth and sound philosophy.

3. This distinction is useless—it relieves the subject of morals and religion of no difficulty. The purpose for which it is introduced; viz: to constitute the basis of moral agency, is not subserved by it. We have seen the true ground and rule of duty to lie in the will of God, made known to man. The Creator originally endowed man with certain powers, and prescribed the rule of action. To reduce the standard of moral obligation to the present ability of man, is the distinguishing feature of the Armerian scheme. A man cannot be bound to do, what he is unable to do—Inability cancels moral obligation. Ability—present ability is the measure of present duty. On this let us have a few particular observations. (1) It will be admitted, that a man is bound morally, "to provide for those of his own household." But the drunken gambler, who has squandered away an abundant patrimony, destroyed his health and reduced himself to a poor, weak, helpless wretch, is not able to provide for his household; therefore he is not bound to provide: for no man can be bound to do what he is unable to do! But if a man is not under obligation he cannot sin against obligation; consequently, the drunkard's present neglect of his family is no sin at all. (2) These things being so, we see, that sin is its own apology and its own cure. Its own apology, for every thing but the

first act: and its own cure, because whenever the disabilities, resulting from it, are complete, it can be no longer sinful. (3) As I have elsewhere observed, "Apply this principle to the commercial transactions of society. A man contracts a debt within the compass of his present ability—he perversely and wickedly squanders his estate, gambles away his property, and disables himself from payment, is he *therefore* not bound? Is he free from moral obligation to pay it? Must justice break her scales, and no more hold up an equal balance, because he chooses to be a villain? Oh no! the children of this world are wise in their generation. The merchant may *forgive* the debt; but forgiveness implies obligation to pay. The master whose servant has maimed himself may omit to demand service or to punish for its neglect, but it is an omission of *mercy*. The law may not prosecute the rum-seller who poisons his neighbour into intemperance and ruin—the beggared wife and children may be unable to exact justice of him, but then it is because cupidity and lust are more powerful than justice. (4.) "This principle is a subversion at once, of all moral government. Let it be known throughout the moral universe, that inability (resulting from the most perverse wickedness) cancels moral obligation, and there will henceforth commence a jubilee in the realms of rebellion"—(5.) But the argument most conclusive, perhaps, against this limit to moral obligation, is that which takes its advocates on their own principle. They maintain, that man has the natural ability, viz: the physical power, and the intellectual power—which qualify him to obey all Gods commands; and if he had not, he could not be bound to obey: that is—natural ability qualifies for moral duty: and where this is not, there can be no moral obligation. Then I say, if *natural inability cancels moral obligation, much more does moral inability cancel moral obligation.* But now they admit that man labors under a moral inability, consequently, they much more destroy the foundations of moral agency.

4. But should we even wave all objections to the accuracy and abstract truth of the distinction, there is a

most serious objection to its practical application. If man had natural ability to keep all the divine commands, and lacked moral ability only, still in applying the doctrine, its advocates loose sight of the latter half of it, so that in broad terms, they affirm that man is able to meet all the requisitions of God. Full ability is asserted and insisted on, as indispensible to moral agency. And when this belief exists in the mind, it leads to many ruinous results. (a) It puffs up the pride of the heart. A man who believes that he is able to do all that God requires of him, will of course despise the proffered mercy of the gospel. "I was alive," says Paul, "without the law once." He felt himself able to do all things himself. And such is the natural and necessary tendency of the doctrine that a man has it all in his own power and can repent and believe, and be saved, just any moment he pleases. This is the general belief of impenitent men. This is the broad road of Armenian antinomianism, along which the almost entire mass of the unbelieving millions, are trooping downward to the chambers of eternal death. To convince them of their utter helplessness—oh, here is the difficulty, which nothing but the almighty energies of the Holy Ghost can overcome. (b.) When such persons do become a little alarmed, they ordinarily put themselves upon severe supposed duties, and having made a few efforts, they suppose themselves willing now to use their sufficient power, and speedily speak peace to themselves, and procure some self-deluded mortal, like themselves, to daub with untempered mortar; and to encourage hopes, and so they settle down unconverted, proud professors of religion; they continue for a little while and then wither away.

Thus much, it seemed necessary to say, in reference to this metaphysical ability doctrine. The fearful havoc which both its use and its abuse, have produced and are now producing, in the American churches, renders it imperious upon all, who wish to see the humbling doctrines of human dependence upon divine grace for salvation, triumphant, to hold it up in the light of sound reason and sacred scripture. The latter will next claim our attention.

SECTION IV.

Man's inability, as taught in the Bible.

We have seen, that the metaphysical distinction of *ability*, into natural and moral, has no foundation in reason and nature and man; and that its use has been attended with very mischievous consequences to the cause of truth and of human salvation. Let us now turn to the sacred scriptures, and ascertain, if possible, what they say in reference to man's duty and inability. And in this enquiry let us be guided by the obvious and natural arrangement before presented; viz: Let us enquire what the Bible says concerning the *bodily*, *mental* and *moral* powers or abilities.

1. His bodily powers are in a ruined state—his faculties are enfeebled, and this as a result of his sin. And here, it may be well to remark, that little is affirmed directly, of this in the sacred scriptures. The proofs are rather indirect. They seem to assume the fact of man's powers being prostrated by sin, as so obvious that all the race must *feel* and confess it: and this kind of assumed concession is stronger proof than any direct assertion. So the bible rarely, if ever, directly and formally asserts the existence of God, yet it very abundantly testifies to that fundamental principle of religion. In like manner is assumed, oftener at least, than directly affirmed, the doctrine that the bodily powers of the race have been injured by the fall. Among the numberless passages to this effect, let us advert to the following: Rom. v. 12. "by one man sin entered into the world and death by sin." This has express reference to the words of the covenant, "in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." It is a fact, that death is the result of sin. Now, that bodily death is included under this, will not be denied by any; and especially is it not denied by those whom we oppose here; for their policy has been to confine the threatening of the covenant, to the death of the body. The only question is, whether death implies a failure of the powers of the body; whether sick-

ness, feebleness, the wasting of the energies of the body is included. If this can be admitted—and how can it be denied?—then the bible does teach physical inability —bodily infirmity, as a result of sin. The sorrows and sufferings of the body have all one common origin. "Because thou hast harkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it, cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life." Are not sickness, painful weariness, faintness, and feebleness and all the calamities of the body, included? "Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception." Can there remain in any mind the shadow of a doubt? Does not every one *feel* within himself the evidence of sins enfeebling influence? Do not rioting and drunkenness, chambering and wantonness—do not all sensual indulgences tend to destroy the powers of nature? Surely, we waste time and insult the common sense of mankind, in delaying to prove what needs no proof. No man can be ignorant of the facts, and of the principle, that when the talent is abused, it should be taken from the possessor.

The only thing necessary farther, is distinctly to call to your notice the connexion between bodily disease, pains, and sorrows, prostration and feebleness, and the moral causes of them; viz: the sins of men, and especially, our first sin. The helpless sorrows and sufferings, and feebleness, and often death of infant humanity, all result from sin—sin in the first of the race—the sin of all, through their first head, Adam. The very feebleness—the loss of power—the derangement of our faculties, all originate in sin, as their moral cause, and are penal results of it. The command, "take the talent from him," is founded upon the fact of its abuse—the privation is penal—it is an expression of displeasure against the sin of misuse. As certainly as the sin of intemperance is followed by loss of bodily health, soundness of constitution, trembling, feeblenss mania, delirium tremens, —that hell upon earth—and death, so certainly has the

sin of Adam opened the door of numberless maladies and paralysed the physical energies of the whole race.

2. Equally clear and humiliating is the truth, that the intellectual powers have suffered by the fall. Here let us particularize.

(1) The fact of human ignorance, is as clearly exhibited in the scriptures, as it is set forth before the eyes of all men. Men's minds, their understandings are very defective. "Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart." Eph. iv. 18. A very early display of this ignorance, I have already referred to. This attempt to conceal themselves from the searching eye of God, betrays in our first parents, ignorance as well as guilt. Had not "their foolish heart been darkened," (Rom. i. 21) such attempt had not been made (22,) "professing themselves to be wise they became fools." And the Apostle gives as proof of it, their idolatry. v. 23. "And changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image." So Isaiah, lxiv. 18. "They have not known nor understood: for he hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see, and their hearts that they cannot understand. v. 19. And none considereth in his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say, I have burned part of it in the fire," and with a part of the same tree hath he made a God. And Paul was sent, Acts xxvi. 18. to the Gentiles, "to open their eyes and to turn them from darkness to light," and Christ was raised from the dead, v. 23, "to shew light unto the people and to the Gentiles." And Paul says, II. Cor. iv. 3, 4. "But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost; in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not." It is superfluous to adduce scripture farther. The entire gospel scheme, presupposes a state of dreadful and soul destroying ignorance. The revelation of God's will and the system of means for *illumination*, presupposes darkness.

(2.) This darkness—this ignorance is to man unaided by supernatural power, insuperable. Man never would —man never could—he has not the intellectual power

to overcome this ignorance—to dispel this darkness. He labours under an imbecility of mind, to such a degree as to render it *impossible* for him to discover the true knowledge of God, and to understand the things of the Spirit of God. He has an understanding by which he can know natural things—can reason and investigate truth and learn much of God's wisdom, displayed in the works of creation—he can—he is able to know the moral truths of God's word as mere abstract propositions—he can reason about them, but to have a true, saving, spiritual apprehension of them is beyond his unaided powers. He is not able to know the things of the Spirit. There is a positive defect and inability in the mind. 1. Cor. II. 14. "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God." By the natural man here is unquestionably meant, the unregenerate man—the man in whose soul the great work of spiritual illumination and regeneration has not been affected—an unconverted man. This is manifest from the whole train of the Apostles remarks. In v. 12, he says, "Now we" christians, believers—"have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God," and for what end was the spirit sent into the hearts of these sinners? For this end precisely, that they might be rescued from the chains of ignorance—that their inability of mind might be removed—that the scales might fall from their eyes—"that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God." "Which things [of the spirit] also we speak," "not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth; but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." Here is a contrast between man's wisdom and its teachings, and the Spirit's wisdom and his teachings—"comparing spiritual things with spiritual. For the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit." The natural man is the unregenerated and unbelieving man: as is farther evident from the contrast between him and the spiritual man, v. 15. The Apostle then goes on to render a reason, why the natural or unregenerate man does not receive the things of the spirit; and this reason is a most cogent one. He does not receive them; that is, he rejects them, *because* they are absurd, in his ap-

prehension; and it is not in the nature of the human mind to receive as truth, that which it deems to be absurd—"for they are foolishness unto him." But this raises another question. Why do the things of the spirit *appear* to the unconverted man foolishness? Are they not in themselves the consummation of wisdom? And if so, how can they be to the sound understanding of unconverted men, foolishness? Wisdom is not folly. But it may so *appear* and be so treated, and that even by the mind which in other things, is not destitute of powers of perception. Wise sayings uttered in an unknown tongue, are foolishness to me. The lofty wisdom of the astronomer is foolishness to the simple, unlettered christian. Because why? He cannot understand them. He has not the powers of mind to grasp the mighty thoughts and to comprehend the sublime demonstrations. The things of the Spirit are foolishness to the unrenewed man, because, he cannot know them —he is οὐ δύναται *not able* to know them. Still the question rolls back upon us. Why is not the unconverted man able to know the things of the Spirit? Has he not a clear and discriminating mind? Has he not a strong calculating head? Can he not reason correctly, after having perceived with precision? Do not unconverted men give us the most illustrious exhibitions of the power of human intellect? Are not many of them the very giants of intellect? Why then are they not able to know the things of the Spirit? This also, Paul meets; because these things require a peculiar power of discrimination, which the unconverted have not—"they are spiritually discerned:" and the natural man is not a spiritual man. Until he is taught of God—unless the "eyes of his understanding be enlightened," Eph. i. 18, he will never see any beauty in the son of man, or wisdom in the spirit. v. 15. "But he that is spiritual, discerneth all the things [of the Spirit] yet he himself is discerned of no one." So, John viii. 43. Jesus asks "why do ye not understand my speech? Even because ye cannot—*ye are not able to* hear my word."

But the knowledge, of which we here speak, is connected with salvation; for none have it, or can have it,

except the spiritual—those who are taught of the spirit. Salvation is everywhere connected with the knowledge of Christ, "and this is eternal life, to know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." This is equivalent to coming unto God or Christ. Now he says, John vi. 44. "No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me, draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man, therefore that hath heard and learned of the Father cometh unto me." Here it is manifest that *being taught of God* and having *learned of the Father*, are equivalent phrases with *conversion*, and *coming unto the Father*.

But now the Redeemer affirms explicitly that "no one is *able* to come—ουδεὶσ δύναται ἐλθεῖν—to him unless the Father draw him, and I will raise him up at the last day." He most intimately connects the drawing of the Father, with his raising the body from the dead. Why this? Unless that the Father's drawing, is like the Son's raising—that is, by a divine and almighty energy. And this is explicitly shewn in the explanation he gives v. 65. "Therefore I said unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father,"—the coming to Jesus is *given* to the sinner: the drawing is a gracions exercise of the divine power. Whenever that energy is put forth and the sinner is restored to spiritual life: whenever he becomes a spiritual man, he comes: but not until then. The lame man cannot walk and leap, until he is made whole by a divine power. True, he is commanded to rise up and walk: but it is equally true, that he cannot—he is not able, until he is restored.

It is well worthy of remark, that this word, *draw*, is always used in scripture as expressive of force or power, which, in the face of resistance, overcomes. Allow me to adduce all the cases: John xviii. 10. Peter having a sword, drew it. xxi. 6, 11—"they were not able to *draw* the net"—into the ship. "Peter *drew* the net to land." Acts xvi. 19. "They *drew* Paul and Silas into the market place, unto the rulers." xxi. 30. "they took Paul and *drew* him out of the temple."

James II. 6. "Do not rich men oppress you, and *draw* you before the judgement seats?" It is always a drawing by force, and where the thing drawn, has life, it is a drawing against the inclinations, wishes and desires. The fishes floundered and resisted—the prisoners are dragged against their inclination and desire. These are the only cases, except the one before us, and the parallel passage, chap. xii. 32, where Christ says, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all [my people] unto me"—where the *drawing* is the same as here. Now, the uniform use of the word teaches us the important truth, that man before, and at the time the gospel net is thrown around him, is indisposed to come to Jesus—and when he feels himself enclosed by it, and the truths of God's word begin to cramp him up, he resists and flounces and fights against God, until the divine Spirit changes his heart, and then he is made willing, and comes to Jesus. He is arrested by a process of law, and is dragged, by the power of the law in his conscience, before his judge, fighting and resisting all the while, until the Holy Ghost touches his heart of stone, and it is changed, and the wild maniac comes to his right mind, and follow Him who lead captivity captive. Now, we are not to be misunderstood, as though we taught, that a man is saved by a kind of physical compulsion. He is saved contrary to what was his *will*, and *wish*, and *desire*, and *inclination of heart*, before the spirit renewed his mind. In this sense, he is saved *against his will*. But in the work of *drawing* him, by the power of his Holy Spirit, God "worketh in him both to will and to do"—God, of *his good pleasure*, *worketh both the willing and the doing*. That is, the Holy Ghost, by his almighty power, renewing the mind, changes the will; so that he, who at first resisted, now ceases to resist—he who at first refused to do, and to come, now, becomes active and laborious in running the race set before him.

3. The intellectual inability of man, is proved by the scripture doctrine of the Spirit's illumination. II. Cor. iv. 6. "God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus

Christ." Hence, "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him," is given by the Father. Eph. i. 17. Previously to which gift of the Spirit, "ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord," chap. v. 8. "This is the anointing which ye have received of him—and ye need not that any man teach you." 1. John iii. 27. "But the comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my room, he shall tell you all things." John xiv 26. "for he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you." xvi. 14.

From these passages it is evident, (1.) That the mind of man is in a state of spiritual darkness. (2.) That it remains, and will remain so, until the Spirit of God give light or knowledge. (3.) That this giving of light and knowledge, is by a divine influence, analagous to that by which the light at first creation, was produced and made to shine. As to all spiritual, saving knowledge of the truth, the mind, is like the chaos, before the eternal first said "let there be light." Darkness covers the earth and gross darkness the people. Now in this state, it is impossible for man to understand—he cannot discern the things of the Spirit.

I know it is affirmed, that man has the eye—the organ of vision, and therefore, he has the ability to see, although he has no light. Only remove the obstructing window shutters, and the prisoner in the dungeon sees; he therefore had the ability to see before.

Let us not deceive ourselves or others. It is not true that a man who has an eye in a sound state, has *ability* to see. It is false, in *fact*. Without light, he *cannot* see—he is not *able* to see; he has not *ability* to see. It is not true either, in point of fact, that a man who has a sound eye and light too, can see all things, which are perceptible, even by other eyes. The myops can behold near objects clearly, and not distant ones—he is not able to see afar off. So a man may be *able* to see, with the mental eye, some things, who *cannot* see other things. Ability is the adaptation of the cause to produce the effect. The eye of the myops is adapted to produce the effect of vision as to near objects; but not as to distant objects.

The mind's eye of the natural man, is adapted to be the cause of mental vision, as to natural things, but not as to spiritual things. Mental ability to understand a mathematical demostration may exist, where there is an inability of mind to comprehend the beauties of a painting, or a poem or a piece of music. To affirm that this man of abstractions is able to understand and perform music, to write epic, or to pencil the canvass into life, is to affirm an untruth. Just so, to affirm that he "that lacketh these things,"—the christian graces of faith, virtue, knowledge &c. 2. Pet. i. 6, 9—can see spiritually, is to contradict the express declaration of scripture, which is, that he "is blind and cannot see afar off." "Thou blind Pharisee." "Ye blind leaders of the blind." Either therefore there is in the unrenewed mind, an incompetency, an incapacity, an inability to understand the things of the Spirit; or the whole language of the bible on this subject is adapted to deceive us: and the fact of restoring sight to the naturally blind, is not intended to teach us our need of the same divine power to recover the soul to spiritual vision.

But I wish to present this as a distinct argument.

4. The miracles of healing, performed by the Saviour are designed to teach men their need of supernatural power, for the restoration of the soul to a state of holy, spiritual life. Particularly, the restoration of sight is adapted and intended to teach the doctrine for which we contend. "For judgement, I am come into this world; that they which see not, might see;—"I am the light of the world: he that followeth me, shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." Surely, no man can read these, and such as these texts, without imbibing the conviction, that the Bible inculcates the doctrine of man's native blindness of mind, and his utter inability to understand the things of God, until the day star of supernatural illumination shines into his mind. Bartimeus was not less able to *see* the multitude as they passed by than the most learned Pharisee was to discern spiritual things. Lazarus was not less able to come forth out of the tomb, before the divine

power restored him to life, than the "blind Pharisee," to understand the doctrines of salvation.

Now, we need only farther remark concerning this intellectual defect or mental inability to understand the things of the spirit, it is, *according to Dr. Edwards, a natural inability*, an impeding defect, or obstacle, extrinsic to the will, in the faculty of understanding!

It is sometimes objected to this, that, the defect itself cannot be pointed out, and consequently, the thing done, when this inability is removed, cannot be explained. What is the deficiency? Where does it lie? How is it removed? What faculty has a renewed sinner, that is not possessed by the impenitent? What is done to enable, to give capacity to understand spiritual things?

To all these, we answer: they are founded on our ignorance and may easily be retorted. What faculty had the lame man after he was healed, that he had not before? Was there added a bone, muscle, or tender to his bodily frame? What was done to him? It is manifest, that ignorance of the change and the mode of its production are no proof against the fact.

The blind man knew nothing, but that "he put clay upon mine eyes and I washed and do see—how he opened mine eyes, I know not." But now, the fact of spiritual illumination is just as perfectly well known to the subject of it, as the fact of natural restoration to sight. And all pious men, of all sects, acknowledge a difference, and refer it to the spirit of God.

III. The moral powers of the soul are paralysed by the fall.

We have seen with Edwards and Locke, that to ascribe inability to the will, is philosophically absurd: and yet, wise men do so speak. We must, therefore, exercise due caution, or we shall entirely misunderstand them. By *inability of will*, is meant simply *unwillingness* or *disinclination*. Now, that man is *unwilling*—that he is *disinclined* to holy things, none deny. This, the state, and the almost universal practice of the race most sadly testify. Who needs proof of it? Who asks for evidence to shew, that man is inclined to evil as the sparks do ascend? There is no room for doubt,

and can be no need of proof here. Every man's eyes and inward consciousness are sufficient for him.

But it may be of some consequence to see the connexion of this with the preceding. The will is the mind choosing: and choice implies motive in view. To choose without a motive influencing to choice, is not conceivable. Now, the motive to an act of choice is, as we have seen, some apprehended good, to which the mind is drawn by its apprehension or view of it as a good. The motive is the thing, *as it is seen or perceived by the mind.* When a child, or a man, being offered an orange of wax, supposing it a real orange, and a real apple, chooses the orange, the motive of the choice, is not a waxen orange ; but a real orange ; the deception and mistake, has given a reality to the motive in the mind, which did not exist in the thing. The power, therefore, of any thing, as a motive, depends upon the mind's present view and estimate of it. But now it is clear, that this view and estimate depend wholly, upon the mind's powers of perception, and these upon the organs and medium. To illustrate. The waxen ball, being painted so as to resemble an orange, produces, through the organ of vision, a belief, that it is an orange, and thus, choice is determined. The waxen ball is chosen and the real apple is rejected. But change the organ of perception—let the smell and the feeling be brought to bear ; then the mind's apprehension and belief are changed, and these change also, the choice—the will is to take the apple. Darkness then, in the understanding—ignorance in the mind—inability of intellect, most materially affects motives and choice.

Now, if, as some have supposed, the mind had a power to act contrary to motive, it would manifestly not be a moral being at all : for the very essence of morality is a capacity to be influenced to action by considerations of right and wrong. If a rational mind, could act without motive, which to me, appears a contradiction in terms, it would certainly not be a moral act. If, as I suppose, it belongs to the very essence of reason and morality, to be actuated by motives; and if motives are

the mind's views of things, it is easy to see how the understanding is the governing faculty: and the understanding being blinded by sin and its corrupting lusts, it is easy to see how the enlightening of the mind, must lead to the sanctification of the affections, and rectification of the will. There is no possible—no conceivable way of changing the human will, but by changing the views which the mind has of the subject matter before it. The will cannot be forced. You can induce the child, or man, to prefer the apple to the orange;—that is, to a change of will, only by a change of motive. And how is this effected, when the subject matter before the eye is the very same? If the subject matter before the mind is the same, there can be no change of will. But if you inform the hungry child that the orange is not an orange and cannot be eaten, but that the apple is a delicious reality; you place a new motive before the mind and the consequence is, a new choice—a change of will. Other mode of access to the will there is none, but through the understanding. What men have been accustomed, unphilosophically, to call *inability of will*, is nothing more or less, than simply, "a defect of motives"—"a want of sufficient motives, to induce, or excite the act of the will"—i. e. to induce the mind to a choice. But as choice may, and often does occur, without any moral character—as when I choose between figures and letters in numbering chapters, or as when a horse chooses between hay and corn fodder,—it is obvious that the inability of mind to choose holy things, lies in the want of moral motives: i. e. in spiritual blindness; in the loss or derangement of the powers of moral perception. This I have not been able in the previous discussion, to keep entirely separate from the idea of intellectual inability: yet I trust we have seen (Chap. I. S. VII.) full evidence, that a moral sense or power of preception there is, and that this is the basis of moral agency. Now it is the derangement of the mind, by sin, which effects this power of perceiving right and wrong, that enfeebles or destroys the force of moral motives. Unrenewed and renewed men, look at the same subject matter; but then moral perceptions are

quite different; and therefore their motives are quite different, the things actually seen by their minds are different; and by necessity, different effects must be produced upon them. The one sees "a root out of a dry ground," in which there is "no form nor comeliness;" the other sees one "altogether lovely;" by the former, he must be despised and rejected, who is by the latter, loved and embraced. Whilst such are the views of the individuals, respectively, such must be their choice and conduct. It is *impossible* to be otherwise. You must change their moral perceptions, before it is possible their volition should change. Now the precise thing we insist on here, is that no human power—no created power *can* change the moral perceptions of sinful man. He is unable to change himself. "The Ethiopian *cannot* change his skin—nor the Leopard his spots." None but the creating—the regenerating energies of God's Almighty Spirit can change the mind, so as to enable man that is blind to see God's light clearly. Here then precisely lies the moral inability of man—not in the will, for the supposition is nonsense—but in the want of adequate powers of moral perception—the moral sense is protracted: the mind is unable to discriminate between good and evil, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, God and Mammon, Christ and Belial. Not that it can perceive *no* difference; for this we admit; but it cannot appreciate in any tolerable degree, the excellence of truth, and the glory of its Author, on the one hand; and the baseness of falsehood, and degradation of vice, on the other. Nor are you to suppose that man has the adequate faculties for this moral perception, and wants only the moral light. Just the reverse; the moral light shines all around him; but his powers of vision are gone: he walks in darkness whilst the noon tide splendors of the sun of righteousness pour all around him. He gropes for the way and stumbles over the very rock of ages, into the slough of despond. Wretch that he is! he must ever remain so, for any relief that can spring from earth. Onward he totters toward the gulph of eternal dispair, and soon must he plunge in, and buffet the fiery flood unless the Father of mercies cry to the Son of his

love. "Let there be light," and the Spirit of all grace shines into his heart to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God.

Now this change in the mind, is effected by the divine power. It is *supernatural.* Created agency may be employed as a means, or instrument, but the power is God's alone. It is the same power as that by which Christ was raised from the dead.

Such is the Bible doctrine of inability. What are its practical tendencies and effects?

2. To stain the pride of all human glory. To bring down the lofty looks of man. To make all men feel themselves less than the least of God's mercies.

3. To produce that state of feeling dependence on divine power and grace, which is indispensable, as the antecedent of forgiveness of sins through the blood of atonement.

4. To exalt the condescension and law of God in the apprehension of the humbled sinner. He only who feels himself absolutely helpless, will surrender himself to sovereign mercy and grace. He only who feels himself already sinking under the billows of a justly incensed indignation, will explain in tones of piercing agony, "Lord save me or I perish."

5. To place the crown of glory on the only head worthy to wear it. "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name, give glory, for thy mercy and for thy truth's sake." Ps. 115, 1.

1. To awake the sin secure soul, who feels that he can repent and be saved, whenever he pleases, to a sense of his lost and ruined state. The thought is awful! and leaves no rest in the mind. Lost, and no help! No power in me, or any creature to save me! O, dreadful!

CHAPTER XII.

THE GOSPEL REVEALS THE ONLY EFFECTUAL REMEDY FOR THE EVILS OF THE BROKEN COVENANT.

We have looked into the great general principles of moral government, as established by the Creator, and revealed in the sacred scriptures.

We have examined, in considerable detail, the special modifications of that government, as it was extended over man, in his primitive condition.

We have discussed the question of the extent of the covenant made with Adam, and the Representative character which he sustained.

We have settled the meaning of certain terms, important in this discussion—Just, Righteous, Righteousness, Justify, Justification.

We have enquired what was requisite to Adam's justification, according to the terms of the covenant, and have found one thing only, necessary, viz: Righteousness, conformity of his conduct with the law.

We have contemplated the fact—that he violated his covenant engagement—disobeyed God; and consequently, incurred the penalty, which constitutes an additional requisite in order to his justification.

We have examined the physical, intellectual, and moral consequences of Adam's sin upon himself, and his posterity.

We have canvassed the fundamental doctrine of original sin—including the general doctrine of imputation.

We have attempted an exposition of that difficult, and very important portion of the divine word, contained in Rom. v. 12—21, as an argument on this great doctrine.

We have deduced, from the case of those who die in infancy, an argument for the same doctrine.

We have seen the utter inability of man, in his fallen state, to meet the requirements of law, and thereby, to restore himself to the favour of God. In which, we have examined the metaphysical distinction of ability into moral and natural.

The result of this discussion and examination, is, a thorough conviction, that man is fallen, ruined, lost, undone, and totally helpless in himself—an outcast from God and Heaven, and helplessly undone, by the broken covenant of works.

We are now prepared to enter upon the most important question of a remedy. How shall the fearful calamities consequent upon sin, be obviated? Is there a possibility of man's escape from the just and legal consequences of his transgression? and of his receiving the blessings and the benefits originally proffered as the reward of obedience? The original law given to him, and which was ordained unto life—which was so adjusted that obedience to it, must be followed by life, but where transgression has been found unto death,—can it yet be restored and fulfilled, and thus life be still secured to lost man? Is there any where, an arm almighty to save? Can man yet be just with God?

Our theme is the affirmative response: "for behold I bring unto you good tidings of great joy, which shall be unto all people; for unto you is born, in a city of David, the Saviour, which is Christ the Lord." The Bible reveals a remedy. And here our first position,

SECTION I.

Is, that *the Gospel is a remedial law.*

By this, is meant, that the scheme of redemption revealed in the Bible, professes to counteract the evils, resulting from a former scheme; to make amends for its violation; to provide a remedy for the moral diseases introduced through its agency; and so to heal the hurt of the daughter of my people.

The evidence may be found in the professed design of the Saviour. He came to fulfil all righteousness

—to seek and to save that which was lost—to heal the sick—to cleanse those infested with the leprosy of sin—to rescue man from the condemnation of the law, and to restore him to the favour and enjoyment of God—to throw open the prison doors, and to proclaim liberty to the captives—to give sight to the blind—to make the lame walk, and the tongue of the dumb sing for joy. The entire phraseology of scripture shews, that the gospel is a remedy for evils consequent upon some scheme of law, which preceded it. It is not a device original, in and of itself; but is manifestly based upon the hypothesis of another covenant having preceded it, at the head of which, is another Adam, of whom this second man is the anti-type. The actual work accomplished by the Lord from Heaven, is remedial. He restores from the ruins of the fall.

SECTION II.

The Gospel, like every remedial law, establishes the principle of the original Institute.

This is implied in the term, by which I have expressed the idea. To speak of remedying a defect, supposes the continuance of the thing in which it exists. In human legislation, an original statute defines its object, and the principle by which it proposes to accomplish it. The general law for the establishment of schools in this Commonwealth, specifies its object—the education of the entire mass of the people: It also settles the great principle upon which it shall be done—by a fund provided by the State, and a tax levied by the people upon themselves directly. This is an original statute. But now, many defects may be developed in the application of its detail. These, it may be possible to cure, without abandoning either the object, or the general principle by which it is proposed to secure it. Subsequent laws may correct the defects, and all such laws are *remedial*, and in our legislation are called *supplements*. Should our Legislature hereafter determine to abandon the object, or the principle, they must pass a re-

pealing act. But *moral* laws cannot be repealed, even by a divine ordinance. They are an expose of the divine perfections and are eternal like their author; and hence the reason why the *law* given to Adam, could never be repealed, abrogated or set entirely aside.* It is a moral law, and can no more be changed, than God himself, of whose perfections it is a transcript. By a change in man, it has wrought death, and must continue to work death, unless the omniscient Legislator provide a remedy. The law, he can never repeal: a supplement remedial he has revealed in his holy word. The obligation upon Adam and his race, to obey God, as we have seen, never can cease: the motive to obedience, held out in the promise of life, never can be withdrawn. "If thou wilt have life, keep the commandments." The gospel does not make void the law; "God forbid! yea, we establish the law." But "what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh—by man's failure—God sending his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." So far therefore, from the gospel being an original law, defining and fixing its own principles, irrespective of any pre-existing scheme, or system of law, it is simply a remedial scheme, designed to confirm, and establish the eternal principles of right, laid down in the law and covenant given by his Creator to man. Material things are subject to mutation. Earth's surface may be the theatre of ten thousand ever shifting scenes, whose last drama may be a renovated world, emerging from a deluge of fire. Material suns and systems may be blotted out from the page of existence; but God's law is immutable as his own eternal throne. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil; for verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." It is not denied, that the *law* here includes the Mosaic

* See Gray's Mediatorial Reign, p. 144.

writings, and the prophets, but it is unquestionably true, that the main substance of the whole, is the *moral law*, which is interspersed throughout the scriptures.

The truth of our second position will be, if possible, more clearly manifested by reference to the fact, that the gospel reveals no new moral principle—prescribes no rule of action different from the moral law.

New motives to holy action—new views of God's benevolent character, it does indeed present. But the impulsive power of these, is not in a different, but in the very same direction as the previous moral system. Gratitude and love are presented in a new and stronger light; but they are not new duties—they were of old, even from the beginning, binding upon man. In the progress of this discussion, we shall see that every leading doctrine of the new covenant, was previously in operation in the old—that the covenant of works involves all the elements, whose application, in the covenant of grace, is productive of so many blessings to man and so much glory to God.

It may be suggested, that faith and repentance are duties enjoined in the gospel: and it may be asked, are they not peculiar to the gospel? Were men, before its promulgation, called upon to believe and repent?

As to faith, it may be remarked, in reply, that the general principle is a part of the moral law of man's creation. It is as much a part of man's nature, to believe in testimony, as to perceive truth, and to reason about it; to love his fellows, and himself. The gospel requires the exercise of the principle of faith, in reference to a new testimony; and it makes provision for the renewal of the mind, by which, the man is enabled to such exercise. But it introduces only a new modification of that trust and confidence in God, which has always been obligatory on man.

Repentance is not a moral principle at all. It is the turning of the heart, the mind, the soul, the man from sin to God. It consists essentially, in the action of the man: and, as a moral action, may be resolved into hatred of sin, which is only a form of holy feeling—the re-action of love to God and holiness: and that love it-

self, called into action by faith's view of the bleeding cross. Every one of its elements, may be found in the requirements of the moral law. All that is new in the duty of repentance, is the peculiar circumstances which occasion its exercise. True, if by repentance be meant compunction of conscience, and sorrow for sin, it might be, with some plausibility, affirmed to be, a new duty, unknown to the moral law. These, however, I hope to shew, are only accompaniments, at most, and not repentance. Indeed, they are not always, even accompaniments; for they often occur, where there is never a true turning of the heart to God.

Let us then, view the gospel as a remedial law—a scheme devised by infinite wisdom, to remedy the evils resulting to lost man, from the violated covenant, and designed, not to abrogate, but to establish its principles, and secure its objects.

SECTION III.

The gospel must provide a complete fulfilment of the positive precept of the law, or covenant of works.

In the original institute, the whole substance of moral obedience was summed up in the single precept, relative to the fruit forbidden. As the law is a unity, and he who offends in one point is guilty of all; so when the spirit of obedience is tested in a single point only, and confined to that point, a failure here, brings upon man the guilt of the whole—he is liable to the whole penalty. Now this was the sum total of the law, as a covenant given to Adam, that he should obey, and as the reward of obedience should receive life. This glorious reward was held up as the motive prompting to choice on the side of law and right. The law was ordained unto life. This is its object, and to this it was adapted. But it failed in the hands of the first Adam, and the second comes in to make it good, to establish its principle and secure its object. Life, as the reward of active obedience to law, must be guaranteed by the surety of this better covenant, established upon better promises. And

the expansion of this obedience over ten thousand points, which originally was confined to one, does not alter the nature of the transaction. It may indeed, enhance its value; as he who is exposed to the possibility of failure, in a variety of ways, may be supposed more meritorious in his obedience, than he who possibly can err in but one. The spirit of subordination to the will of God is the same, whether one, or one million of acts be the expression of it. "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me," said the second Adam, and wherever this is the ruling spirit, there the right to the reward of life still exists. The remedial scheme must reveal this spirit, and develope it in full action according to law.

SECTION IV.

It must remedy the failure—must make amends for the positive evils under the original institute.

Under the administration of the first Adam, sin incurred death. The law having been transgressed, there was no evasion of its penal claim. The faithfulness of God to his own declaration, was pledged to see the sanctions of justice fully carried out. The character of his moral government over the universe, and even the reality and perpetuity of it, imperiously demanded that she should hold an equal balance. Disease and death have occurred; and these most especially, demand the interposition of a remedy. The law worketh death, and that, by its legitimate and necessary action. Now, death and disease must be counteracted, before it is possible that the great object of the original institute can be attained. Justice is as much concerned to inflict merited punishment, as to bestow merited reward. Clearly then, such infliction, where it is merited, must precede the bestowment of reward, and hence, the remedial law must provide an adequate satisfcation to the claims of insulted justice. This we shall hereafter contemplate under the head of atonement.

SECTION V.

The two preceding grand requisites in the remedial law, must be secured on the principle of the original institute; viz: by a covenant representation.

First, it must be by covenant, that security may be given, and confidence won. If there is no pledge, promise or guarantee, on the one hand, that the evils of sin shall be remedied, and the terms of the first covenant fulfilled; there could be no ground, on the other, to expect deliverance from condemnation, and security in life. The nature of moral government must be changed, if God could grant to man, life on any other terms, than had been prescribed in the law, and agreed to by man. An arbitrary bestowment of life, irrespective of, and in opposition to the claims of violated law, would have been a virtual abrogation of it, and inconsistent with the very nature of a remedial scheme. But how the remedy could be by an adequate sacrifice, rendering satisfaction for sin, without the voluntary action of the Surety, it is impossible to conceive. If a Surety be admitted at all, it must be by agreement of the party offended and the person offered as Surety.

But again, this is necessary, in order to its being by representation, according to the original covenant. Ruin was brought upon the whole race, through their connection with their moral head; so the remedy for that ruin, must be through the agency of their moral head. The great fundamental doctrine of all social organization, without which, there can be no government of any kind, of man over man—the doctrine of representation, and of consequent imputation, stands out in bold relief and luminous prominence, upon the whole front of that moral constitution, originally given to man. This must appear also, with a correspondent prominence, upon the front of that splendid structure which the Son of God is erecting to the praise of his glorious grace. It was never designed, in the former case, that human persons, all and

each, should be insulated, and stand firm, here one, and there another; or should fall on the right hand, and an the left. Such a scheme would have left man essentially unsocial, and peopled a world with spirits of precisely opposite characters. On the contrary, God made man social; and enstamped this character on his constitution: and in the representative doctrine of the covenant of works, you have the elemental principle of all social relations. By this is man attached and united to his fellow: he is made dependent, as to his moral destinies, and social interests, upon the action of his moral head: and thus, a necessity exists, perpetually, in his very nature, for society. Now, the gospel discovers to us no design to interfere with this tendency, but it uniformly promotes it. It furnishes, as the detail will evince more fully, a moral head to that immense multitude, who shall stand ultimately before the throne of Messiah, and go away into life eternal. It puts into the safe-keeping of this glorious Head, the moral destinies of the body. It sets him forth as bearing a representative relation to his people, both in his active obedience, the fulfilment of all the holy precepts of law: and in his extinguishing its penal claim. Always, and every where, Jesus is represented as obeying, and suffering, and dying, and rising, and ascending, and reigning, for his people.

In concluding this chapter, let us remark.

1. It is vain to expect, by philosophical research, to discover any new principles in morals. Even the revelation of Jesus Christ, is but the modified application of that morality, which was of old, even from everlasting.

2. The doctrine of Neo-nomianism, or that which affirms under the gospel, a new law of grace, reduced in the severity of its demands to the present capacities of men, is without foundation in the word of God. There is not even a partial abrogation of the demands of justice.

3. We learn hence, how to value the doctrine of God's covenant with man. It contains the substance of all moral rule.

4. The importance of possessing that revelation, which makes known the only remedy. Where there is no such vision, the people perish.

5. How solemn the obligation upon all who have it, to let it be known in all the earth! How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him, that bringeth good tidings!

CHAPTER XIII.

THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

In treating of the general idea of a covenant, we had occasion to remark, that it consists of three parts, viz: the parties, the terms, the agreement. These all, we found when discussing the covenant of works, or that which God established with Adam; and these all, we shall find in the following enquiry into the covenant of grace.

SECTION I.

The parties are two, viz: God, the Father, and Jesus Christ, the Son.

"I have made a covenant with my chosen." Psalm lxxxix. 3. This passage is primarily applicable to the son of Jesse, but principally to David's greater son. Who is meant here, by God's chosen or elect, is manifest from the language of Isaiah, lxiv. 1. "Behold my servant, whom I uphold, mine elect—or chosen one—in whom my soul delighteth." Which passage is applied Math. xii. 18—20, to Jesus, our mediator. And in Isa. lv. 3. "Incline your ear, and hearken unto me; hear and your soul shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David; that is, of the *beloved one*." Here you have the language of gospel invitation to the sinner: God, the Father invites him to come, that he may be brought actually into the covenant of his own Beloved Son, and partake of its blessedness. This gives us incidental evidence (which is

the strongest kind of evidence) of the existence of such covenant: and it is called "the sure mercies of the Beloved one," to intimate the relation which the Beloved sustains to it as surety, and the consequent permanency of the covenant, and safety of those who are actually brought into it.

This language, "I have made a covenant with my chosen" also intimates, as Mr. Boston remarks, "the party proposer—though he was the party offended, yet the motion for a covenant comes from him. The Father of mercies beholding a lost world, his bowels of mercy yearn towards, the objects that his sovereign pleasure pitches upon: and that mercy seeks a vent for itself, that it may be shewn to the miserable." Body of Divinity, v. II. 4, 30.

When this covenant is presented anew to Abraham, the blessing of salvation which it goes to secure, is said to have been "confirmed of God in Christ." Gal. III. 17, and the same Apostle assures us, that its establishment was prior to the existence of the world. Titus I. 2, 3. "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began; but hath in due time manifested his word through preaching." How God should *promise* "eternal life *before* the world began," on any other hypothesis than that of a compact, agreement, covenant, with the Son, on the behalf, and for the benefit of his people, it is to me impossible to conceive.

A similar testimony we have in Eph. I. 4. "According as He [God the Father] hath chosen us [all believers] in him, [Jesus Christ] before the foundation of the world." Here is the exercise of electing love, prior to creation. So Rev. xiii. 8. and xvii. 8. "Their names were written, before the foundation of the world, in the book of life of the slain Lamb. "The former of thesetexts, for want of a point after "slain," is equivocal, and hence some suppose it refers the slaying of the Lamb, to a period anterior to the world's creation: whereas, the plain and obvious intention, in both, is, to refer *the writing* of their names in the Lamb's book of life, to a period before creation: that is, they were chosen in Christ, be-

fore the world was: the promise, in the covenant of grace, existed before creation. To whom was the promise made? There was, as yet, no man—so far as we know, no angel. The notion of a promise, implies a *person* to whom it is given—to whom there is a pledge of veracity. To suppose a promise, without two persons at least, appears to me, absurd. The idea of writing their names in the Lamb's book of life, implies that the Lamb, i. e. Christ, the second person of the Godhead, so furnished by God, as to be capable in due time of suffering, did then exist, and had a book of life.

The confirming of a covenant, of or by God, in Christ, before the promulgation of the law, implies that there was a covenant, prior to the law—a better covenant than that given to Adam, and than that given to Moses, —better, because established upon better promises; even the pledged veracity of God, who cannot lie.

SECTION II.

This covenant is gracious, because eternal.

The benefits of it are all gratuitously bestowed. Man to whom they come, has no claim of right, in himself, to them. That which is not, can have no attributes, no claims, no rights. Man did not exist, and yet a covenant was made between God, the Father, and God, the Son, which guaranteed to men unspeakable blessings—eternal consolations. Is it possible to conceive, any thing more perfectly beyond the reach of human merit—more purely the fruit of simple benevolence, on the part of God. It is "an everlasting covenant," not only in reference to its results, and extension into the future, but in reference to the past—it is eternal—it existed before the world was. "I was set up," says the wisdom of God, that is, the Messiah, "I was set up—I was annointed—from everlasting, from the begining, or ever the earth was." Prov. viii. 23, This annointing of the Son as a covenant head, is the same as the confirming of the covenant of God in Christ.

SECTION III.

The Terms.

First, The stipulation on the part of God the Father; or the things which the Son was required to do. Every covenant must be proposed by one party; and each of the terms must be suggested first, by one. The scriptures represent the Father as originating this covenant. Its source is his everlasting love—the pure fountain of his own boundless benevolence. Hence, the apostolic benediction speaks of *the love of God*. Now, the proposition of the Father is, that the Son shall fulfil his Father's will, in saving lost men. This can be effected, only by fulfilling all the law, under whose penalty the scheme of redemption contemplates the objects of mercy. This scheme is remedial: and, as we have seen, must meet the penal, and the preceptive claims of law. Two things, therefore, are required of this surety—1st. He must suffer whatever is included in the law's demand against his principal. He must pay the debt of his people's iniquities. 2d. He must accomplish the righteousness required of Adam—He must fulfil the precept.

"But further," says Witsius, vi. 249, expressing the same truth, "as *Mediator* and *Surety*, he is under the law, in another manner, and that two ways. 1. As *enjoining the condition* of perfect obedience, upon which he and his, were to partake of happiness. 2. As *binding* to the penalty due to the sins of the elect, which he had taken upon himself." These are the two items, which the *original institute* make indispensable to the justification of fallen Adam, and his posterity: and consequently, the remedial scheme must meet them both.

Secondly. The *restipulation*, on the part of the Son, viz: That the reward of life to all his people, for whom he is Surety, shall be given to them through him, and the glory of their salvation, shall be his. This is the valuable consideration, on the part of the Father, which constitutes the whole transaction, a compact or covenant. The Father proposes, and promises this reward. This, too, is indispensable as the basis of moral confidence.

Correspondent to this promise of the Father, is the Son's engagement to fulfil all righteousness. Thus, there is a mutual pledge, promise, or guarantee and security, that the things to be accomplished by the covenant, shall not fail.

Let us not however, suppose, that this, like contracts among men, results from a feeling of want. Fair covenants with us, must be productive of mutual advantages. The design is, to accomplish some useful purpose. The intent and purpose of this covenant, is to exhibit the divine perfections, and thus, to secure a revenue of glory to God, whilst it dispenses infinite blessings to man. To speak of gain to God, absolutely, is improper; because he is infinite in all perfections, and increase or diminution, in regard to him, are ideas wholly inapplicable. Yet, we may speak, and often do speak, of increasing the glory of God. Glory is the manifestation of excellence, and such manifestation, or display does admit of degrees, even in reference to the Creator. Just in proportion, as the attributes of the divine character are expressed in his works of creation and providence, does the glory of God increase. Now, the covenant, of which we speak, guarantees and promises the manifestation of God's love, in a manner and degree, not elsewhere to be found; and therefore, the interests of his glory, are greatly promoted by it.

We may scarcely allude to a penalty, where the covenanting parties are both absolutely infallible. Penal sanction implies the possibility of failure; and therefore, we may not ask, what must have been the consequences to Christ and his people, had he failed. It is obvious, that he could never have arisen from the dead, nor his people with him. But it is not wise to reason from hypothesis, impossible in themselves, and we forbear.

SECTION IV.

The agreement.

The principle, that mutual consent creates moral union, runs deep into the social system of man. The laws of

eternal right are the only limit to it. Whatever is lawful and right to be done, that, two or more persons may consent and agreee to do: and in the doing of it they are one. The voluntary action of the parties is necessary to any compact, contracted or covenanted. Did the Father and Son consent to carry on and complete this glorious scheme of remedy, for a ruined race? Where is the evidence of it? Let us turn to Psalm xl. 6—10. "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire; mine ears hast thou opened: burnt offering, and sin offering hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy will, O my God, yea thy law is within my heart. I have preached righteousness in the great congregation; Lo! I have not refrained my lips, Lord, thou knowest." Now an infallible interpreter tells us, that it is Jesus who here speaks. Heb. x. 5. "Wherefore when he cometh into the world he saith, sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared me. In burnt offerings, and sacrifices for sin, thou hast had no pleasure; Then said I, Lo, I come, (in the volume of the book it is written of me) to do thy will, O God." A comparison of these, and an inspection of the Apostle's reasoning, must satisfy us, that the Father's expressed will was, that the Son should suffer—and that the son acquiesced in the same—I delight to do thy will. Here is mutual consent—the agreement of the parties. So that we have here, all the essentials of a covenant.

To the same purport is the declaration of the Lord, by Isai. xlii. 6. where, speaking of his chosen servant, who should not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street, nor break the bruised read, nor quench the smoking flax, he says, "I will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people." Jesus is the federal head, with whom the Father has established his covenant for his people's salvation. Parallel to which passage is, xlix. 8. where the Father saith of Him, "I will preserve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth, to cause to inherit the desolate heritages; That thou mayest say to the prisoners, Go forth." The grand purpose is here stated,

to release the prisoners, from the chains of sin, to establish the great principles of moral government—to remedy the mischiefs of the fall, by confirming the principles of the original institute.

Hence, Messiah is called the Messenger of the covenant—the one who was sent of God as an ambassador. All these, and a thousand other testimonies of scripture, clearly shew the consent and co-operation of God, our heavenly Father, and Jesus, our divine Redeemer, in the glorious federal compact, which secures the eternal welfare of all them that believe.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE FULFILMENT OF THE COVENANT. 1. ON THE PART OF THE LORD'S SERVANT. 2. ON THE FATHER'S PART.

SECTION I.

Jesus did obey all the precepts of the law of God, and thus fulfilled all righteousness.

Preparatory to this, we ought to remark, that in the fulness of time, he assumed human nature, in a miraculous manner. This was necessary to the work he had undertaken. The obedience of man, is that to which the life of man is promised. An angel's obeying, would not have been the establishment of the original law; nor could life for man have been claimed as the reward of angelic obedience. By man came death, and consequently, by man, must come the resurrection from the dead. It was indispensable that he have a body, and be in full possession of humanity: that he might obey, and die for man.

That he did run the round of human duties, the his-

tory of his life fully testifies. "He was subject unto his parents"—he respected the laws of his country—he punctiliously regarded the laws of God—he submitted to every institution of religion. When John "forbad him, saying, I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me? he answering, said unto him, Suffer it to be so now, for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness." No duty was he ever known to neglect—no sin was he ever known to commit—he did no evil, neither was guile found in his mouth—he went about doing good.

Of his perfect compliance with the whole requirements of law, the most satisfactory evidence is presented, in the testimony of the court, which handed him over to the executioner. Every species of malignity had been at work from the beginning; and all possible ingenuity had been exercised to detect in his conduct, some omission, or some actual sin, that might lead to his condemnation. But after malignity and genius, under its influence, had exhausted their efforts, the judge is constrained to declare, when delivering him up to the will of his malignant foes, "I find no fault in him." It was never, even attempted to be proved, that he had done any thing contrary to the pure and holy law of God. So perfectly had his life carried conviction to the understandings of his enemies, of his spotless purity; and so fully had it overawed their spirits, that no attempt was ever made to prove any immorality or impiety against him.

Hence, an Apostle affirms, "Christ is the end of law for righteousness, to every one that believeth," Rom. x, 4. He is the end, or termination of the law *ceremonial*—it is fulfilled in him, and comes to a close, and must cease. He is the end at which it aimed, to which it constantly directed the eye of faith. He is the end, or fulfilment and completion of the *moral* law. All its requirements are met by him. It is a transcript of the moral perfections of God—an expression of his holy will; and wherever these perfections exist, as qualities of the mind, they will shew themselves by their accordance with the law. But in the person of

Jesus, all holy properties are found in measureless abundance; and, consequently, their perfect coincidence with the precepts of the divine law, was to have been expected. "In him dwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily"—as embodied—as incarnate, he possessed all divine perfections, and consequently, all those requisite to a fulfilment of the moral law.

On this point, I shall not detain you; because, the matter of fact is so obvious; and because, no person denies the truth of it. Even infidelity—in its Pagan, Mahomedan and Christian forms,—all infidels have acknowledged the spotless, moral character of Jesus our Redeemer. There is a glory and a splendour in the Sun of Righteousness, at which the Vulture eyes of infidelity blench; on which, only the Eagle eye of a sanctified faith, can look with unqualing steadfastness.

SECTION II.

The obedience of Christ is vicarious: or, in other words, he, in all this, acted for his people, representatively.

On this subject, three opinions have been advanced. 1. That the obedience, or righteousness of Christ, was, in no sense vicarious. But on the contrary, that he acted simply for himself, as a moral being—that all he did, grew out of, and was necessary to his moral relations, and went simply to meet the requirements of law upon himself, personally, and had nothing to do, and could have nothing to do, with any other moral being; only, so far as his example might have a moral force. This way, go various classes of heretics, and the mother of all abominations.

2. Others maintain, that Christ's righteousness was necessary for himself, personally, and also, that he acted for his people, in the accomplishment of it. They view him, as individually, under the law, apart from the consideration of his representative character, and of course, bound for himself, to fulfil it: but also, that he

was under the law, federally, for his people, and for them bound to obey.

This opinion is deemed erroneous; although not so utterly off the foundation of a sinner's hope, as the former. It is erroneous, because, 1. Christ never existed in his Mediatorial character, except as a representative head. His moral headship existed by covenant, from eternity, and his susception of our nature, was the legal result, and constituted part and parcel of the covenant itself. Now, if the God-man—the Messiah, never existed in any other character, he could never be bound in any other: and consequently, his righteousness could not be for himself, but only for his people.

2. Another phase of the same thought is, that the human nature of Christ, never had a separate existence —it never was a human *person;* and therefore, a righteousness for its sake, could not be necessary.

3. The Messiah is a divine person, and to talk of a divine person being bound to procure righteousness, as the title for himself to eternal life, is, at the very least, to *approximate* blasphemy. A divine person not entitled to eternal felicity, unless he go through certain acts of obedience to law! The thing is preposterous. He has "life in himself," eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably. For *himself* he could not *merit* eternal life. A person cannot earn by his merits, what he already possesses eternally, and must forever possess. He needs no *such* merit—he can have none such. The righteousness of Christ is not, nor is it conceivable it can be his title, by which he holds a place in heaven. The fountain of life cannot be dependent upon the stream that issues from it, for either the beginning, or the continuance of its own existence. I therefore, think, that the doctrine here rejected, is dangerous. It has been unadvisedly admitted, by some sound men without, as I fondly hope and believe, duly weighing the consequences. Should we concede that Christ's righteousness was necessary *for himself*, I see not how we can maintain by sound reason, his Godhead on the one hand against the Socinians; or the imputation of his

righteousness on the other, against the Pelagians, Arminians and Socinians.

3. The third opinion is the true evangelical doctrine, that Christ's whole righteousness was wrought out for his people. Not being in any sense necessary for his own justification, in order to life, it goes entire, to the benefit of his people. Having never performed an act of obedience, in any other character, than that of a representative, none others, but his represented ones, can possibly be interested in it. But I may not here anticipate the doctrine of imputation.

SECTION III.

Jesus did satisfy the penal claims of law for his people: or the doctrine of atonement.

1. "ATONEMENT. (kapher—καταλλαγη.)—This is the characteristic appellation of the doctrine. It occurs frequently in our English translation of the scriptures, but only once in the New Testament. The Hebrew word which is so translated, signifies a *covering*. The verb means *to cover*, to *draw over;* whence it comes, by an easy and natural process, to signify to forgive, to expiate, to propitiate; that is, to cover an offence from the eye of offended justice by means of an adequate compensation. The term is applied to the mercy-seat, which was the lid or *covering* of the ark of the covenant, a divinely appointed symbol closely connected with the presentation of sacrifices on the day of expiation. The idea that seems to be expressed by this word, is that of averting some dread consequence by means of a substitutionary interposition. It thus fitly denotes the doctrine of salvation from sin and wrath, by a ransom of infinite worth. The Greek word more closely harmonises with the English term atonement. It signifies *reconciliation*, or the removal of some hinderance to concord, fellowship, or good agreement. This is the true import of the term AT-ONE-MENT, the act of reconciling or uniting parties at variance. 'The next day, he (Moses) showed himself unto them, as they strove; and would have set them AT

ONE again, saying, Sirs, ye are brethren; why do ye wrong one to another?' Acts vii. 26. Sin has placed God and man *apart* from one another; all harmony between them has been broken up; and those who once dwelt together in perfect concord, have been separated and disjoined. What Christ has done has had the effect of reconciling the parties—of restoring them to a state of *one-ness* with each other. The Deity is *at-oned;* God is brought to be *at-one* with his people; the work of the Redeemer is a proper *at-one-ment.* 'We joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have received the AT-ONE-MENT.'" Symington on Atonement. p. 7.

This extract gives a clear and honest exhibition of the term atonement: and I only add, that the strict and proper meaning of the word, refers to the consequence—the effect of the death of Christ, rather than to the cause whence it proceeds. The *reconciliation* is an *effect*; the *satisfaction* rendered by the blood, death, sufferings of our Saviour, is the *cause.* It will be important to bear in mind also, that in theological discussions, the former, rather than the latter, forms the subject matter of controversy. They who deny the penal and vicarious nature of Christ's death, do, for the most part, admit this reconciliation, as a result. The questions at issue, relate to the nature of the connexion between the sufferings of the Redeemer and the at-one-ment, or bringing together of the parties who were at-odds; viz: God and man.

2. As to the truth, that Jesus did suffer and die, there is no dispute. As to the nature and extent of his sufferings, there is. Let us look a little into the matter; and (1.) as to his whole life. He was born under circumstances well adapted to make this world a scene of sufferings. He lived amongst a poor and oppressed people, and though history is silent on the subject, we may well suppose he had at least the ordinary trials of such a lot. He could not indeed, be well styled "a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief," had he lived thirty years, free from great and sore afflictions, and had his griefs and sorrows been of only three years continuance.

(2) The next point, claiming our attention, is Gethsemane. Here, we have evidence of extreme anguish—excruciating agony. "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death." "And being in an agony, he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat was, as it were, great drops of blood, falling down to the ground." It would be difficult to present more unequivocal proof, of extreme sorrow, and suffering, than is here displayed. How can we account for this agonizing exclamation, and this bloody sweat? (a) Can it all result from the foresight he had of the shame and sufferings, that awaited him on the morrow? Is it nature sinking under the load of contumely and the bodily pains which are inseparable from a death by crucifixion? Is not the soul of Jesus sustained by the consciousness of rectitude? And does not conscious rectitude give fortitude, and nerve the heart for heroic endurance? Who will charge the Son of God with pucilanimity? It is therefore, no satisfactory account of the facts, to say, that his sufferings are the result of anticipated pains. Did ever the most hardened wretch, with conscience stinging, like ten thousand scorpions, sweat blood at every pore? Oh no! To suppose that alone, to be the cause of this baptism of blood, were to exhibit the Redeemer of the world as destitute of heroic fortitude. This cannot be the reason. And yet there was no visible, no physical cause: what then? (b) Some invisible agency there must have been: what was it? I answer, The foul spirits of hell—the leader of the fallen angels and his bands. These were permitted by God, to assault him, and try their last efforts to turn him from his purpose. What the forms of attack —*how* malignant spirits operate to cause pain to other spirits, we know not. But several reasons conduce to the opinion here expressed. And *first*, it is an assault most reasonably to have been expected. The purpose of Jesus was to die, and "through death, to destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil." Most reasonably, therefore, might he expect him to put forth one more desperate struggle to maintain his usurped dominion over men. Satan summons all his legions and puts the issue in a last and fearful assault. "He shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." Now,

what might be reasonably looked for, is not without some allusion to it in scripture.

For I remark *again*, Jesus had been led up of the spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil: and he was tempted. Satan practiced many arts to lead him aside from the path of duty. "And when the Devil had ended all the temptation, he departed from him for a season." Luke iv. 13. (ἀχρι καιροῦ) *until a season.* This word rendered *for*, properly means *until*, and is mostly so translated. It marks properly, the limit of time. The very same expression occurs, Acts. xiii. 11. "thou shalt be blind, not seeing the sun *for* a season," —*until* some period referred to. So, Luke i. 20. "thou shalt be dumb, and not able to speak *until* the day that these things shall be performed." So, Luke xvii. 27. "they did eat, they drank—*until* the day that Noe entered into the ark." "The Devil departed from him until a season." What season? If the season of a second assault ever occurred, it must be that before us. We have no account of any other. The language obviously implies, that the tempter was again to return, and here is the only period to which we can refer his return. On this supposition, we see good reason for this sorrow unto death—these sighs and groans, and bloody sweat. Foiled in his various attacks—disappointed in his malignant attempt to cut off the babe of Bethlehem; a hundred times thwarted and forced to abandon his ground and leave the subjects of demonical possession; utterly unsuccessful in his long and laboured assault upon Jesus at his entrance upon his public ministry, Satan has looked upon the growing interests of the Saviour's kingdom, with tormenting anxiety. He has marked His steady advance toward the completion of his purpose and his work. The more he contemplates the perfection of our Redeemer's character, the more does his own malignity lash him up to higher and more determined wrath. The nearer our Saviour approximates the consumation of his work, the more terribly fixed and desperate and determined becomes the opposition of his deadly foe: and now "the hour is come," and no time is to be lost; he therefore, rallies to the

charge all the mighty fiends of hell, and down upon the solitary mourner in Gethsemane, he pours his malignant legions. Hence this sorrow unto death; hence these sighs, and tears, and groans, and bloody sweat; hence this agonizing prayer, "Be not far from me; for trouble is near; for there is none to help. Many bulls have compassed me: strong bulls of Bashan have beset me round. They gaped upon me with their mouths, as a raving and a roaring lion:" Ps. xxii. 11. And hence resulted the fact before alluded to, "I saw Satan as lightening, fall from heaven:" for here was fought the sorest, and the last battle. The first onset was that which caused mourning in Rama; the second general assault was in the wilderness of Judea, and the third here, at the very heart of the Redeemer's kingdom, and it consists of three distrinct actions, for Jesus went and came once and again: after which the agony ceased and he returned to his disciples, and immediately delivered himself up to his fleshly foes.

The (c) third reference is to the cross. Jesus was nailed to the tree and endured unutterable things. These may be viewed, in reference to his body and his soul. The body of the Redeemer endured whatever of pain and anguish can result from this form of death. And it is difficult for us, in this day, when his blessed gospel has meliorated the condition of all men; even of those, who still treat its messages with contempt, duly to estimate such sufferings. Now, even when justice is most severe and determined in taking vengeance, the execution of her sentence, is accompanied with many molifying circumstances. The criminal is ordinarily launched upon the unknown ocean of a vast eternity, in the most easy and expeditious manner. The very executioner soothes and sympathises with the sufferer. Not so, the sorrows of our Saviour. Spiked fast to the cross, whilst his body is in full health and midlife vigour, he is lifted up and suspended by his lacerated hands and feet, until worn out with intense agony, the body dies. Scarcely does savage barbarity ever exceed, among the most ferocious tribes of wild men, the ingenuity of this form of torture. Meanwhile, he is the object of profane scoffing

and jeers—he is cursed and ridiculed, and refused the most simple and customary anodyne, a refreshing drink. Hardly dares the tear of sympathy to trickle down in silence, and the sigh of compassion is smothered, even in the bosom that gave him birth. "I have trodden the wine press alone, and of the people there was none with me."

But we are mingling with his bodily pains, things that ought to be viewed separately. The agonies of his human spirit, "when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin"—these are indeed his sufferings. In comparison with these, all his bodily pains are nothing. Dreadful as they were, they cannot be compared with what his soul experienced. For the contemplation of these, we have not much express scripture. This, I think, is designed to prevent us from indulging a too curious and minute scrutiny. General ideas only are thrown out; to these be our attention confined. Two forms of sufferings will appear, by an inspection of the scriptures; viz: the positive goings forth of God's wrath; and the withdrawal of all sensible evidences of his love.

God the Father commissions the sword, Zech. xiii. 7. "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow; saith the Lord of Hosts: smite the shepherd." So, Isa. xliii. 10. "It pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief; when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin; 2. Cor. v. 21. "He hath made him to be sin for us." That is, he made him a curse, a sin offering—Eph. v. 2. "An offering and a sacrifice for sin." And by the reply to Peter, "Put up thy sword into the sheath; the cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" it is manifest, that the sufferings were from the Father. "It became God—to make the Captain of salvation perfect through sufferings." Heb. II. 10.

In view of those texts, it appears to me impossible to evade the conclusion, that God's displeasure was manifested, his wrath was poured into the cup. Nor ought our ignorance as to the manner in which this may have been effected, to throw a straw of difficulty in the way of our faith. Jesus, as we shall see hereafter, bore the

sins of his people, and God laid on him those tokens of his displeasure, which otherwise must have fallen upon us. Our inadequacy to comprehend what God did—or *how he* could kindle upon him the burning fire, through which he was offered up a burnt offering, is no reason at all in the face of the fact, and the necessity of the fact. It pleased the Father to *bruise* him—he *did bruise* him; he did make him to suffer: and the bitterest ingredient in the cup, is the withdrawal of his countenance. "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me." My timed followers, and even Peter, so bold and confident—all have forsaken me and fled; but O my Father! why hast *thou* forsaken me? Thus hangs the man of Calvary—abandoned of all men and forsaken of God—bearing alone the reproach and the sin of his people—burning as a sacrifice in the fire of God's eternal spirit. Heb. ix. 14.

Here let us stand still—nor prosecute the enquiries vain. How could a holy soul suffer? How could a holy Farther inflict it? How much did he suffer? Could he suffer enough in so short a space of time, to satisfy for all the sins of God's redeemed? Nay, but O, vain man! withhold thy steps—and put off thy shoes from off thy feet: this is holy ground. Canst thou measure the depths of God's wisdom? Hast thou a measure or a scale to estimate pain, and take an exact account of agonies? Tell me then, the value of that sweat drop, that oozes from his blessed brow, as he lies yonder on the cold earth in Gethsemane!—and that blood gore, that overtakes it, and mingles as they trickle down his blessed face. What is their value? And that heart bursting sigh—"if it be possible, let this cup pass"—And those crimson streamlets, from his gracious temples.—And those flowing currents from his pierced and beneficent hands? What dost thou deem all these to be worth? And that agonizing shriek, "Eli, Eli, lama Sabachthani"—Weighed in thy balances, Oh, philosopher, what is its worth?

But now, if there is more folly than presumption, in any attempt at reply; if there is less philosophy, than piety, then stay thy hand; for "the Lord is in his holy

temple, let all the earth keep silence before him." Heb. 2, 20.

3. The magnitude of the Saviour's sufferings, is therefore, incomprehensible. Whatever was in that cup, he drank it. The requisitions of law, he met them all. We pretend not to define or measure. This only is manifest from the proceeding; they were unutterably great—unutterable even by himself. Articulate speech fails, and the stronger language of sighs and groans never could reach and express the whole truth.

One other consideration let me present. If bodily pains were all the Saviour endured—if, as some will have it, he experienced no curse—suffered nothing but the agonies of body, inseparable from death by crusifixion; then why this great commotion? Why this Gethsemane scene? Where is the fortitude of the man of Calvary? Why this complaint—this exclamation on the cross? Has Jesus less moral heroism than the blaspheming murderer at his side? If his pains were merely bodily, he surely suffers in comparison even with thousands of malefactors. He suffers in comparison with Stephen and James, and Paul and Peter, and ten thousand of his martyred disciples, in after ages, who endured greater torments than he did, and exulted in the same. How many blessed martyrs have gone rejoicing to the stake, and poured forth their hymns of praise, and their songs of thanksgiving from the midst of the burning flame? If therefore, the Redeemer's sufferings were no greater than theirs, his fortitude was less, and the very object of them, according to those who deny their vicarious nature, is defeated. If he suffered, merely to give an example of patient endurance what a complete failure! Now, in opposition to all this, we maintain both their vicarious nature, and their transcendant magnitude. See if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow!

4. The sorrows of the Saviour's life and death, were all by appointment of God, the Father. To this the texts above quoted, are plain and pertinent. To these may be added a few more. Isa. liii, 6, "the Lord hath laid on him, the iniquity of us all." Acts, vii, 20,

"Him being delivered by the determined counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Acts 4, 27, 28, "both Herod and Pontius Pilot, were gathered together, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." It is surely a work of supererogation to labour the proof of a position so plainly taught in the scriptures. Jesus was appointed by the Father to these sufferings. He put the cup into his Son's hand—and even when that son, with sighs and groans, and tears and bloody sweat, entreated that the cup might pass from him, the Father refused to remove it. That so it must be, was the Father's will, and unchangeable.

5. These sufferings were required by the eternal laws of right, or they were not. We present either alternative, to all who deny the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction by Christ's death. We deem, that other alternative, there can be none. That Jesus should suffer, was either right, or wrong, not in reference to the mere human agency, concerned, but in regard to the act of God, in allotting this portion to him. In this aspect of the case, no man who accredits the Bible, can hesitate. All indeed, but the Atheist, must at once, reject the latter. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? If therefore, it was right in God his Father, so to appoint his own Son to suffer, we are thrown upon another dilemma, viz: Jesus must have been liable, in the eye of the just and holy law of God, so to suffer, either on account of his own personal sin, or that of others, assumed by him. The former to affirm is blasphemy, the latter leads us to—

SECTION IV.

The doctrine of legal substitution.

1. Substitution is the removal of one thing and the putting of another in its place. The golden shields, made by Solomon, and hung up in the temple, were removed, and brasen shields were put in their place—

were substituted for them. Saul's armour, was *substituted* for David's sling and stone; but afterwards, these were restored. Anciently, chains of iron were used for the rigging of ships, and leather for sails; the moderns have *substituted* cords and canvass. Horses, a few years since, were exclusively used to draw carriages with passengers, from one part to another; now, to a large extent, steam engines, are put in their place—are *substituted* for them.

So one man is often substituted, or put in the place of another. The citizen soldier is allowed, by our laws, to put another in his place, in the ranks of his country's defence—the latter is *substituted* for the former.

2. This change of place, whenever the law covers and sanctions it, is properly called *legal substitution*; and can occur only in reference to personal acts; and when one person is put in the place of another, with a view to his acting for him, it is called *vicarious substitution;* and is but another name for the doctrine of federal representation, or rather is the preparatory to such representation.

Now, in order to legal or vicarious substitution, there must be a person bound by law, to some certain duties—*secondy*, a person not so bound under law, who may be put under the legal obligations of the other, upon his removal; and *thirdly*, a person representing the law and ruling in the whole transaction.

In the case of military service, just referred to, the *principal* is held under law, to certain services, involving laborious efforts and peril of life. The law has a claim upon him, which it will not forego. But as the claim is for specific services and the sufferings and peril which may be contigent thereto, the law concedes a change of person, whilst it demands identity of service. The object of the legal claim, may be as effectually secured by a substitute, as by his principal; and when the ends of law are fully accomplished, justice is satisfied, and of course awards the meed of due applause.

The possibility of legal substitution, therefore, implies in the *principal*, an obligation to do or to suffer

something; and a willingness to have this claim transferred, or passed over to another person: or, in other words, a willingness, that another person shall take his place and abide his responsibilities.

It implies in the *substitute*, a moral right, that is, a right in the eye of the moral law, to come under the obligations of the other. The thing to be done or suffered, must, in itself, be such a thing as is right for *him* to do or to suffer. He must have a right of control over himself in reference to the services required. He can have no right to give away services to, or for another, which were not his own. Hence, manifestly, a man has no right to offer himself as a substitute for a person condemned to death; he has no right to give away his life, for it is not his own. It belongs to God, and none but God who gave it, has a right to destroy it. A man may forfeit his life to the laws of God and his country, and thus throw it away: but he has no *right* to do so. The act is criminal. It partakes of the nature of suicide, and for it, as well as for the crime which caused the forfeiture, God will hold him responsible.

So, personal services, a minor has no right to give away by substitution; for they are not his own; they belong to his parent or guardian. Before he can have a right to expend them for the benefit of another, he must have the right in himself to expend them for himself. A minor, therefore, however willing, cannot of himself, become a legal substitute.

Another phase of the same idea, is, that the person substituted, must be duly qualified to perform the services to which his principal was bound. To engage to perform what a man is unable to perform, is an immorality and a fraud, both upon the principal and the law.

Another indispensable to legal substitution, is, a willingness to assume the responsibilities of the principal. It must be voluntary, in order to be right. There is, in fact, in every case, a virtual covenant, agreement or contract, between the principal and his substitute—a mutual consent, creating a moral union between them as parties.

But these are not the only requisites to substitution. It is not sufficient, that there be a principal, under certain obligations, and willing to have them transferred—that there be a substitute, having a moral right to receive the transfer, an ability and a willingness to meet the obligations of his principal. Every instance of legal substitution, is a covenant of three parties. The law, also, has a voice in the matter. It has a specific claim upon the individual. A. is bound to certain duties —or to endure certain penal evils. In either case the law knows only A. It can *claim* of A only. It has nothing against B and can claim nothing at his hand. A's willingness to transfer his liabilities to B; and B's willingness to receive them and abide the consequences, lays the law under no obligation to admit the arrangement. If I employ A to do a piece of work, I am under no obligation to put it into the hands of B, C, or D, or any other whom A may send as a substitute. I know only the party contracting, and the admission of another in his room, is purely optional with me. I may think D and C unsuitable to the service, and insist upon A fulfiling his contract. I may think B as competent as A to secure my object, and may agree to the substitution: but this is manifestly, a new item in the contract. It brings in another party. It is now a contract of three parties.

Hence it is obvious, that on the part of the law, there must exist a moral right to approve the substitution. If the law's claim upon A is for something over which B has no right of control as to himself, the law cannot approve the transfer. To put B to death for the crime of A would be unjust, even with consent of both; unless B had a *right* to give that consent:—that is, unless B had a right to dispose of his own life at pleasure. But as this is not the case with any mere creature—as no mere creature has a right over his own life, to destroy it at pleasure, so, no man can have a right to substitute himself for another doomed to death, and the law cannot consent to such substitution. It can only originate with that sovereignty which is above the law.

This reasoning will apply in all cases of criminal a-

ward. Suppose A condemned to ten years confinement in the penitentiary, and suppose B willing and able to do the labour, and to endure the hardships awarded to A, can such a substitution take place? Would it be morally right? Could the law allow it? To these interrogatories, the common sense of mankind, and the laws of all civilized countries give but one response. All revolt against the punishment of the innocent in room of the guilty. And the reason is obvious. No man has a right to sell his own freedom. A did wrong in becoming bound to durance vile: it was his crime. B's rights and duties are reciprocal. God made him free, and the possession of this precious treasure, is, itself, evidence of an obligation to preserve it, and to improve it. It is a talent, which he has no right either to bury in the earth or to lay up in a napkin. He *must use* it, or be criminal. He has no right to throw it away, and therefore, substitution in such case, is not allowed. Every man is under eternal obligations to preserve and to improve his natural and unalienable rights, and cannot, without criminality, ever be willing to surrender them. I have no more right to sacrifice my freedom, than to cut off my hand or my head. Each of these would be wrong, and a man cannot have a right to do wrong. Legal substitution, therefore, can occur only within the limits of personal rights. Just so far as I have, in the eye of law, human and divine, entire control over my person and conduct, and so far only, can I consent to be substituted in room of another, to sustain his legal responsibilities. Such is the simple doctrine of vicarious substitution. Our next position is,

SECTION V.

That this doctrine is embodied in the doctrine of Atonement.

1. The whole body of God's redeemed ones, are the *principal.* "I lay down my life *for* the *sheep.*" "He suffered, the just *for* the unjust." "He was wounded

for our transgressions." In the condition of the lost, whom He came to save, we have the two great requisites to a principal, (a) God's redeemed were bound under his law to the endurance of his wrath. This is the common lot of the race, as we have seen at due length. All have sinned and do come short of the glory of God. The whole world has become guilty before God, and therefore it is appointed by a decree of heaven, unto man once to die. The wages of sin is death. Guilt is the bond which binds the sinner to the stake for eternal burnings. This state of the race makes it necessary to procure a substitute, as it lays open the opportunity—it creates the possibility of substitution. (b) All the people of God are (or will be) willing to accept the proffered substitute. Naturally of themselves, they are hostile and unwilling; but supernaturally—through the teachings of the word, and the almighty workings of the Holy Ghost, they become willing, and do humble themselves, and embrace the proffered boon of heaven. They are made to feel their lost estate, and exposure to wrath. They are enabled in God's light, to see light clearly, and seeing the suitableness of the offered salvation, they become willing in the day of God's power.

(2) The *substitute* is Jesus, the Lamb of God. And we have in him the three requisites. (1) He had a moral right to make the substitution: i. e. to put himself under the legal responsibilities of his people. For He has "life in himself"—it is his absolutely, and independently. In John x. 17, 18. He is very particular in the statement of this position. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself: I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." The power here, unquestionably involves the right to use it. His life, which he lays down for his sheep, is his own, by an underived title. It belongs to him essentially, and He may therefore, do with it as seems good in his own sight. The humanity of our Lord is a miracle as to its origin. It was not produced as other human beings are produced; but beyond the range of the ordinary laws of our nature.

Its mode of existence is a miracle; it is not sustained by a divine power existing apart from itself; but it is, and always has been, in personal union with the self-existent Jehovah. As he holds his life, as man, not dependently on another, but in himself, he may lay it down at pleasure. Where he dependent—did he hold his life by suffrance, he could not rightfully give it away: but inasmuch as the Father hath life in himself, and so hath He given to the Son to have life in himself, it is at his own disposal. He may voluntarily surrender it, by putting himself into the legal relations of those who are under condemnation, by the judgement of the holy God. There is this clear difference between the man Jesus and all other men, that they all are dependent for life and all its attributes, upon another—even upon God the Creator, and, of course, not one of them has a right over his own life; but Jesus has such a right in and of himself. The importance of this point is not in proportion to the time spent in its illustration; but its obvious plainness and simplicity, prevents the necessity of dwelling longer on it.

2. Jesus was able to meet the claims of law upon those for whom he became a substitute. He could and did, as we have seen, fulfil the entire law of God by a of life, active holy submission to all its commands. He could and did endure pain and anguish inconceivable.

(3) These he voluntarily undertook. "Lo, I come, in the volume of the book it is written of me—I delight to do thy will, O my God."

3. God the Father, supervising the claims of eternal righteousness, had (1) a demand on man for perfect and full obedience and entire satisfaction for sin. These we fully set forth, when speaking of the effects of the broken covenant. (2) He had a right to transfer those claims to his Son; or in other words, there was no principle of law violated, when the Father accepted the substitution of his Son in the room of lost man. And (3) this was actually done. The Father did lay the burden of our iniquities upon him, and was pleased to bruise him.

SECTION VI.

The doctrine of substitution, proved and illustrated by the typical sacrifices.

Under the old dispensation, various offerings were prescribed by law, and the bloody sacrifices all represented substantially the same thing. Moses describes the essence of the whole in a few words; the worshipper he says, (Lev. 1. 3, 4.) "shall offer it of his own voluntary will, at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation before the Lord. And he shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him."

Here is substition—it is accepted for him—to make atonement for him. In these offerings, there is, 1. a confession or remembrance of sin. The worshippers are still reminded that they stand charged with sin. 2. There is an acknowledgement that life is forfeited. The life of the animal is destroyed, and its body, in whole or in part, is burnt upon the altar—a most significant mode of confessing, not only the sins of the worshipper; but also that these sins deserve God's wrath and curse —in whose execution the worshipper sees the everlasting ruin of his soul; and is thus led to deep concern for his safety. 3. There is expressed a hope of escaping the death due for sin. The worshipper is restored to favour. His past sin is remembered no more against him. He is admitted to the communion of the church—to the congregation of the Lord. 4. This deliverance from ceremonial guilt is through the sufferings of another. His victim has bled; and he escapes. The offering is substituted in place of the offerer, the one dies and the other lives.

On the great day of atonement, when the High Priest confesses over the scape goat, the sins of the people, and sends him away unto the wilderness, and when he slays the other goat to make an atonement for the people, the same truths are set forth.

So, the paschal lamb represents a suffering Saviour,

whose flesh is meat indeed, and whose blood is drink indeed. And a single inspired allusion is sufficient to satisfy every candid reader of the true intent and meaning of this thing. Christ, our passover, is sacrificed for us, let us therefore go forth to him who has suffered without the gate. Never could it be supposed that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins; but those sacrifices were typical—they pointed to Christ the Lamb of God, who, through the eternal Spirit, offered himself a sacrifice for his people. As the High Priest laid the sins of the people upon the victim's head, so God our Father laid our iniquities upon his own Son. As the devoted victim must die: so the devoted Redeemer must die.

SECTION VII.

This doctrine alone can account for the fact, that Jesus suffered, bled and died.

We have seen that the Son of God did suffer most excruciating agonies—that this was by express appointment of the Father—that when the Father was intreated to let the bitter cup pass, it did not pass—the Saviour drank it in all its bitterness. This is the fact. God did bruise him.

Now this was either right or wrong. The sufferings of Christ were inflicted on him, by God, either in pursuance of the claims of divine justice, or in opposition to them. Now which? Was it wrong in God to put such a cup into the hands of Jesus, and to constrain him to drink it?—to refuse to let it pass from him, though entreated by all that is tender and sympathising in the bleeding agonies of Gethsemane! Was it wrong in God to nail him on the accursed tree!! Was it wrong in God to withdraw from his own Son, the tokens of his love, and to leave him to all the agonies of one forsaken!!! Was all this wrong!! Nay, but shall not the judge of all the earth do right?

How then could it be right, to inflict such pain upon one so holy, harmless, undefiled and separate from sin-

ners? He that condemneth the righteous, is an abomination to the Lord; how much more he, who both condemns and executes the righteous? How then shall we exonerate the divine government from the enormous cruelty and the flagrant injustice of imposing the most awful sufferings upon the holiest, and the loveliest and most upright of all the subjects of its laws? Here is a problem in the moral universe—a spectacle to angels and to men. Heaven's first born, and best beloved—the sum of all moral perfections—the personified essence of all moral virtues—the brightness of the Father's glory—the express image of his person, writhing, bleeding, dying by God's appointment!!! Amazing scene! Well might yonder sun hide his head! Well might all hell rejoice! Well might all heaven tremble! Well might mightiest Archangels feel for their crowns, and tremble for their heads! Well might their trembling hearts exclaim, If *such* innocence, *such* holiness, *such* righteousness, can suffer *such* things; alas for us! where the guarantee of our safety? If no mountain load of *sin imputed*, bows that blessed head; alas, for the moral universe!! God has forgotten to be just! Cruelty and unrighteousness are the habitation of his throne—wrathful and indiscriminate destruction go before him!!!

Leaving out of view, the doctrine of vicarious substitution, I ask, is it possible, for any rational mind to avoid these horrible and tremendous conclusions? How can you solve the problem in any other way than this, which charges God foolishly? I therefore, leave the burning point of this sword, in the conscience of all who deny the doctrine of Christ's being a substitute in room of his people, and bearing their sins in his own body on the tree: and turn to this glorious and blessed truth, as containing a full and thorough solution of the broblem before us.

Jesus was the substitute of his people—their Paschal Lamb. By his own voluntary deed, he put himself in their legal position. He undertook for them, to meet all the claims of law. God the Father, consented to the substitution; because the Son had a right over his own life and could lay it down at pleasure. Jesus

having thus taken upon himself, the legal responsibility of his people, is bound to do and to suffer in their place and room, all that they were bound to do and to suffer. Their sins were laid upon him. The cords by which they were bound to the stake, are loosed from off them, and bound upon him. The law lays hold upon Him. Justice commands, "Smite the Shepherd and the Sheep shall be scattered." He is wounded for our transgressions—he is bruised for our iniquities—the chastisement of our peace is upon him—and by his stripes we are healed, for the Lord laid on him, the iniquities of us all; and *therefore* was He pleased to bruise him.

Thus, the doctrine of substitution solves the moral problem: and presents us at once, with the most illustrious exhibition of the immaculate purity of divine justice and of its eternal inflexibility. To the cross of Calvary the universe is triumphantly pointed, as illustrating in the highest possible degree, the glory of the divine justice. On that awful mount she stands. The scales of eternal equity in one hand, and the flaming sword of immutable righteousness in the other. A bleeding, weeping Christ before her. The groans and tears and bloody sweat of Gethsemane, pleading with ten thousand tongues, "let this cup pass!" Heaven and all its hosts of angels, aghast and in wondring amazement. Hell, deluded hell, in malignant joy, watching the grand result. Justice—stern, and unyielding, utters her fiat—SMITE THE SHEPHERD.

Oh, what a groan was there! "It is finished." The deed is done. Justice is satisfied. The moral government of the universe is established upon her eternal basis. Hell is disappointed. The curse is merged in Calvary's blood and forever lost. The barrier is removed, mercy, with her bow of promise, ushers forth—a ruined world is saved.

SECTION VIII.

The consequences of legal substitution.

1. *To the substitute.* For all the purposes, for which he is a substitute, he lies under the same legal obligations, under which his principal lay. If his principal was bound to active obedience to the law, so is he. If the principal was held under the curse, or penal sanction of the law, so is He. He must endure it all. Hence the impossibility, of this cup passing away, because of the immutability of divine justice.

If the principal should himself satisfy all claims of law against himself, he must be released from punishment, and made happy forever, according to the terms of the covenant, wherein God promised life to man. So Christ, the sinner's substitute, surety, and friend, having finished the whole work given him, having for his people, and in their responsibilities, fulfilled all law, must rise from the dead and live forever. Hence, "he could not be holden of death." It is a moral impossibility. Justice—the very same stern justice which demanded of Him, obedience and death, now demands his release from that death. Her claim is satisfied and she has no more disposition than power to retain her captive in chains. The same divine fiat which said, "Smite the Shepherd," now proclaims, "Raise him to everlasting glory, and "let all the angels of God worship Him". Unto him let every knee bow, and every tongue confess. He has glorified me above all the creatures of God, and let all the creatures of God—through everlasting ages, exhalt his glory in the highest.

From the actual substitution of Christ—his actual meeting of all claims against his people and him, results his universal dominion. "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." This dominion is founded in right. Because he hath established the great principles of moral government, therefore is its actual administration over the universe, entrusted to his hands. Because he humbled himself and became obedient until

death, therefore hath God highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow and every tongue confess.

From this substitution, results the Redeemer's right in his people, and his claim to their release from all the consequences of sin. He has met those consequences, and has a claim to their exemption. He has paid the price of their redemption, and is entitled to their deliverance. To retain them in bondage, after He demands their release, were the height of injustice. Such power, the law has not. It must recognize the claims of our blessed substitute, the moment he puts them in.

Hence results, the mission of the spirit at the intercession of the Son. "Him the Father heareth always." This is not the place to dwell upon the intercession of Christ, nor the mission of his Spirit. I only remark the connexion in law and in right, between these things. These follow as a matter of moral necessity, as peremptory and inevitable, in a legal or moral point of view, as any consequence in the natural world, follows its natural antecedent. It is not more a matter of necessity, that a ponderous body projected into the air, must descend again to the earth, than that the deliverance of his people from the bondage of the law, and of sin, and of death, should follow Christ's legal substitution in their room, and his consequent obedience and death for them.

Equally clear is Christ's right to his people's rescue from the grave, and their eternal blessedness in heaven. Their reception to everlasting glory and security therein, by an irreversible decision of eternal judgment, is one—and indeed the main right, title and claim of Jesus, founded on the fulness of his own satisfaction to all the claims of all law, human and divine, ceremonial and moral.

2. *To the principal*, The results of substitution are correspondently important.

He is released from those demands of law, for which his substitute has already satisfied by his death. This grows out of the very nature of moral government—the

nature of justice. That a man should be held liable to suffer, after the law has said, in reference to its own claim against him, it is finished, is a contradiction in terms. It is affirming a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. Guilt, or liableness to punishment, lies upon him, after it has been taken off him and put upon the head of his substituted Surety, and he has taken it away! The Lamb of God has taken away the sins of the world, and yet they lie upon it! The sinner is redeemed, and yet he is in bondage!! The curse has been laid upon the head of his Surety; and yet it is laid upon his head! The one has suffered all that justice demanded or could demand, and yet the other is still bound to suffer!! That has drunk the bitter cup to the very dregs; and yet this must drink it all!!

Clearly then, it is a moral impossibility, laid in the very nature of God's eternal righteousness, that the sheep of Christ's flock, should not be with him, in due time, to behold his glory and to enjoy him forever.

3. In reference to God the Father, as the executor of justice—*atonement*, in the general sense of the English term—reconciliation results. The parties offended, and at variance, viz: sinful man and the sin-hating God, are brought together. The cause of God's displeasure towards man—the only possible cause, is sin. If then, the cause be removed, the effects must pass off. God is angry with the wicked on account of their wickedness. Their sins only render them odious in his sight. But their sins are removed, taken away, and forever washed out by the blood of Christ; consequently, their Father's displeasure must cease, and he admit them to his favour, which is life, and to the participation of his loving kindness, which is better than life. We are reconciled to God by the death of his son.

But here, it is of no small importance to distinguish, between offended God and offending man, in reference to this reconciliation. God's indignation burns eternally against all sin. His justice requires its punishment. His holiness requires, with equal rigidness, holiness in man, and in case of its absence, he cannot look with complacency upon him. Now the eye of God is turned

upon the all perfect satisfaction rendered by Christ's death, and He is pleased: it is turned upon the infinitely perfect righteousness of Christ, in his obeying the law, and He is satisfied, and delights therein. God is reconciled—He is no longer angry with the sinner; for he is no longer a sinner in the eye of God, and of his justice.

But as to the man,—his actual reconciliation—the removal of all feeling of enmity to God, and the substitution in their place, of all holy affections—of supreme and ardent love to God—this is quite a different thing. It follows as an inevitable, but not immediate consequence of substitution and satisfaction. It is inevitable, as we have seen, because of the very nature of moral law and government, from Christ's satisfaction by his substitution. But it follows mediately, viz: through the agency of the divine Spirit, which agency operates in the conversion and sanctification of the soul. This therefore, belongs not to the question of legal relations at all; but will come in properly, when our attention shall be claimed by the moral affections, accompanying the change of legal relations. Then we shall find, that reconciliation, in the sense of propitiating us to God—i. e. rendering us well disposed, friendly, and imbued with a spirit of love to him—flows from renovation by the Holy Ghost, and that in view of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice.

CHAPTER XV.

THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

This is a very vexed question, and were it one merely of doubtful disputation, and not vital in its importance, on the great subject of Justification, we might avoid the discussion of it, as entirely controversial. But, inasmuch, as the extent of the atonement depends upon its *nature*, the enquiry will, I trust, be at once interesting and profitable. In the discussion, I shall pursue the didactic form first; and shew the true doctrine, as a necessary result of the preceding views: and then take up the erroneous sentiments and evince their true character and tendencies.

SECTION I.

Let us recall a few leading principles, heretofore settled.

1. In the government of a holy God, an innocent being cannot suffer. To suppose that God would lay the punishment of sin—or treat a moral being, entirely free from sin, as a sinner, by delivering him up to suffer, is to charge God foolishly.

2. The sufferings of Jesus were by appointment of God, therefore, as he had no sin of his own,

3. He must have suffered for the sins of some other person, or persons. I say *person*, because,

4. We have seen, that the idea of a person representing or acting morally for a *nature*, for a mere abstraction that never existed, and never could exist, is a speculation too foolish to claim serious attention.

5. Jesus, in acting and suffering for persons, stood in their moral relations—he occupied their place—he bore their legal responsibilities. For,

6. There is no other reasonable solution of that stupendous moral phenomenon, presented on the cross of

Calvary. If Jesus did not legally bear the sins of some others than himself, then his sufferings, by appointment of God, exhibit the monster crime of the universe, and God is its author. Hence it is evident,

7. That Jesus did suffer for sin. But sin is a personal matter; and the sin that caused his death, must have been the sin of some human person or persons.

8. The person or persons whose sins lay on Jesus, and caused his death, are his principals; that is, they are the persons for whom he acted and suffered—whose sin "he put away by the sacrifice of himself." Hence,

9. They whose sins "he bore in his own body on the tree," whose sins he *suffered for*—(because this is what is meant by his bearing them)—cannot, without the most palpable violation of all right, and law and justice, be themselves constrained to suffer for the same sins. "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Therefore,

10. The atonement—the satisfaction rendered to divine justice, is as extensive so, as the sheep of Christ's flock, and no more—the atonement is as long and as broad as the salvation of God. Or in other words, they whose sins are washed out in the blood of Calvary, must be saved, and none others *can* be. "There is none other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we must be saved." In other words, They, and all they for whom Christ died—for whom he paid the ransom, or price of redemption, will be saved, and none others. To maintain any other doctrine, is to abandon the atonement altogether.

To this agrees the language of the Bible. "Christ loved *the Church* and gave himself *for it*." "He was wounded for our transgressions—bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of our peace, was laid upon him, and by his stripes we *are healed*." "I lay down my life *for the sheep*." "My sheep hear my voice and they follow me, and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hands."

SECTION II.

Proof from Sacrifices.

To this agrees the doctrine of sacrifices. The victim is offered up for the worshipper, "to make atonement for him." The sacrificial and scape goats, on the great day of atonement, bear the sins of the church, or congregation of the Lord. We shall search in vain in the sacred volume, for a sacrifice that was offered indefinitely, for no person, or any at all, or any one indiscriminately. And the reason is plain. There is no such sacrifice: and in the very nature of the thing there can be none such. Because there can be no indefinite sin—no sin committed by persons indefinitely. Sin is always a personal matter, and until some man shall point out indefinite sin, it will be vain and foolish, to talk of indefinite atonement for sin.

SECTION III.

Proof from the general opinions of Men.

But this principle is found also, in the common sense of mankind, as it is emdodied in their legal enactments and their commercial regulations. Every where, their responsibilities are personal and special: never indefinite. To talk of an indefinite satisfaction for an offence against the laws of the land, or the indefinite payment of a debt, or the indefinite obligation for a debt, is to utter incomprehensible and indefinite folly.

SECTION IV.

Proof from the idea of Redeeming.

The same is evinced by all the language and imagery which represent this doctrine as a redemption. Here Christ is the Redeemer—the one who purchases back the lost property of God, viz: his people, who

are carried away captive by sin and Satan. They are his redeemed ones. The price which he pays for them,—the *ransom*, is that atonement which, by his death he renders to the law, which had sold them into captivity.

Duly to appreciate the force of these expressions, it is necessary to bear in mind, that human language is greatly influenced and modeled by human customs. Many habits of society it is necessary to understand, as a means of arriving at the true meaning of its language. Among the ancient customs of this nature, is that of making slaves of the prisoners of war: and the consequent custom of recovering these again to freedom, by purchase. Very frequently, wealthy friends interpose in behalf of unfortunate prisoners. In this case, the price demanded for their release, is not in proportion to their value. For the sons of the wealthy were likely to be less worth, as slaves, than the sons of the poor. But the price of redemption, or the ransom was, designed to be proportioned to the wealth and influence of the friends at home. The will of the master fixes its amount. And the payment of the ransom is part of the work or process of redemption. It is, however, only a part of it. The mere delivering of a sum of money into the hands of a man, unaccompanied by a declaration of the intention, is not a purchase. It may perhaps, be a deposit, but it does not necessarily imply a contract. It may be for safe-keeping. It may be in payment of a debt. It may be a donation. The transaction has no moral or legal character, unless the purpose be declared, and unless it be agreed to by the receiver. Then, and then only, can it be considered as a *ransom*, when the buyer and the seller of the captive, both view it as such, and are both agreed, the one to give, and the other to receive it. Thus the redeeming of a captive is, substantially a covenant between two parties for the benefit of a third; and when the terms are complied with by the redeemer, he has a claim of right to the release of the third party: the full vindication of which claim, completes the operation, called *redemption.*

Such were the customs of the world which gave rise to that language of the Bible, that sets forth the work of salvation, as a *redemption*. Thus, Christ redeemed his people from the curse of the law. He gave himself a ransom for all of them. Hence, they are bought with a price, and are not their own; nor do they belong to the world or the devil; they are Christ's.

Now, all such language is calculated to deceive us, unless it be true, that Jesus has certain friends and brethren, who by fraud and deception, force and violence—have been carried away captives, and sold under sin: and whom it is his purpose to recover to their original state of holiness, happiness, and freedom. But on this supposition, all is plain, and obvious, and forceful. Let it be conceded, that an immense multitude of persons are given to him by the Father; and that he has undertaken to bring them all to glory; and this language about redemption has a beauty and a force, altogether worthy of the glorious subject. Of this multitude, Jesus is the Redeemer. This redeeming, of course includes the payment of the *ransom* and the *release* of the ransomed.

1. The payment of the *ransom* or *price of redemption:* which is death. Math xx. 28, "the son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom (λύτρον—a price of redemption) for many." Psalm, xlix. 7, "none of them can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him.' Here the ability to redeem, that is, to buy back to life, his brother, is denied; yea even the ability to pay the price. A man might be able to pay the ransom required to restore his brother to freedom; and at the same time, be unable to vindicate the rights of his purchase. But neither of these is the case. No man is able to pay to God the ransom; much less, is any able to release the soul from death. Jesus Christ says "I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death: O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction." Hos. xiii. 14; and again, "for the Lord hath ransomed Jacob and redeemed Israel." Jer. xxxi. 11. Here again, is the distinction marked between ran-

soming and redeeming—between the payment of the price and the deliverance of the persons for whom it is paid.

2. The restoration to their former state of freedom and happiness, is the main part of redemption: it includes the other; for when the price is paid, and there is power to vindicate the rights it creates, this follows of course. The other is presupposed; so that, in a just administration, you can infer, from the actual release of the sinner from the consequences of sin viz: death, that death has been suffered for him—the price has been paid. Accordingly, it is affirmed, Gal. III. 13. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: for it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." And Peter iv. 18, says, "ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, such as silver and gold, from your vain conversation, received by tradition from your fathers; but with the precious blood of Christ." And Titus, II. 14. Christ "gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity." The *actual release* is a very important—it is in reality the *all important* item in the work of redemption. Without it, there is no redemption at all: without it, what is the payment of the ransom, but an exhibition of folly or weakness, or both? Without it, no song of gratitude can ever burst from living lips. Who will ever thank and praise a Redeemer that left him in bondage? If they had only had the price paid for them—if they had been left, notwithstanding, in sin and misery, could ever the elect of God have struck the lofty notes of that "new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou was slain and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood?" Rev. v. 9.—thou hast purchased—paid a price for us (ἠγόρασας.) Surely, this song belongs only to those who are paid for, and restored to everlasting joys. Hence, Paul says, Heb. ix. 12. Christ hath "obtained eternal redemption for us:" and this is the redemption, (λύτρωσιν,) the *releasing* which Luke says the faithful in Israel looked for. (II. 38.) The same original word is used to signify the releasing of the persecuted saints. Heb. xi. 35. "others were tortured not

accepting *deliverance*"—redemption—release from their affliction, i. e. not accepting it on the terms offered by their persecutors; viz: upon condition they renounce their religion. Hence, again, I infer, the leading and principal idea in redemption is, the restoration of the redeemed to their former state, and the secondary idea, as to importance, but primary as to order of time, is the purchase or payment of the ransom.

This, Jesus effected, when he died on the cross, and said "it is finished;" the vindication of his rights thence accruing, he effects by the power of his spirit in the entire work of sanctification. Our present concern is to shew, that the purchase and the release are co-extensive. Christ paid the ransom for all who shall ever be by him brought to glory—for all who shall ever "sing the new song." Not one of that immense throng shall be guilty of affirming an untruth, when he shall say to the Redeemer—"thou was slain, and has redeemed us to God by thy blood." But He redeemed no more. Not one of that other and doleful multitude who shall go away, shall be allowed to strike up, as he starts on his downward course into the fires of an endless hell, the note, "thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." Who, of all the lost spirits of hell, will venture to blacken his own guilt and sink himself deeper in the abyss of woe, by uttering such a falsehood and disturbing the chorus of perdition? What foul-mouthed fiend will dare to assault heaven, and insult the Judge, who has just pronounced his irrevocable doom, by thus charging the Son of God with offering a vain oblation—paying a price for him which did not secure him? What case hardened demon will thus flout the efficacy of atoning blood? Dwells there in all hell such effrontery as to affirm, Jesus "gave himself for me!"—"he died for my sins!"—he paid the ransom for me!—he purchased me!—he took away my sins!—he died as much for me as for those who yonder go into life eternal!! Ah! No. This ignorance, presumption and blasphemous arrogance, is a sin of earth only. Neither heaven nor hell, can thus trifle with atoning blood. Neither Angel nor devil, neither sinner lost or saved, will be found thus

contemptibly to think or speak of the groans of Gethsemane, and the sorrows of Calvary. Of such folly earth only is the abode. Here only, is the satisfaction of the Son of God, so lightly esteemed, as to be thought to secure the salvation of no one. Here only, is Jesus Christ accounted guilty, either of folly, or weakness, or both:—of folly in paying a price for those he never expected to secure and bring to heaven; or, if he did expect and design to save them, of weakness in not accomplishing his purpose and fulfilling his expectations; or of both in the nonperformance of the principal thing in redemption, viz: the actual salvation of the redeemed!

But now, if your heart and your head equally revolt at the absurdity and impiety of an atonement that of itself secures the salvation of no one—if you shrink from tabling such a charge, against the wisdom and goodness of Christ, as that of paying a ransom, but not vindicating the rights of his purchase; of redeeming multitudes who shall burn forever in the fires of death; of atoning for multitudes who are never reconciled to God!!—if these things are too monstrous; then you are ready to receive the plain scripture doctrine of Christ's true and proper legal substitution in the room of his people—his consequent representation of them—his acting for them, and for none others, in his obedience—his suffering for his sheep—not for the goats, and thus making legal restitution for their sins; so as to bind down the faithfulness of God the Father, to their release from sin and their security forever in the joys of life. In other words, that the obedience and death of the Son of God, are vicarious—they are for his own people. The atonement, by the very necessity and essence of its own nature, is precise and definite. "I lay down my life for the sheep."

Such is the doctrine of atonement, as you have it set forth in the Bible—a doctrine whose inimitable simplicity bespeaks its heavenly origin, almost equally with its unspeakable grandeur—a doctrine which glorifies the justice of God, whilst it reveals his mercy—a doctrine which has its foundation in the eternal and unchanging principles of right and law, and sets not "at odds heav-

en's jarring attributes," brings all the perfections of God to harmonize in the salvation of man :—a doctrine, which presents to the bleeding heart, a full and gracious guarantee that it "shall never perish," and thus forms an immoveable foundation for the edifice of its hopes, and the habitation of its joys as a doctrine :—that points out, with a sunbeam, the manner in which "God can be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."

CHAPTER XVI.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST A LIMITED AND REAL ATONEMENT.

Against this doctrine, so abundant in blessings to good men, and glory to the good and upright God—who are they that have any thing to object?

SECTION I.

The Universalist's Objection.

They maintain, that Christ will ultimately bring to heaven all the human race—yea, some insist, that all moral creatures, fallen angels, as well as men, will be saved. It is unworthy of God to stop half-way. It is inconsistent with his universal benevolence, to thrust out into eternal death any creature of his hand. The doctrine of limited salvation makes God partial, and thus stains the glory of the divine attributes, by exhibiting God as a cruel being, who makes his creatures unhappy. On the other hand, universal salvation is broad and liberal, worthy of the benevolent God, and attracting by its liberality the hearts of all creatures to himself.

On this subject we must be very brief, and that not because of its difficulty; but because of its plainness

and simplicity, and comparative insignificance. I remark,

1. The doctrine of universal salvation is very palatable to the carnal mind—the unrenewed heart. All unconverted men *would* believe it, if they were able. Whenever it is presented to the unsanctified heart, there springs up a spontaneous desire, that it might be true; and this desire resists steadfastly the evidence of its falsehood. Wicked men, all over the world, would fondly believe it; and do actually believe it, so far as they can. Now, from this fact, is manifest the opposition of the doctrine to the pure teachings of the Bible. If universalism were the gospel of Christ, that gospel would have no cross in it. If the Bible taught universal salvation, it would be universally, and at once embraced. Its agreeableness to the feelings of the carnal mind, would secure it a prompt reception in every bosom. The popularity of universalism with the thoughtless and wicked, is proof irresistable, that it is not the system taught in the Bible.

2. The word of God is the only infallible rule of direction in this question: and its testimonies are very explicit—a few only of them we can present. Ps. ix. 17. "The wicked shall be turned into hell and all the nations that forget God." Prov. xiv. 32. "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness, but the righteous hath hope in his death." Prov. xi. 21. "Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not be unpunished."

This punishment is represented in scripture, by the strongest language and imagery possible: both in regard to its intensity and duration.

(1) Its intensity—"who among us shall dwell with *devouring fire!*" "Tophet is ordained of old, for the king it is prepared; he hath made it deep and large, the pile thereof is fire and much wood: and the breath of the Lord"—the Spirit Jehovah—"like a stream of brimstone, doth kindle it." (Isa. xxx. 33.) And the fearful destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah are constantly, referred to as expressive of the terrible punishment of the wicked. And in Math. xxv. 46, the Saviour says "these shall go away into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels"—"their worm dieth not and their fire

is not quenched." No language can more awfully and fearfully, depict the terrors of future punishment, than the account given of the rich man and Lazarus; Luke, xvi. 19—31. The only request the lost spirit presents is, that "Lazarus might be sent to dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame." And even this momentary and trifling alleviation is denied. The power of human language and fancy is exhausted. No stronger representation can be given or conceived, of the terribleness of hell torment.

2. But many of these texts also go to show the interminable nature of it. The last for example. There is a great gulph fixed and there is no passing out nor in. It is an impassable gulph. The son of man hath arisen and shut to the door, and those who are without shall never enter in—"depart from me ye cursed, I never knew you." Such language, from such lips; Oh! how it seals the soul up in endless death! And is there no hope at all? no alleviation? no termination? Must it flounce, and flounder, and roll upon the flowing billows interminably? When ten thousand years have dragged away their weary weight, will hell torment be but half over? Will it be but just begun? Will there be no proportion of it past?

> "When I have rolled these thousand years in fire,
> Ten thousand, thousand let me then expire."

Ah! no—unhappy spirit! Eternal justice has against thee an eternal demand; which cannot be satisfied by finite mortal in any thing short of eternal ages: thou hast gone away into *everlasting* fire.

Here we may remark, to cut off licentious criticism at once, the original terms (ἀιώνιον, ἀιῶνας τῶν αιώνων) are the strongest that can be used to express endless duration: or the end of the being, or thing to which they are applied. No words in the Greek language are of more determined character. And therefore, this term is applied to signify the endless happiness of the righteous—"the righteous into life *eternal*"—"these into punishment *eternal*," it is the same Greek word. If then, as universalists would have it, *everlasting* or *eternal* means

only a long time, but not forever; then it follows, that the righteous are not to live forever: the very same word describes the duration of the punishment and the duration of the life. If the criticism be good against the endless duration of the punishment; it is equally good against the endless duration of the happiness: if it extinguish hell fire; it also extinguishes the life of heaven. But more than this; it brings the existence of the divine being himself to a close. For the Greek word for everlasting, or eternal, is the strongest used to express the duration of God's existence. Paul says, Christ offered himself "through the *eternal* spirit" (Heb. ix. 14.) and in Rom. xvi. 26, he speaks "of the everlasting God," in both which places, he uses the same word, which is applied to mark the duration of heaven and of hell. Thus, by one single criticism, hell and heaven, angels, and men, devils, and God—all—all are swept off. So nearly does the universalist's doctrine approach to dark, doleful, damnable atheism. Perhaps indeed, this is the object. These men wish, perhaps, to get clear of all belief in the being of a God, in hope of escaping the lashes of a condemning conscience, that refuses to submit to the humbling doctrines of the cross. Alas! vain hope. Hell is not so easily put out. God is not thus obliterated. Ah, no! The dreadful reality recoils upon us continually.

> "The sinner must be born again,
> "Or drink the wrath of God,"

in an eternal hell. But many refuse the proffered salvation, die in their sins, and are forever lost.

Now, against these plain scriptures, it is vain to urge abstract reasonings. Must not, say these men, punishment be proportional to crime: and if so, does it not follow, that those who have sinned less than others, must be punished less, and so at last cease to suffer; when they have suffered their portion. To this, the answer is very simple. To all men the punishment is everlasting, as to duration, but the Bible represents it as differing in degree. The servant who knew his lord's will, and did it not, shall be beaten with many stripes—shall suffer a more severe punishment, than he who knew not

his lord's will. In the future state, the *degrees* of punishment, as also, the *degrees* of happiness, will differ; but all will be alike in *duration*.

Another consideration leads us to the same conclusion; it cannot be doubted that the wicked in hell, will gnaw their tongues for pain, and blaspheme God. Fiendish wickedness will be their employment. But this wickedness must be followed by its proper punishment; and thus, eternity of torment, and that a progressive torment, is before every impenitent, lost soul. He must become in the course of ages, a giant devil.

Again; The modern doctrine of universal salvation, admits some punishment in future; but insists that after a time, all will be saved. That is—those whom the invitations of the gospel, the love of Christ exhibited therein, and all the means of grace, failed to convert unto God, are sent to hell for a while; and there, by some more efficacious process than Christ and his church could use, are soon converted, burnt clean, and fit for heaven. That is, the devil is a more successful preacher than Jesus Christ! Hell is a more hopeful place for conversion than earth!! Christ converts whom he can here, and the hard cases are put into more powerful hands!!! Oh, horrible impiety!

Lastly, The same reasoning, which would reject the doctrine of endless punishment, because of its inconsistency with the love and compassion of God, would reject all punishment. For, manifestly, if punishment can be dispensed with, in any degree, it can be, in every degree. If the divine compassion is inconsistent with the infliction of pain upon the creature, for one part of duration, it must equally so for another.

To this, it will be answered, that punishment must be proportioned to crime. Some punishment is due to every crime, and the more crime, the more punishment.

I reply, that the only power to determine the measure of penal suffering, is the power of the lawgiver. Who shall grade the rewards of iniquity? Who shall fix the quantum or duration, if not God himself? But if God in his law fixes and grades the punishment of crime, is it not manifest that we are wholly dependent upon reve-

lation for our knowledge of both? Where, but in the Bible, can we find any certain decision as to either? Human legislators are competent, within their sphere, to graduate crime and punishment; but their sphere is earth. This life only, is subject to their control. They never pretend to do more than punish for injuries done to society. They leave vengeance to Him, to whom alone it belongeth. What may be the amount and duration of pain due to sin, no man ever pretended to say. And the reason is obvious; man has no measure of criminality, absolutely; nor can he measure pain and anguish. The possibility of measuring either, is utterly beyond our reach: consequently, to strike the grade and proportion, is altogether impossible. God only can measure crime, and He only can apportion its punishment. To the revelation of his will we must look for light upon this subject. And here, as we have seen, the duration of punishment described by the same terms, by which He describes his own duration; the duration of the soul; of heaven and of hell—it is "everlasting fire"—it is "eternal punishment"—it is a "worm that never dies"—its victims "shall never enter into my rest"—"they shall not see life"—a cooling drop of water shall never touch their burning tongues—the gulf that separates them from life is impassable—they are sealed up in endless despair.

The doctrine, then, that Christ redeemed and saved *all*, is untrue. The atonement, therefore, in its actual efficacy, as well as in its intrinsic nature, is not universal; but particular; not general; but definite.

EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

SECTION II.

Objection second—Indefinitism.

The second theory which lies in our way, concerning the extent of the atonement, is that of indefinitism. And one of the peculiar difficulties we find in meeting

it, is the fact of its own indefinite character. It assumes several forms, two of which I shall endeavour to arrest and examine, viz:

1. That Christ died for all men alike.

2. That he died for no man, or set of men at all, but simply to satisfy public justice.

As to the former of these theories, if I have been able to understand the meaning of its advocates, they maintain, that Jesus offered himself a sacrifice for the whole of the human race: each and every one of the natural descendants of Adam are alike included in it, and whatever may be the value of the atonement, every human being has an equal right to it; and it may in truth be said, of every one, Christ suffered and died for him, to make atonement for him. This is the doctrine of the redemptional Universalists, and with these we have settled accounts. But those with whom we have now to do, deny the universality of its application. They say, the application of this universal atonement, is particular. It becomes actually availing to a part only—to those who believe and repent—to the elect.

To this I answer,

1. If the atonement be universal, the salvation—that is, the actual application of it, must be universal too; or then, the word *atonement* cannot be taken in the sense of the English word—*reconciliation, restoration to divine favour;* nor can it mean the rendering of complete and full satisfaction to God's justice for man's sin. Because, manifestly, if the atonement, (meaning the *reconciliation)* be universal, the salvation is so too. For all who are reconciled, made friendly, restored to favor with God, are happy—are saved. The conception, that persons who are in a state of friendship with God, are found in Hell, is monstrous. No man can entertain it in his belief.

Nor can *atonement* mean *satisfaction* for their sins: because, to suppose that men, whose sins are satisfied for,—against whom justice has no demand, shall burn in an eternal hell, is to maintain even a more horrible blasphemy than in the former case. It is, as we have seen, to charge the pure and holy and just God, with

the most iniquitous crime of exacting full satisfaction for their sins from his own son, until, both the son and the Father testified it finished; and yet of inflicting the punishment of these very sins upon themselves.

Thus, if you admit the doctrine of a real satisfaction to justice, by the sufferings of Christ; and if, at the same time, you maintain, that this satisfaction is for *all men*, you must maintain that all men are saved, or that God sends to eternal torment those—a part of those, against whom the law has no demand—whose sins Christ has taken away!

Such is the dliemma—plain to the common sense of all men—in which the advocate of a general but a real atonement, places himself. On one or the other of its horns he must hang. If he shrink from the idea, that God sends to perdition—to hell—a part of those, for whose sins his justice has received full satisfaction—if his soul tremble at such an insinuation—if this horn pierce him beyond endurance; then he has no retreat, but into universal redemption—he must maintain, according to common sense—that all whose sins are taken away by the death of Christ, must escape eternal torment, that is, according to him—all men are saved.

There is thus, no stopping place, between universal *atonement*—meaning thereby, *full satisfaction to divine justice*—and universal salvation. The ideas, therefore, of a general atonement, and a particular redemption, are irreconcileably inconsistent. They are *contradictories*, and can never *agree*.

It by no means relieves, or even alleviates the difficulty, to say, that Christ, in atoning for the sins of all, opened the door for all; so that all could be saved if they would: but inasmuch as they will not come to him, their refusing to come cuts them off. For, whilst it is true, that they refuse to come, and therefore perish; it is also true, that this refusal to come is, itself a sin—the sin of unbelief—and they are condemned through it. But they could not be condemned for it, if it had been taken away by Christ's atonement; therefore, the sin of unbelief remains unatoned for, and consequently, it is not true that He took away *all sin*, of all, by the sacrifice of himself.

But as I am using Dr. Owen's argument, let me state it in his own words. (On Redemption, B. III. C. 3.) "If Christ died in the stead of all men, and made satisfaction for their sins, then he did it for all their sins, or only for some of their sins. If for some only, who then can be saved? if for all, why then are not all saved? They [his opponents] say, it is because of their unbelief; they will not believe, and therefore, are not saved: that unbelief, is it a sin, or is it not? If it be not, how can it be a cause of damnation? If it be, Christ died for it, or he did not. If he did not, then he died not for all the sins of all men: if he did, why is this an obstacle to their salvation? Is there any new shift to be invented for this? or must we be contented with the old, viz: because they do not believe: that is, Christ did not die for their unbelief, or rather, did not, by his death, remove their unbelief; because they would not believe, or because they would not themselves remove their unbelief; or, he died for their unbelief conditionally, that they were not believers. These do not appear to me to be sober assertions."

This argument has long been opposed by cavill, but has never been fairly rebutted. After all that has been said in opposition to it, it remains unanswered, for the good and sufficient reason, that it is unanswerable. For manifestly, if Christ by his death took away all the sins of all men, he took away the sin of unbelief; and consequently, no man can be condemned for unbelief; for what is taken away by such a sacrifice as Christ offered, no longer remains, and can no longer procure condemnation. But if he did not take away this sin of unbelief, "by the sacrifice of himself," then he left untaken away, the very worst sin in all the catalogue of crime: for "he that believeth not, shall be damned." And to affirm that Christ satisfied *conditionally*, for the sin of unbelief in all men, and that their *belief* is the condition on which their unbelief is taken away, is to make the removal of unbelief, the condition of its removal! Christ's death shall atone for their unbelief, on condition that they first of themselves become believers. God

for His sake, will forgive their sin of unbelief, so soon as it no longer exists!! He will heal their disease on condition that they first heal it themselves! Christ will save their souls from hell, on condition that they themselves first escape from hell and come to heaven!! Here is the essence of the Pelagian heresy—an attempt to bring in human merit, as partially the basis of human salvation. Scarcely can the heresy be named which does not grow from some cancerous root of Pelaganism.

The above argument is obviously designed to operate upon those, who have scriptural views as to the nature of the atonement—who admit, that the Saviour, did, as the vicarious substitute of his people, offer up himself a sacrifice for sin, thereby making satisfaction to divine justice and reconciling man to God. And it is fondly hoped, that its simplicity, plainness and force, will lead them to the conclusion, that this full and perfect satisfaction, must be followed by full and perfect reconciliation: that to maintain, that Christ thus *acted and suffered for* all human persons, is to maintain that all human persons must be saved; which is not true—that therefore He did not make satisfaction for all, but only for those, and for all those who shall go away into everlasting life—for all the redeemed. If this conclusion be not admitted, then it must be denied, that Christ offered any real propitiatory, vicarious sacrifice, and thereby made any real full and complete satisfaction to the claims of justice for any sinners whatever. For obviously, if he suffered *alike* for all men—if he made atonement *equally* for all men, and yet all men are not saved—salvation, is not secured by the atonement at all. If Christ paid the price of redemption for all men—if he redeemed all men alike, and yet all men are not redeemed, his redemption is worth just nothing at all—salvation is not an effect of it.

Hence, the first form of indefinitism *must* be abandoned. There is not a tenable port in the whole ship. Every point is assailable, and there is no safety in her. Universalism rakes her from stem to stern. Paulism, Calvanism, and Christianism, rends her canvass, and pierces her sides and leaves not a solid plank in her

hull. She is obliged to strike; but first she calls in her lagging sister in the rear.

2. The second form of the doctrine of indefinite atonement, claims our attention, viz: That Christ Jesus, our Lord, did not make restitution to divine justice at all, for the sins of any man, or set of men. He did not die for men in such sense as to purchase salvation. His object, in giving himself up to death, was simply to afford an exhibition of God's hatred against sin. God was determined to pardon the sins of men; but then to pardon sin,—to pass it by, and not punish it, might give reason to believe that his moral government did not require sin to be punished. Thus the confidence of the moral universe in God might be shaken. Holy and righteous beings seeing unholy and unrighteous beings admitted to favour equally with themselves, might begin to tremble for their own safety. If this, say they, may be, what prevents a reverse change from occcurring? Why may not holy beings be thrust down to hell, in violation of justice, if unholy beings may be raised up to heaven in violation of justice. Thus the pillars of Jehovah's throne begin to totter. The moral fabric of the universe to vacillate.

To prevent this, and to give firmness to the system—to establish public justice and so to secure the rights of the universe, God holds up in the sufferings of his own Son, an awful display of his hatred against sin: and so gives assurance that whilst he does pardon sinners, he yet hates sin. To illustrate and enforce this theory, an old scholastic distinction of justice is sometimes adopted. Justice, say the friends of this system, is divided into three kinds; viz: *commutative*, *distributive* and *public*.

"Commutative justice respects property only. 'It consists in an equal exchange of benefits,' or in restoring to man his own."

"Distributive justice respects the moral character of men. It respects them as accountable creatures, obedient or disobedient. It consists in ascertaining their virtue and sin, and in bestowing just rewards, or inflicting just punishments."

"Public or general justice, respects what is fit or right

as to the character of God, and the good of the universe. In this sense, justice comprises all moral goodness, and properly means the rightousness or rectitude of God, by which all his actions are guided, with a supreme regard to the greatest good. Justice, considered in this view, forbids, that any thing should take place in the great plan of God, which would tarnish his glory, or subvert the authority of his law."

Such is the surgical operations which the old scholastic theological dissecting knife, in modern hands, has performed upon a simple and indivisible attribute of God! The demonstration then proceeds. "Did Christ satisfy commutative justice? Certainly not." That is, for sins about property, Christ has made no satisfaction! He has made no restitution; restored nothing to the violated law." So, distributive justice Christ did not satisfy. For all sins respecting moral character he made no distribution! Paul is now as deserving of hell torment as Judas is!!

But public justice Christ did satisfy. Christ's atonement rendered it right and proper to forgive sin. Such forgiveness is consistent with the good of the universe. Public justice is perfectly satisfied by the death of Christ.*

Now, in view of such representations, you will please to remember, that the doctrine of vicarious substitution, representation and consequent imputation of the believer's sin to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to the believer, is denied by these moral dissectors of God's justice. Jesus bore no sin—he was not held by the law of God as responsible for the sins of his people. There is a moral sensitiveness—or I might say, *sentimentalism*, connected with the error we combat, which shudders at the doctrine of sin being imputed to Christ and of his being held guilty in the eye of the law. That Christ should be viewed as a sinner, and treated by the law as an offender, for the sins of his people, is a thought too horrible for the delicate sensibility of a Pelagian heart. Whereas the Bible says "he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin." 2. Cor. v. 21. He was held

* See Dr. Moxcey, quoted in Ridgley, II. 276, note.

and accounted a sinner and consequently suffered. Recollecting these, let us remark on the above distinction and the scheme it is adduced to support.

1. The distinction has no foundation in the word of God. Not one scripture, it is believed, nor allusion of scripture can be fairly adduced to support it. Where does the Bible say any thing about public justice? The passage, Rom. III. 21. "But now the righteousness of God without the law, is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets," is indeed, brought forward by the author quoted above, and its terms transposed and its meaning, as I think, perverted. In the preceding part of the chapter, Paul had shewn, not that public justice had been violated—he knew of no such thing—but that men had individually sinned and were individually deserving of death. The sins, which he particularizes, are chiefly of the very kind which the distinctions we oppose, classifies under offences against commutative and destributive justice. And yet Paul is made to teach that public justice alone, is satisfied!

2. This division of divine justice has no foundation in sound philosophy—that is, in common sense. Justice is that, in a moral being, which leads him to act rightly, that is, according to the laws of morality, in reference to others—to give to every one his due. It is the same principle, as to its essential nature, in the humblest private individual, the mightiest earthly monarch and the eternal Judge. The ten thousand modes of its manifestation modify not its nature, but only its form of expression. To administer justice is to give to every one what is right—what the rule of law, under which he is placed, allows to him. To give him more or less, is injustice. When we say, *God is just*, the meaning plainly is, that He gives to his creatures what is due to them, agreeably to the law under which he has placed them.

3. On this scheme, which denies the imputation of the sins of his people to Christ, it is no easy matter to see how public justice, in the sense even of those who hold the distinction, can be satisfied. Jesus Christ is not viewed by the law as a sinner—the sins of his peo-

ple are not imputed to him—he is not liable to punishment on their account—he was not the substitute, the representative of his people—he did not act for them, or suffer for them as a vicarious person. Such are the grounds held, and to account for Christ's sufferings and man's salvation, they say he died to satisfy public justice! "Perfect justice therefore, is done to the universe, though all transgressors be not punished according to their personal demerit." Perfect justice is done, though justice is not at all administered! Transgressors are not punished; yet perfect justice is done!!

But even this is not the weakest nor the tenderest point. "Perfect justice is done," How? Why by God's putting the bitter cup of his wrath into the hands of his own Son; although that Son had himself done no wrong, nor was he in law, according to these men, accountable for the sin of any others. No sin is imputed to him, either of his own or his people's, and yet he suffers, bleeds and dies in extreme agony! The Lamb of God—holy, harmless, undefiled and separate from sinners; no guile in his mouth, no guilt on his head—no endless catalogue of his people's sins laid upon him; heaven, earth, and hell testify "he did no evil"—and yet it pleased the eternal Judge to bruise him! "Perfect justice is done." Oh, if this be "perfect justice," who will define perfect injustice? Where, out of hell, or in it, shall we search for that transaction, which shall be held up before the moral universe as the most illustrious and revolting instance of unalloyed iniquity, impiety and injustice? If this be an "exhibition" of God's hatred against sin; Oh, where, in his wide universe, shall we search for an exhibition of his love to holiness? If the deep groans of Gethsemane and the piercing shriek of Calvary, are unavailing to remove this cup, and yet no sin was imputed to Jesus, to what transaction shall we turn our eyes as the monster cruelty of this universe?

Look at the case, with the unclouded eye of calm reason. The son of God does suffer. But, say's the system we combat, he is not guilty—he has no sin of his own—no sin of others is imputed to him, which can be the just moral cause of his death—he dies not to sat-

isfy the law for his people's sins—but only to exhibit God's hatred against sin in general—and to give assurance to the moral universe that God is just whilst he forgives sin: and so to quiet the fears of holy angels and men, and rivet the convictions of unholy angels and men, that God is just.

Now, I ask you, can you conceive of a more dreadful act of injustice than is presented in the sufferings of Christ, on the supposition that his people's sin is not imputed to him? If you cannot,

I ask again, how can this give security to the moral universe? Must it not do exactly the contrary? May not Gabriel say, If Jesus thus suffered, having no sin to account for, of his own or any others', may not I also, and all this shining host be brought to endure such degration and anguish? Where is our security? Whose head so high as not to be thus bowed down? Whose crown so safe, as not to be thus cast to the dust?

Return we then, dear reader, to the simple and glorious doctrine of salvation, by and through the vicarious obedience and death of our divine Surety. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. Thus God's justice is satisfied and calls for our deliverance from death, and restoration to eternal joys. Here is nothing indefinite—nothing uncertain—nothing conditional—here is "an everlasting covenant with you, even the SURE MERCIES of David."

SECTION III.

The intrinsic sufficiency of the Atonement.

We have been shut up, by an examination into the nature of that special form of moral government, which God has extended over man,—and by an inspection of its principles, as they are applied in the covenant of grace,—we have been shut up to the conclusion, that the death of the Son of God, rendered a true, proper and vicarious satisfaction to divine justice, for all the sins of all the saved; and that this, its essential nature, is the very thing, in the atonement, which *secures* the salva-

tion of all God's people. The legal restitution which Christ, as their representative, rendered to the law for his people, renders their salvation sure and certain, as a matter of right to their Saviour.

But, it is said, is not Christ's death and its attendant sufferings, intrinsically of themselves, *sufficient* for the salvation of all mankind? Is not his atonement of sufficient value for the redemption of all men? Is it not of infinite worth, and therefore, sufficient for all? And may we not therefore say, he died for all?

To these interrogations a serious and calm response is due: and,

1. As to the *sufficiency* of the atonement:

It is plain, that the *sufficiency* of any penal satisfaction, depends entirely upon the law prescribing it. The will of God *only*, can define what the law shall demand as a satisfaction. That, and that only, is *sufficient*, which meets the precise claim of justice. Less than this, Christ could not offer, and close the offering by saying, "it is finished:" more than this, God could not put into the cup of his sorrows.

2. I must think, that the honor done to divine justice, by the death of Christ, is equally great, as if all the race of Adam had been left to drink the wrath divine forever. Consequently, the stability of God's moral government, is as complete, as if man had never sinned. God has given to the moral universe, in the infliction of this punishment upon his own Son, for the sins of his people, the highest testimony of which we know any thing, of his hatred towards sin; as he has given in his resurrection and the salvation of all for whom He prays the Father, the most illustrious display of his righteous regard to his own righteous law.

3. I must also think, that the sufferings of Jesus have nothing to do with the number of the finally saved. The penalty of the law is the same, whether one or two, or a thousand persons are concerned. Whether the Father gives ten millions to his Son as the reward of his service—or ten million times ten millions, the obedience and sufferings of Jesus are the same. It was for him to meet the claims of law. But the demand of law

was *obedience* and *death*. This obedience to the precept, and this meeting of the penalty is the same, whether one man or the whole race are to be saved. I have, therefore, no sympathy with the doctrine, that the sufferings of Jesus must have been *graduated* according to the number of the saved: so that if the number were increased, there must be a *pro rata* increase to his sufferings. This doctrine seems to be founded on the hypothesis of a scale to measure pains: at least it questions the correctness of a principle sanctioned by sound laws among men, viz: that penal inflictions have no regard to the number of persons implicated. If one man be murdered by one man, the one murderer only is put to death: if ten men be murdered by one, the penalty is the same—one man only dies: If ten men are concerned in the murder of one, the ten must be put to death. The law connects sin and death. Here again, let me call your attention to the identity of principle in the doctrines of grace and the morality of the common laws which govern society. Let us ever bear in mind, that God has made it necessary for man to act, in the affairs of this life, to a large extent, upon the great principles embodied in the covenants. The truths of religion are none other than the eternal truths of unchanging morality.

If then the sufferings of the Redeemer must be the same, whether one or one million be the number of his people; and if the number can be defined by none but God himself, the question about the extent of the atonement is, in reality, a mere question of fact—does God save all men? Did the Father give all men to Christ as his peculiar people? Did Christ undertake, in the covenant of grace, to bring all human beings to eternal glory? And these amount to the inquiry—are all men saved? For surely, all that the Father hath given him, he hath kept and will raise them up at the last day, Jn. xvii, 6—12. "I pray for them; I pray not for the world; but for them which thou hast given me." Was it the design and purpose of Christ, when he paid the ransom, to deliver by it, the whole of mankind? If it was not his purpose, then, in no sense can it be said, he

redeemed all men—in no sense can it be said, he made atonement for all. Jesus, by appointment of the Father, suffered the penalty of the law. Now, the persons who are to be saved by his death, are they for whom he made atonement. He could not have suffered at all, unless the sins of his people had been laid upon him. These sins were laid upon him by the Father—"the Lord hath laid on him, the iniquity of us all," Isa. LIII, 6. And in the preceding verse, the prophet defines the phrase, "us all," when he says, "with his stripes we are healed." The sins of all the persons who are healed, were laid on Christ by the Father. Thus, as we have already seen, the very nature of the transaction defines its limit. The *intention* of the Father and the Son, is abundantly revealed: it is to save his people—to redeem them from all iniquity—"I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me"—Unless, therefore, it can be shewn, that the *intention* of the Father and the Son was, and is, to save all mankind—that is, unless it was their *intention* to do what the Bible tells us never shall be done—it remains true, the atonement was made for the *saved* only, and not at all for the *damned.* Jesus never *intended* to bring to eternal life, those of whom he says, "these shall go away into eternal punishment"—"depart from me, ye cursed, I never knew you." Now this *intention* is the limit and bound of the atonement. It is the *intention* that constitutes it an atonement. Whilst, therefore, it remains an admitted and glorious truth, that the satisfaction is sufficient, because it is a satisfaction; and the atonement infinitely valuable in itself, still it is an atonement and satisfaction made only for the flock of the great Shepherd.

SECTION IV.

But Christ died in some sense for all men.

There is yet another shade of the doctrine of general atonement, to be noticed very briefly, viz: that, as the surgeon of a regiment, is the surgeon of every man in

it, so that every soldier and officer may point to him, and say, 'that is my surgeon,' so is Christ the Saviour of all the world; so that every man may say, 'that is my Saviour.' As every soldier has a right to call upon the surgeon, so every sinner has a right to call upon Christ.

This comparison is fallacious.

1st. Because the military surgeon is employed and paid for his services; and those services are a part of the consideration in the contract between the soldier and his government, at the time he enlisted, and he has a right, which he can enforce, to command the services of the Surgeon. But the great Physician renders all his services gratuitously. 2d. Because, the *regiment* is put under the surgeon's care—the whole regiment. He is not the surgeon of the whole army. His duties do not call him beyond his own specific charge. Now here the comparison holds in part. The Great Physician has his specific charge. He is not bound nor does he administer his spiritual medicines to the soldiers of another leader: the legions of the damned are not healed by the Great Physician: nor can they in truth affirm, 'he is our physician.' 3d. Because, The comparison is deficient in another respect. All the soldiers of the regiment do not need the services of a surgeon—that necessity is a contingency. But all his spiritual army, who are by the Lord of Hosts, put under the Captain of Salvation, do need his healing medicines, and are utterly unable to perform any services in the ranks, until after He shall have applied the balm of Gilead to the healing of their hurt. To make the comparison hold, every soldier must be in the hospital, (or in the grave,) and utterly helpless; and the surgeon must be bound to restore every man of them to the ranks and ensure his life through the war.

Reasonings, from these loose analogies, are very unsafe.

SECTION V.

All men enjoy a respite from death and hell, in consequence of Christ's atonement.

Here is a sense in which it can be said the atonement is general. If the meaning be, that wicked, unbelieving men—men who finally perish, do experience many temporal blessings, and a respite from eternal burnings, as a consequence of the satisfaction of Christ, I admit it. If there had been ten righteous men in Sodom, it would not have been destroyed. This is a clear Bible principle. Man by sin, forfeited that right to food and clothing which God gave to him at his creation; and the right can be restored only by a reversion of the act of forfeiture. Thus, true believers in Christ have, in and through him, a right to their daily bread. The righteous, and the righteous only, have a promise in the Bible, of food and all other necessaries. And because, the present race of wicked men, are the forefathers of a race, who are or shall be the seed of the blessed, they are spared. Thus the world of ungodly men are saved from death, for a time, by the good providence of our Heavenly Father, "the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe," 1. Tim. iv, 10. And this I take to be the true meaning of the passage. This phase "the Living God" is not applied in the scriptures as a distinguishing epithet of Christ; but as descriptive of the Father, as the God of providence. The Apostle is speaking of trust in God, not as to the direct matter of salvation, but as to temporal good things —the bounties of providence. God saves men from death, and bestows his favours upon all men; but has, and exercises a special regard to them that believe.

Yet, whilst these things are so, it appears to me altogether improper to say, that the atonement is for all men. The circumstance of the unbelieving and ungodly world deriving benefit *incidentally* from the atonement, by no means justifies the language, that it was made for them.

CHAPTER XVII.

OBJECTIONS FOUNDED ON PARTICULAR TEXTS, AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED ATONEMENT, STATED AND ANSWERED.

It will not be expected, that I should take up and respond to all the arguments for all kinds of indefinite and universal atonement, which claim a foundation in some text of scripture. This work has been done by various hands; and the reader is referred to Dr. Owen's "Death of death, in the death of Christ," for a most masterly exposition of all these passages. b. iv. c. ii.—v. All that the nature of my undertaking will allow, is a refutation of a few of the stronger arguments, by a fair exposition of the passages on which they are attempted to be founded. And first, let us lay down the principle of interpretation upon which we proceed:

Viz: General terms must be restricted and understood, in consistency with the nature of the subject discussed and the general drift and meaning of the writer. This rule is well established amongst critics; as to common sense it is obviously true. Let us apply to a few of the texts supposed to teach indefinite atonement. There are two classes of these texts; viz: those where the term *world* occurs, or *whole world;* and where the term *all* or *every* occurs.

SECTION I.

Arguments from the term, world, answered.

The very strongest perhaps, is 1. John ii. 1, 2. "And if any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Hence it is

argued, in some sense, Christ is the propitiation for the sins of *all men*, or the *whole world* means *all men*.

The point toward a fair exposition here, is to settle the meaning of *propitiation*. The Greek word, ἱλασμός, is used in the New Testament in only one other place, viz: 1. Jhon iv. 10. God "sent his Son to be the *propitiation* for our sins." It is used in the Septuagint five times; viz: Am. viii. 14. "They swear by the *sin* of Samaria, and say, "Thy God O, Dan, liveth." Here *sin* stands for sin offering. And inasmuch as the real and efficient sin offering of the Bible, is also the Priest who offers it, the object of their idolatrous worship, is called their sin offering or propitiation. So it is in Ezek. xliv. 27. "he shall offer his *sin offering* saith the Lord God"—his sin offering—that which appeases God. Num. v. 8. Here it is translated *atonement*—a sin offering procuring reconciliation. In Psalm cxxx. 4. it is translated, *forgiveness*. "But there is *forgiveness* with thee"—a propitiatory sacrifice that ensures pardon. The verb is used, Luke xviii. 13. "God *be merciful* to me a sinner"—*be propitiated*, rendered friendly and so extend pardon. So, the only other place in which it occurs, Heb. ii. 17,—"to *make reconciliation* for the sins of the people—to *propitiate*—to render God friendly and secure forgiveness to the people.

So the kindred word translated propitiation, Rom. iii. 25. "whom God hath set forth to be a *propitiation* through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the confession of sins." And, Heb. ix. 5. it is translated mercy seat, "the cherubim of glory overshadowing the *mercy seat*"—the mercy seat of the ark, being an emblem of Christ as the reconciler between God and man.

From all these it is manifest, that propitiation is the *actual restoring to favour and friendship*, of those who were alienated and hostile. This, Jesus does by his removing of sin, the cause of enmity between God and man, and the consequent procurement of forgiveness from God and gratitude and love from man. To render God propitious and man alive to a sense of divine goodness, is the full idea of *propitiation*. Now, that Jesus is the propitiation—that he has actually restored friend-

ship between man and God is certain. But to what extent? Has he *propitiated* God to all mankind, and all mankind to God? Then is universal salvation true. But universal salvation is false, therefore Christ has not propitiated all men. What then will you do with the universal terms, "the whole world?" I remark,

2. It is manifest in the very words themselves, that all men absolutely are not meant. Because he is speaking expressly of believers, "little children," such as rest with childlike credulity upon their Father's word—children in knowledge, many of whom were for limiting salvation to the Jews, and could scarce endure a Gentile believer to come into the church, except at the door of circumcision. The opposition that the Apostle makes between us and the world, in this very place, is sufficient to manifest unto whom he wrote. So, John says, (gospel xi. 51, 52,) "he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation, And not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one," all men of all nations?—no—"but the children of God that were scattered abroad" among all nations. To this, the passage before us is a parallel. Jesus is the propitiation—he restores to friendship the children of God, not only among us Jews, but also, those scattered over the whole world.

3. The phrase, *whole world*, is by the other terms of the text and by the general drift of this writer, limited to "the whole world" of God's children—the entire body of his redeemed ones. That the words do not in *every* place necessarily mean all mankind, it will be sufficient for us to shew. For, if sometimes the general terms are, by necessity, restricted, we are under no obligation to admit them as absolutely universal here. Dr. Owen thinks that there is but a single case in which they must thus be understood. (1) We quote Luke, ii. 1.—"there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus, that all the world should be taxed." Here all the world is certainly no more than the Roman empire. It will not affect this, that the terms are different (πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην) they are equivalent to whole world—*all the inhabited earth*. Now, is it true that all the inhabited earth, i. e.

all men were included in this decree? Clearly, the general term is limited by the sense and the connexion.

(2) Col. i. 6. "The gospel is come unto you as it is in all the world." Does all the world here mean, absolutely and unqualifiedly, all mankind? Had all men absolutely heard the gospel? Why then do we still labour to send missionaries? Manifestly, the universal terms must be restricted by the sense and connexion. *All the world*, can therefore, only mean, that the gospel, instead of being confined to the land of Judea and the lost sheep of the house of Israel, is gone abroad, without restraint, into very many places.

(3) Very similar to this, is Rom. i. 8.—"your faith is spoken of throughout the whole world" (ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ.) Must this mean that the faith of the Roman believers was known and spoken of by all the race of man? Did all men every where speak of it? Did one man out of every ten thousand in the Roman empire know any thing about it? But, moreover, this speaking about their faith, is approbatory: they who spake of it, commended it. Did all the people of Rome, and of the empire, and of all other nations, admire and commend the faith of the handful of obscure believers at Rome? How perfectly absurd! What then does he mean? Obviously, the believing world—the world of believers. The disciples *every where* heard of their faith and thanked God for it. The whole world here, is equivalent to the whole body of believers.

(4) 1. John v. 19. "We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness." Here is the same phraseology and in the same epistle: what does it mean? All men! every individual of the race! Why, the first clause says nay, "we know that we are of God:" and can they be of God and yet lie in wickedness! Evidently therefore, *the whole world* here means, the world of unconverted men—all the race, except the children of God who have tasted of his grace. Now, if it is undeniable, that the universal phrase *whole world*, here means only the world of unconverted men; I want to know by what rule we are bound to understand the same phrase in chapter ii. 2, as absolutely universal.

There exists as clear and cogent reasons for limiting it there, to the world of believers, as here, to limit it to the world of unbelievers. Rev. iii. 10. "I will keep thee from the hour of temptation, which shall come upon all the world."

(5) Rev. xii. 9. "that old serpent, called the devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." Yet, the Bible tells us that the devil, would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect; plainly intimating that it is not possible, and this the former text proves. God so exercises his divine power and grace, that Satan, working with all his skill, through the emissaries of Rome, shall yet not succeed in deceiving the true church. The *whole world* here is the mass of unbelieving men, to the exclusion of those who wondered not after the beast.

(6) Rev, xiii. 3. "all the world wondered after the beast." Here, *all the world* means only the apostate Roman Catholic Church—not all the human race—nor even all the world of nominal christians; God always had a chosen generation, who never bowed the knee to the thirty thousand Gods of pagan or of christian Rome.

It is surely unnecessary to prosecute the investigation. The Greek term for *world*, signifies any organized and arranged system, and so it is applied to the system of a lady's dress. Peter says of christian women, "whose adorning," (whose *world)* let it not consist in external arrangements, but in internal graces. Even the strong phrase *whole world*, does never mean all men; but only all of the class referred to. So, in the passage before us, Jesus is the propitiation, not only for the sins of us Jewish believers, but of the whole world of redeemed men—the whole body of the elect.

SECTION II.

The arguments from the general term all, stated and answered.

The advocates of a general atonement build much upon those expressions of scripture, where the general term, *all*, is applied to the saved. Let us examine a few

of the cases chiefly relied on: and let us keep in view, the rule of interpretation, which limits general terms by the sense and connexion.

1. The passage, 1. Tim. II. 4, 6, is a chief dependence—"who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Christ "gave himself a ransom for all." Hence it is inferred, that Christ died equally for all men: (the atonement was made for all men.)

It is plain, that the whole force of the inference rests upon the vagueness of the term *all—all men*. If this does mean all and every one of the human race, absolutely; then, not only is general atonement, but universal salvation also, true. The entire argument, therefore, turns upon the single word *all*. If *all* and *all men*, always, and every where in the Bible does, and must necessarily, include the entire race, we concede the argument; but if, as we have seen, it never is so used in the Bible, or at least very rarely, then no reason forbids our limiting it here according to the sense and connexion.

The Greek word for *all*, occurs more than twelve hundred times in the New Testament, and therefore we cannot examine all places. It occurs twenty four times in 1. Tim. Now, if in a majority of them, it cannot possibly be understood in its absolutely universal sense, it ought to relieve us from all difficulty with it in this argument. Let us then advert briefly to those cases in the twenty-four, where the interpretations must be restricted. Ch. I. 16,—"that in me first, Jesus Christ might shew forth *all* long suffering." Will any man aver thence, that the totality, the whole of God's long suffering was in Paul? Has Jesus never shewn any long-suffering in any but Paul! Such is the absurdity and the falsehood, which the general construction would force upon the Apostle's language. What then does he mean? Any child in interpretation, can tell you. He means to affirm, that a large measure—a great deal of divine forbearance had been displayed in his case.

Ch. II. 1. "I exhort therefore, that first of *all*, sup-

plications, &c. be made." The *first of all*, is connected with the exhortation—but if not, it effects not the argument. Did Paul mean that the first thing of *all* in the universe, that should be done, should be to pray for all? The persons addressed must not bend the knee—they must not meet for prayer, they must not eat, or sleep or stand or walk or breathe, until they prayed for all! Nay, but the plain meaning is, that in a very special manner, and very *largely*, christians should pray.

Ch. II, 1. "prayers, &c. for *all* men." Does he mean here that we shall pray for the dead? for the damned! for those of whom John says, "there is a sin unto death, I do not say that he shall pray for it!" for those of whom Jesus says, "I pray not for the world!!" To assert that *all*, here, includes the whole race of men absolutely, is to affirm what Jesus, and John his servant, and the general current of scripture denies. What then does the Apostle mean by *all men?* Let himself answer. "For kings and for all that are in authority, &c." In those times of persecution, the saints might be tempted to invoke curses upon their enemies. By no means, says the Apostle, wicked and unreasonable as they are, pray for all descriptions of men. Ch. II, 2, "for all that are in authority." Here the general term *all* is limited to persons in office, exercising power.

Ch. II, 2, "in all godliness and honesty." Surely it was far from the Apostle's mind to intimate that those to whom he addresses himself, had *the sum total*—all godliness and honesty treasured up in themselves! Nay, but that godliness and honesty, to a large extent may be manifested in and by them.

Ch. II. 8. "I will, therefore, that men pray *every* where" [Greek, in all place.] Does he mean *all*, absolutely? Must men pray in all places! Then they must *be* in all places! The injunction cannot be complied with until men possess ubiquity! How then? Manifestly, in *every place* where their lot may be cast.

Ch. II. 11. "Let the woman learn in silence with *all* subjection." Does Paul teach that female submission has no limit?—that she must be subject to all men and

in all degrees! Preposterous absurdity! What then? Why a woman must submit to her own husband in *all things lawful and right.*

Ch. III. 4, "having his children in subjection with all gravity." Can any one man or set of men, possess all gravity—so that there shall be no grave deportment with any besides!

Ch. III. 11,—"women—deacons wives, are to "be grave, not slanderers, sober, faithful in all things." Are *all things* absolutely obligatory upon deacons wives? Must they do all the things of the world? Nay, but all the things that lie within their proper province. They could not possibly be faithful, if they meddled with *all things* absolutely.

Ch. IV. 4—"For every creature of God is good." Here the Greek word is the same. But is it true in the universal sense? Is the devil good, if his visits be received with thanksgivings? Manifestly *every creature* is to be limited to the eatables of which the Apostle is speaking in the place.

Ch. IV, 8—"godliness is profitable unto *all* things" —all states and conditions of men. Is it so? Is godliness profitable to the ungodly who have it not? Is godliness profitable to the possessor in all things, when it occasions his persecution and death? Nay, but it is profitable unto all the things referred to.

Ch. IV, 15—"that thy profiting may appear unto all" —or may appear in *all things.* What? In all and every thing? or in all the things in which he laboured? Meditate upon these things—give thyself wholly to them; that thy profiting in them all, may appear. Manifestly, the *all*, here, is limited by the *things* spoken of.

Ch. V, 11—"Entreat the elder women as mothers, the younger as sisters, with *all* purity." Is there to be no purity but with Timothy: *must* the term *all* be taken in its universal sense? This were to make the passage nonsense.

Ch. V. 10—"If she have diligently followed every good work." Here to insist on the absolute universality of the term, is to make all the good works in the

universe, the objects of actual pursuit of every good woman.

Ch. v, 20—"them that sin rebuke before *all*"—Does the *all* here mean *all* universally? Or does the Apostle merely insist, that offenders shall be publicly reproved—that is reproved before a great number—the whole congregation?

Ch. vi, 1—"Let as many servants as are under the yoke, count their own masters worthy of all honour." Can any man believe that Paul's design here, is to make a God of the master and an idolater of his servant? Is the servant to account no being but his own master worthy of honour? Or does he intend only to urge servants to bestow upon their *masters all due* honour, and to kings and the Lord of kings, still higher honour; —"fear God, honour the king." No man can believe that *all*, here, is to be taken in its universal meaning.

Ch. vi, 10—"the love of money is the root of all evil." Is it true in the broadest sense? Was it the love of money that "brought death into the world, and all our woe?" And was not the first sin an evil? It is folly to force all the vices in the world into one. There are evil passions not a few, where there is the utmost contempt for money. In fact, it is but a small portion of the ills that flesh is heir to, that can fairly be imputed to the love of money, and referred to that passion as their root. This phrase of the Apostle, has been extensively misunderstood, and great violence has been done to common sense and the context, in efforts to make the love of money the only original vice in the universe or at least in our world. I think, Harris's Mammon, contains some instances of this monomania. The truth is, the Apostle does not at all say that the love of money is the root of all evil. A very slight defect in the translation, has occasioned this forced work among interpreters. Paul says, they who desire to be rich, are thereby liable to some peculiar dangers—he does not say *all*. "They fall into temptation." Some English bibles, as Woodward's Scott, have it temptations—incorrectly. They fall "into a snare." this is another evil. They fall into "many foolish and hurtful lusts." These

also are evils, but they are not *all*, and Paul does not say they are all evils and all lusts. He then adds, "For the love of silver is the root of all these evils." Nay he does not even say the love of silver, is *the* root of all, as if they had no other root, but only that "the love of money is *a* root of all these evils," viz: the evils just referred to. Thus the general term is limited by the connexion, according to common sense.

Ch. vi. 13—"I give thee charge before God, who quickeneth all things." Will any man, however mad upon establishing the starting point of the Pelegian heresy, aver that the term *all* here, must be taken universally? Will he say that God quickeneth; that is, giveth life unto things that have no life! Or will it be admitted, that He quickens or gives life to all that live? The universal term is limited and must be limited by the rule under which we act.

Ch. vi. 17—"God giveth us richly, *all* things to enjoy." Does any man enjoy all things absolutely; or only a small portion of the universal sum of things? viz: all the things which he possesses and uses? To assert the former is sheer folly; the latter, therefore, is the true construction.

Thus, in nineteen cases out of the twenty-four, there is no reasonable ground to hesitate; there is, in fact, no possibility of giving a rational exposition to the passages, without restricting the general term *all* and bringing it within the scope of the context. Should we run over the whole twelve hundred and fifty cases of the New Testament, I doubt not, we would find a similar proportion of unequivocal limitations. It may, perhaps, appear to the reader, that we have been tedious already. Let him remember, that here is the salient point of, at least a majority, of the errors, that have in modern times distracted the church. Consequently, this is the very point at which wisdom dictates, we should exercise patience in our investigation. Two of the remaining cases are identical, viz: Ch. i. 15, and iv, 9. "This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ came into the world to save sinners, &c." If *worthy of all acceptation*, means worthy

to be accepted by all, then the *all* must be all sinners, yea, *all mankind sinners*, at the very best. For, that devils should accept a saying which is not proffered to them, cannot be supposed. The general term must therefore be limited to men at least.

There remain but the three cases which are involved in the point at issue, viz: Ch. II. 4, 6, and 4, 10. As to the last, I have already presented one view of it. Should that exposition not prove satisfactory, I fall back upon another, viz: He is the Saviour of all men, who are saved, and especially of faithful saints. He extends peculiar care over those who are peculiarly faithful to him. To affirm that he is the Saviour, in a *spiritual sense*, of those who shall go away into eternal fire, is surely to speak contradictions. The former view is, however, I think, the true and correct one. The *living God*, not Jesus Christ, but the sovereign Lord and Father, is the Saviour—the preserver—he supports and feeds all men—particularly, his believing people. So is the word Saviour applied in this general sense. Othniel, in Judges, III, 9, is called a deliverer—a *Saviour*. And 2 Kings, xiii, 5, "the Lord gave Israel a *Saviour*, so that they went out from under the hand of the Syrians." And Neh. ix, 27, "thou gavest them *saviours* who *saved* them out of the hand of their enemies." Thus only is God the Saviour of all men. He delivers them from many evils—it is a temporal, not a spiritual salvation, and therefore, the scriptures which speak of it, have nothing to do with this controversy.

Therefore, the two texts only remain. Ch. ii, 4, 6. Now what reason *can* exist to force us to take the general term in these two instances, in its most extended sense, when in twenty-one out of twenty-four times, in this epistle, it must be, and is restricted? Why shall the law of construction be set aside here?

If this is most unreasonable, then the enquiry will be as to the restriction—what is it, and wherefore its necessity? I answer the context and the sense must limit.

Now, in the preceeding, the term *all* is by necessity limited in all the former instances. The *all men* of the

first verse, are expounded in the second, to mean men of all classes, conditions and characters; in contradistinction to the restricted views of the Jews, who seemed often disposed to deny salvation to many classes of men. On the contrary, Paul insists, that the gospel is no respecter of persons; but all classes and conditions of men are freely urged to accept it, for it is God's will that no distinction shall be made in the gospel offer. All classes of men—kings, however far they may have erred in persecuting the church—subordinate rulers—all are invited. The all of the 4th is the same as the all of the 1st verse —all kinds and degrees of men.

But further, the sense restricts the general term. If by "*will* have all men to be saved," is meant, a positive determination on the part of God; then it must even be so, and all must be saved: or if not, God has failed of his purpose; which to affirm is blasphemy. If all men absolutely be not saved, then it could not be God's will, his fixed determination that they should be saved, all and every one. If by, "will have all men to be saved" is meant, that God wills absolutely to save men of all descriptions, nations and languages, then his purpose is and shall be accomplished. And thus the sense unites with the connexion in defining the extent of the *all men*.

So exactly in the 6th verse, where the very same *all* are spoken of—viz: *all* the people of God—*all* that will ever see his face in peace—*all* his sheep for whom he prays—not the world of whom he says "I pray not for the world"—but *all* his redeemed ones—*all* whom he ransomed, by his precious blood—*all* whom the Father gave to him—*all* kinds and classes of men to whom he will say, "come ye blessed of my Father."

2. Peter iii. 9. "The Lord is long suffering to us ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." Hence it is argued, that, as repentance is connected with salvation and the atonement, Christ died for all, or he could not will, that all should repent and be saved.

Dr. Owen's response to this is so brief and conclusive, I shall do little more than simply transcribe it. After alluding to the rule of restriction, he proceeds,

"See then of whom the Apostle is here speaking. The Lord, (saith he) is long-suffering to us ward, not willing that any should perish: will not common sense teach us, that *(us)* is to be repeated in both the following clauses, to make them up complete and full? viz: not willing that any of *us* should perish, but that all of *us* should come to repentance? Now, who are these of whom the Apostle speaks, to whom he writes? Such as had received great and precious promises, chap. i. 4; whom he calls beloved, chap. iii. 1. 8; whom he opposeth to the scoffers of the last days, verse 3; to whom the Lord hath respect in the disposal of these days; who are said to be elect, Matt. xxiv. 22. Now, truly to argue, that because God would have none of those to perish, but all of them to come to repentance, therefore, he hath the same will and mind towards all and every one in the world (even those to whom he never makes known his will, nor ever calls to repentance, and never once hear of his way of salvation) comes not much short of extreme madness and folly." Owen on Redem. p. 270.

God wills, that all of us, who shall see his face in peace, and live and reign with him in everlasting life, should come to repentance; therefore, all who shall pine away eternally in the land of regrets and endless death, he wills also should come to repentance! Because he wills the salvation of his people, therefore, he wills the salvation of the lost also! Such is the reasoning by which general atonement is supported.

Heb. ii. 9. "But we see Jesus, who was made a little [for a little time] lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour: that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man." Hence, it is inferred that, as tasting death means suffering death, the sufferings of Christ were for all men in general—the atonement is universal. But, says the universalist, if the satisfaction of Christ is universal—for all men equally—then all are saved.

Here again, the universalist is the sound logician; his argument, granting him the premises, is unanswerable. But now, I deny the premises. *Every man* here cannot and does not include *all* absolutely; but only *all*

of whom the Apostle is speaking in the context. And,

1. *Man* is supplied by the translators. It is not in the original—"should taste death for every"—every what? Doubtless, the ellipsis is to be filled up, with such word as includes or expresses the persons of whom the Apostle speaks—every what? Who are they to whom he refers? Whom he names? Are they the ungodly, and unbelieving, and finally impenitent? By no means; for in the next sentence he speaks of them as *sons*—"in bringing many *sons* unto glory." He speaks of them as the trained band to which Christ is the Captain of their salvation. And this term Captain—the Greek word, means *the leader of the way*—representing Christ as leading the company of God's sons, and leading them in the way of salvation. Manifestly, then it is for *every son* of God he should taste death—not for every son of perdition.

Again, in v. 11, he calls them *brethren*, and affirms their unity with himself, and speaks of them as his sanctified ones. "For both he that sanctifieth, and they who are sanctified, are all of one; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren." And then repeatedly again, calls them *children*—children given to him by the Father. "Behold I and the children which God hath given me." And in v. 15, he affirms that he delivers them who, "through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage." Does Christ actually deliver from the fear of death, all men universally? Clearly then, inasmuch as the Apostle does not at all, in the context any where, speak of all men absolutely and indefinitely; but only of the sons of God, the brethren of Christ, the united with him, the sanctified, the children, the persons given to him by God; we cannot, without such violence as destroys all the precision of language, stretch the general term *all*, to cover any thing more than "all the sons of God"—"all which the Father hath given me." Christ was humbled, "that he by the grace of God should taste death for every *son*."

2. On the ground of the nature of the atonement we arrive at the same conclusion. To taste death, is to suffer it—to die. And as Christ's death was vicarious and

made a complete satisfaction to divine justice; hence, every man for whom this satisfaction is rendered must, in justice, be delivered from death: consequently, the salvation is co-extensive with the satisfaction. But of this enough.

3. The Hebrews were contracted in their views, and wished to exclude all but their own nation from the benefits of his death: hence, these strong general expressions; as we have before remarked. Every son of God, of whatever nation, tribe or people, is included in the compass of Christ's death.

4. Similar uses of the general phrase occur, Col. i. 28. "Whom we preach, warning every man and teaching every man in all wisdom." Surely, Paul does not assert so great an absurdity, as that he had warned *every man*—had taught *every man*—each and all the human race; and that too in all wisdom—communicated all wisdom and made the whole race omniscient! But such must be the meaning, if the universal construction contended for by the general atonement-men, be correct. The ineffable absurdity of the conclusion shews the rottenness of the premises. Whom then did he warn and teach? Obviously, every man that came before him. What is *the all-wisdom*? What, but all that he could communicate for the time and opportunities he had.

1. Cor. xv. 22. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

Many advocates, of some kind of indefinite or general atonement, less skilfull than zealous, have used this passage as an argument in their favour. A most unhappy selection. They lean upon the point of a sword. For,

1. The Apostle is speaking of the resurrection of the body from natural death; not of the soul from spiritual death. Consequently, nothing can with safety and fairness, be inferred from the passage, as to the extent of the atonement. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept. For, since by man [the first Adam] came death, by man [Christ, the second Adam] came also the resurrection of the dead." The sin of the first Adam rendered it necessary, according to the nature of that moral government

under which he was placed, that all men should descend to the grave. The righteousness and atonement of the second Adam, rendered it necessary that all men should rise from the grave. And the reason of this moral necessity it is not difficult to perceive. The death of the body is included in the penalty—the body is dead because of sin: but now the entire persons must be judged and punished or rewarded; and therefore, must the souls and bodies be again united. But the right, and office duty, of the second Adam, it is to judge the world, hence, his power it is, that must arrest and bring before his own dread tribunal, all who are to be by him judged. Hence,

——"lo, a mighty trump, one-half concealed,
"In clouds, one-half to mortal eye revealed,
"Shall pour a dreadful note; the piercing call
"Shall rattle in the centre of the ball;
"The 'extended circuit of creation shake,
"The living die with fear, the dead awake."

This belongs to Christ as Mediator, but it is not a part of his work of saving men. It is an adjunct of his sovereignty as judge. It is not as redeemer he raises them from the dead, but as judge, whose it is, to do justice—pure, simple, naked justice. The resurrection of the dead is not in itself a blessing. Its being a blessing or a curse, depends upon the moral character of the raised, and their legal relations. It is divine *justice* and not *mercy*, that demands them to arise. Justice demands that the saints shall rise to life everlasting: the same justice requires that the unsanctified shall rise to shame and everlasting contempt. But its exercise by Christ, or the right to exercise it, depends upon his perfect fulfilment of all law. Having fulfilled all law, he must himself rise and being henceforth invested with all power, he must exercise that power in the office of final judgement. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." The burial is by Adam, the resurrection is by Christ. Then the Apostle proceeds to mark the difference amongst the raised. "But every man in his own order—his own rank—Christ the first fruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming."

He says nothing at all of the other class; viz: the wicked, in this whole discourse: and it may well be questioned whether the *all* is any more extensive than the *order* mentioned, viz: the saints, who shall shout, "O death where is thy sting, O grave where is thy victory!" "thanks be to God which giveth us the victory"—us? whom? Believers, unquestionably. Not a word is uttered about the resurrection of unbelievers in the whole chapter. All God's people sunk to the ground by Adam, so did "the children of the wicked one:" all God's people are delivered from the grave by Christ, so are the children of Satan, but that is not a truth here distinctly affirmed.

2. But supposing the meaning of the Apostle to be, as the argument for general atonement here assmes it; that is, suppose the Apostle to speak of spiritual death and spiritual resurrection: the passage then becomes still more fatal to the indefinite scheme. For it is a comparison of *manner* solely. That is, the *manner* of all dying in Adam, is the same precisely, as the *manner* of all being made alive in Christ. *As—even so.* The precise point therefore, which the text presents for our consideration, is, *How* did all die in Adam? *How* are all made alive in Christ? Do these agree? Is the mode of death and of life the same? This last question is affirmed in the text. We have only to enquire what is that *manner? How* did all die in Adam? We ask the advocates of general atonement, HOW? And we can conceive of but one reasonable answer—All died in Adam *federatively—legally*—he was their moral head, and his sin brought death upon all whom he represented—"by one man's offence death reigned by one—by the offence of one, judgment came upon all." (Rom. v. 18, 19.) The question reverts; *how* are all made alive in Christ? *How?* In precisely the same manner, viz: *federatively, legally*, he was their moral head, and his righteousness brought life upon all of whom he is head—"by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous." *Who* are they that are dead in Adam? *All* whom he represented—all his children—all that actually died. *Who* are made alive in Christ? All whom he represented—all

his children—all that are actually made alive. The *mode* of death and of life is the same: the extent of each is dependent upon the representative character of each, as we have before seen. Now, the extent of the dying and of the making alive are determined in the covenants of works and of grace respectively, which as to numbers, are known only to God; but he has revealed to us the absolute universality of it under the first covenant; as to the second, the fact only reveals the knowledge of it to us. Whenever we have evidence that a sinner is born of God, we know that he is made alive in Christ, and therefore was included in the covenant of grace, and was represented by the great Surety. Unless therefore, absolute universality of salvation is maintained—unless all men universally are made alive and so saved, we are thrown back upon the restriction of the general term to the people of God: all Christ's people are made alive in him, just as all Adam's people are made dead in him.

But we must dismiss this branch of the subject. Other texts there are, of a similar kind and similarly used. These are reputed by the friends of general atonement the strongest. All the others are to be expounded in the same way; we therefore, leave them to the discretion of the reader.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE OBJECTION AGAINST STRICT, LIMITED ATONEMENT, FOUNDED ON THE GENERAL GOSPEL CALL, STATED AND REFUTED.

Against the doctrine of a real, proper vicarious satisfaction for sin—a satisfaction rendered to divine justice by the death of Christ, for and on behalf of his own people whose sins, and theirs only he bore in his own body on the tree, it has been urged as an objection, that this doctrine ties the tongue of the gospel minister. He cannot offer salvation to all men. He cannot urge all men every where to repentance and faith. He cannot invite all men to come, and assure them there is yet room.

He cannot promise salvation to all men as a ground of their encouragement to come to Christ. For this would be to promise salvation to the lost; for whom Christ did not die. It were to invite to a feast many for whom no seat had been provided, and no feast prepared. For, to offer salvation to those whose sin is not atoned for and who therefore cannot be saved, is to mock and tantalize; a conduct unworthy of a kind and gracious God; and unfitting for the messengers of mercy.

On the other hand, say the friends of the indefinite atonement scheme, the atonement is for all—Christ died for all; the gospel is therefore offered to all and if all come they will be saved; they who will not come will not be saved. Thus God is honest and sincere in his offers of mercy to all men: and the impenitent and unbelieving, are cut off for their unbelief and impenitence.

Such, for substance is this objection. In reply, let me remark.

1. That the advocates of a real and strict atonement, feel any difficulty—that they are trammelled in their presentation of the gospel call, is not true in point of fact. I have had occasion many thousand times to in-

vite and entreat and command men everywhere (i. e. wherever I have preached) to repent and believe the gospel. I have heard very many of the same belief with myself, urging the gospel call, with all possible zeal; pressing men to believe, repent and be saved: assuring them in the strongest language that *every* penitent believer shall most certainly be saved. But never did I feel any difficulty, and I am confident no intelligent Calvinist ever feels any such difficulty.

Here then, is a *matter of fact* answer, to the objection before us. It is something worse than in vain, to tell a man he cannot do, the very thing he is in the constant habit of doing All Calvinists are in the constant practice of commanding all sinners to whom they preach, to repent, and assuring them that *every* penitent believer shall be saved; and yet the objector, says, you cannot do it! *We do, do it.* We always do it. What, worse than folly to say, we cannot do it!

This might be sufficient answer to the objector, if the only object was to shut him up. But radical error lies couched in the objection and for the truth's sake, therefore, we must give a more extended reply.

2. The entire Armenian or Semi-pelagian scheme is wrapped up in this objection. It supposes that Christ's death has opened a door by which men—all men of Adam's race may be saved if they choose: and it supposes the doctrine of ability in man, independent of renewing grace, to turn himself and choose the Saviour. All men are alike able to repent and believe and the only reason they are not all saved is, some choose to be saved and some do not. *Human volition*, and not *divine grace*, determines the question of heaven or hell. Salvation is offered to all and promised conditionally to all. They who fulfil the condition, that is, who convert themselves by *free will*—that is, who do the *work*—are saved, and the rest perish. Thus salvation is by *human works* and not *divine grace.*

But now the bible doctrine is, that every penitent believer—every one that is willing, is saved; but moreover, that this willingness and this penitence and this faith are not human works, but divine graces, inwrought

in the soul by the regenerating Spirit of God—they "were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John i. 13.) The will itself is renovated by the Holy Spirit. i. e. The man who was unwilling is made willing, by the divine Spirit. This being the truth, in opposition to the preceding error, we are prepared to point out another falacy, viz.

3. That the gospel call is a promise of salvation to every *individual* to whom the preacher has access. This I conceive to be an utter mistake. For,

(1) The gospel call is a commandment. It emanates from the supreme Lord of the universe, *as such*. It does not, in this aspect of it, issue from Jesus as *Saviour*, but as *Governor*. His giving this command—his ordering his disobedient subjects to return into due subjection, belongs to him as *King*. In this he is exercising his *authority* and all men are bound to obey him. For it is the *duty*, and it ever must be the *duty* of every rational being, in heaven earth and hell, to obey God. From this obligation no amount of sinfulness or of holiness ever can release any creature. None can rise above God's authority—none can sink below it. Now, in the gospel call, is included this command. Into this revolted province of his empire, God has sent his Son, invested with full powers, to command submission, and to demand the fruits of his vineyard. It is the supreme authority of heaven that meets us in the command, "repent ye" rebels and believe the gospel. Submit to your King and Lord. Turn from your evil ways. Let the wicked forsake his way—and the unrighteous man his thoughts. Turn ye—turn ye. Seek the Lord—Call ye upon him. Depart ye, depart ye—go ye out from the midst of her and touch not the unclean thing. The gospel call is *mandatory*—it comes with all the weight of divine authority. If any man treat it with contempt, it is at the peril of his immortal soul.

If it were not so—that is, if the gospel call were not a command, based on authority—the authority of the Universal Governor, manifestly there could be no sin in disobeying it. Sin is the transgression of the law. But

now impenitence and unbelief are sins, and therefore transgressions of the law, and therefore the command to return in all things into due obedience to God—the commands to repent and to believe, are commands of the law—they emanate from God as universal Governor. And thus, the whole business of preaching the moral law, and enforcing its duties upon the hearts and consciences of men, belongs to the ministerial office—it belonged to Christ's office and he has entrusted it to his servants. They, therefore, are directly in the line of their duty, when they press all the moral obligations of the law upon the consciences of men. Consequently, the objections of some to law preaching, are not founded on scripture, nor in reason. For the law and the gospel are not two different moral systems, having, in some degree, antagonist interests. They are one in their aim and end: both are designed to promote the glory of God and the happiness of man. The latter is a remedial scheme, as we have seen, for the incidental evils growing out of the violation of the former. When God, in the person of the Son, commands all men every where to repent—that is, to return to due obedience to himself, he utters no new command. It is not a new law he promulgates, but simply what belongs to the unchanging and eternal nature of moral rule. So when he enjoins men to believe in God, it is no new law. All moral beings are bound always to believe all that God tells them. All that is peculiar to the gospel, in saving faith, as we shall see, is merely a modification in the forms of man's belief. It brings in no new principle. Persuaded I am, therefore; that all which is mandatory in the gospel call, is from Christ as Governor, to whom all power is committed in heaven and in earth.

(2) Therefore, the call thus far is universal. All men every where are commanded to trust in God and to turn from sin to Him and holiness. The command, enforcing the obligation, is nothing more or less than simply a going forth of the laws eternal claim upon its moral subjects. How it should be otherwise, to my mind is an impossible conception. A perfect moral Governor, that should cease to require pefect obedience,

is a solecism—a perfect moral Governor who should never call upon a revolted subject to return to due allegiance, but abandon the helm, the moment any should transgress, is a contradiction.

(3) But again—in the gospel call there is a promise; "believe in the Lord Jesus Christ,"—this is a command —"and thou shalt be saved," this is a promise. "Ask," this is mandatory, "and ye shall receive," this is promisory. *That* is the going forth of authority, *this* is the going forth of love. All gospel promises originate in the eternal, free and sovereign love of God and flow in upon us through the rent vail of Messiah's flesh. These, in a strict sense, indeed, are the gospel. The proffer of life through the blood of Calvary, is good news. Yet is it manifest, that, independent of the command going before, this characteristic of the gospel strictly so called, could not exist. That is, the promise of salvation can be glad tidings only to him who feels himself lost. Suppose you promise deliverance from death and hell, through the blood of Christ, to the angels of glory; will they understand you? Will they account it glad tidings! Clearly then, the very nature of the gospel invitations and promises, is most materially affected by the nature of the previous command and the person to whom it is addressed. And practically, in proportion as the mandatory call has seized upon the sin disabled soul, will be the measure of its gladness when the promissory call pervades the heart. The gospel, therefore, meaning the promises, apart from the command, is not good news. Both must go together. The sword of the Spirit must open a way for the balm of Gilead. He only can be healed, who has been wounded. The promises are practically good news only to those who have felt the force of the command 'Repent ye and believe the gospel,' and of their own utter unworthiness, and inability to return to a holy state.

4. This prepares the way for a very important inquiry, viz; Is the promise in the gospel call, conditional or unconditional? Has a minister authority to say to every sinner he meets—here is salvation for *you—you* shall be saved. Every one of you shall live forever?

Christ Jesus has taken away all *your* sins: there is nothing against *you* in the book of God's account? Or has the ambassador of Christ authority only to command all men to whom he comes, to believe, and repent and bring forth fruits, meet for repentance, and evidence of its genuineness; and *then* to promise every penitent believer eternal life? Does his commission authorize him to do more than assure the truly converted man of salvation?

In view of these inquiries, I think the plain reader of the Bible, will not long hesitate. The promises are surely addressed to the faithful, penitent, practical christian. Whilst the disobedient, impenitent and unbelieving man, has no right to their comforts. Whether then, you choose to call it a *condition* or not, the promises, no man has a right to address to any but believers in Christ. The command of the gospel call, is addressed to all men without exception, to whose ears it comes: the promise is limited to the children of faith. "He that believeth *shall be saved.*" There is not a promise of life and salvation in all the bible, that goes without and beyond this limit. It is, consequently, the duty of every gospel minister, clearly to define the character of the believer and the penitent, and to address his promises, or rather, his Master's promises, to those and to those only who sustain the character of true believers. And so far from extending the promise beyond this; it is made his official duty to denounce the curse of God on all besides. "He that believeth not shall be damned." "Knowing, therefore, the terror of the Lord, we persuade men." We paint the character of the impenitent and unbelieving, and tell you all, who sustain this character, that, continuing thus, ye shall be damned. There can be no substantial spiritual joy for you here: and all beyond is dreary and doleful despair. "He that believeth not the son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."

When, therefore, we are asked—and it is often done with an air of triumph—Is not the gospel call universal? and does not this prove the atonement universal? our response is—that the gospel call consists of a com-

mand and a promise. The command, which enforces universal duty, is of course aniversal, and all who hear, are bound by it. The promise of life and heaven, is particular, viz: it is addressed only to the believer—and no man without the most arrogant presumption, can say to any individual sinner, 'this salvation is yours;' until he has indubitable evidence, that such sinner is truly penitent and faithful. The command is absolute—the promise is conditional: that is universal, this particular.

5. But again, every one who complies with the condition, may and ought and doth lay hold on the promise. And it cannot be doubted, but that God's faithfulness is bound to fulfil the promise, by bestowing, giving, conferring the thing promised, viz: salvation. It would be a violation of truth, to withhold salvation from a penitent and obedient believer. He who sustains this character, has a claim upon the divine faithfulness. The conditions of the promise are complied with, and the promiser has no option; he is bound by his own veracity, to give the thing promised.

Now here is the precise point at which Arminiarism interposes. Exactly so—says its advocate. 'God presents a conditional promise; man complies with the condition and then claims the reward of life.' This is true or false, just as you take it. If you mean, that the sinner, by his own strength and freewill, changed his own heart, produced in himself true faith and saving repentance and holy obedience—*if this is man's work*, then your doctrine is false and soul-destructive. If you mean, that the same God, who as Governor *commands* us to believe and obey, and who promises salvation—by his Spirit, renews the soul to spiritual life; produces true faith and saving repentance and holy obedience; then your doctrine is true, for it stains the pride of all human glory, and places the crown of our salvation upon the only head worthy to wear it.

6. Here we meet another turn of the objection. "But the gospel, says the objector, is represented as a feast—the King's servants are sent to invite all to come: now if there is not provision made for them, what, if

more should come than could find place at his table?" I answer, here again is the false hypothesis, that men may and can and will come, without any influence of the King's power in changing their hearts. Whereas, the truth is, and the King has told us so, that none of the whole who are invited and commanded to come, is ever found willing, until the Holy Spirit has renewed and compelled them to come in. It is their duty to believe and obey; but none has any disposition and ability to do this duty, until God's Spirit renews the soul. Unless, therefore, it should happen, that God should regenerate souls, whom he does not mean to save—blasphemous thought! the absurd hypothesis of a sinner believing and repenting and yet being rejected of God, can never occur.

What if more should come than Christ has provided room for! Presumptuous folly! What if the Ethiopian should change his skin and the leopard his spots? What if the devil should become indeed an angel of glory? When will men learn, that to reason from impossible suppositions, can never promote the cause of truth?

7. But it has been common, I am aware, to place the general gospel call on other grounds. Most of the friends of a true and strict atonement, answer the above objection, by retreating to the doctrine of the infinite merit of Christ's death and obedience. Few men have used stronger language to this amount, than Dr. Owen.

"To the honor then of Jesus Christ our Mediator, God and man, our all sufficient Redeemer, we affirm, that such and so great was the dignity and worth of his death and blood shedding, of so precious a value, of such an infinite fulness and sufficiency was this oblation of himself, that it was every way able and perfectly sufficient to redeem, justify, reconcile and save, all the sinners in the world, and to satisfy the justice of God for all the sins of all mankind, and to bring them every one to everlasting glory. Now, this fullness and sufficiency of the merit of the death of Christ, is a foundation unto two things, viz:

1st. The general publishing of the gospel unto all

nations, with the right that it hath to be preached to every creature, Math. xx, vi, Mark xvi, 15. Because the way of salvation which it declares, is wide enough for all to walk in, there is enough in the remedy it brings to light, to heal all their diseases, to deliver them from all their evils: if there were a thousands worlds, the gospel of Christ might, upon this ground, be preached to them all; there being enough in it for the salvation of them all, if so be, they will desire virtue from him by touching him in faith, the only way to draw refreshment from this fountain of salvation.

2dly. That the preachers of the gospel in their particular congregations, being utterly unacquainted with the purpose and secret counsel of God, being also forbidden to pry or search into it. Deut. xxix, 29, may from hence, justifiably call upon every man to believe, with assurance of salvation unto every one, in particular upon his so doing."—Owen's Death of Death, 204.

I have italicised the last words, to shew that Dr. Owen's universal call, is really particular as I have already explained. The command is general, but the promise and assurance of salvation, is particularly limited to them that believe. On the extract I farther remark, that however, it be the common opinion, and however the merits of Christ be correctly stated as infinite, yet I do not believe this to be at all the foundation of the command in the general gospel call. The true and proper basis of it is laid in the authority of God, commanding in the remedial law, what he commanded in the original institute, all men to trust in him, and obey his will. Such command is in the gospel call, "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden." The Son of the mighty King, himself both Lord and King, goes forth to his revolted subjects and proclaims an amnesty—commands all the rebels to lay down their arms. He promises to all and every one who shall thus express their submission, pardon and restoration to favour. But the heart of a desperate rebel is in every one of them, and not one among the millions of revolters ever will accept the proffered pardon; unless, besides all this, a new temper and disposition shall first

have been given to him. Here comes in the gospel provisions. The Spirit of the Great King changes the hearts of an immense number, who, accordingly, accept the proffered pardon and secure their lives. The rest; *left to the freedom of their own will*, run on and perish. The just consequences of their own sin overtake them, and they die in their own iniquity. Their death is not *caused*, nor is it even *occasioned*, by the change of temper and consequent pardon of the others; but simply and solely by their sinful perseverance in rebellion. They are cut off as rebels, not only for the last, but for all the previous acts of their resistance to their King's government. The formal ground of their condemnation is not, because other men are saved—nor because of the all-sufficiency of Christs atonement, but only because they sinned. The damnation of men is not secured by the blood of Christ.

True, the rejection of the King's pardon is an additional and aggravating act of their rebellion; and in order to this the gospel call must have been sounded in their ears; but it is not for *this purpose* it is so sounded. It is, that those whose ears are opened, may hear and return. The others' having an opportunity to commit this last act in rejecting the pardon, is an incidental circumstance, but not the reason why the amnesty is proclaimed and the command to cease rebellion is sounded in their ears. The *purpose* of the proclamation is, to reach them whom the Lord their God shall call: but in accomplishing this, an opportunity is necessarily offered to the other revolters to revolt more and more.

But the nature of unbelief, as the crowning sin, will come in better after we shall have examined the doctrine of faith.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SAVIOUR'S INTERCESSION.

That a man be indifferent to the effects of his own actions—the success of his own enterprise, is scarcely conceivable. All the laws, which ordinarily prompt to action, must first be reversed; and to account for any action at all, would be very difficult. Our simplest notion of a moral act involves the idea of moral motive operating upon and determining choice; and to suppose a state of indifference as to results, is to suppose, that the results themselves could operate as a cause of action, until the very moment of their achievement, and then cease to have any power to influence the mind. It may well, therefore, be doubted, whether a state of indifference to the success of his own labours, is possible with any rational mind. And should such a state actually occur, it might well be enquired whither that mind had not lost its balance and ceased to be a moral agent.

Now this characteristic of our rational nature—this essential attribute of its moral character, was not wanting in the Saviour of men. Petulance of anxiety for results, he never did display; but the steadfast fixedness of his eye and heart upon the hour of his sorrows and the worlds triumph, shewed that the glorious results, being the recompense of his own reward, were never matters of indifference to him. To suppose, that *after* he had endured the pains and privations of this sorrowful life, the groans and agony of Gethsemane and of Calvary, he henceforth ceased to regard the permanent issues of the whole, were to suppose in him strange contradictories indeed. Such, no reader of the Bible can believe to exist. On the contrary, every careful reader must believe that Jesus always looked and still looks with intense interest upon the effects of his own obedi-

ence and death, and that he now exercises his divine government over the universe, with a direct and special and principal regard to these glorious results. Such temper he displayed immediately after his resurrection, and before his ascension. His promises relative to the mission of the Holy Ghost, and their fulfilment at the pentecostal feast, are a beautiful illustration of his deep concern for consequences. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the outgoings of this principle in the doctrine of the Saviour's intercesssion.

SECTION I.

The meaning of the term and thing.

Intercession is coming between, and implies three persons or parties. The middle person is the Intercessor. Hence, Jesus is called *Mediator*—that is, the middle person—one who throws himself between God and man. Man had offended against his Maker's law and was justly obnoxious to the full weight of its sentence. To the infliction of death the law prompts ; the sword of justice uplifted in the hand of God, is about to smite the offending rebel down to perdition ; Christ steps in between—he mediates in arresting or staying the stroke—rather in changing its direction and turning the sword's burning point in upon his own soul. The Shepherd is smitten, that the sheep may escape. This doctrine we have canvassed at some length. But now, having mediated so far as regards the claims of law upon his people, and so mediated as to turn the avenging stroke of justice from his people upon himself: and having done every thing else which the law's claim upon his people contained, he feels his work for them yet far from being completed. They,—many of them are yet in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity; multitudes of those whom he must bring to glory are yet unborn. Hence an all-pervading feeling on their behalf, occupies the bosom of him who sitteth upon the throne. He steps in between the Father and his offending children, and entreats for them the blessings they

need. Intercession is a part of mediation, and includes all the prayers which Christ, our Great High Priest offers up for us—"he ever liveth to make intercession for us," Heb. vii, 25: *to manage our business for us* before God. Such is the force of the Greek. So in Acts xxv, 24, "And Festus said, King Agrippa, ye see this man about whom all the multitude of the Jews *have dealt with me;*" it is the same word—have *interceded*. So Rom. viii, 27—"because he maketh intercession for the saints"—he *manageth* the saints business—he *dealeth* for the saints. And v, 34. Who also dealeth for—manageth with God the affairs of the Saints. It does not *properly* mean only to *pray for*. For the *Jews dealt with* Festus, not by asking benefits of him for Paul; but they endeavoured to procure a sentence against the Apostle, and thus to compass his death. Their *dealing*, therefore, was the presentation of charges, and proof, such as they had. So Rom. xi, 2. "Elias maketh intercession to God against Israel." And in doing this, he states their crimes, v. 3, "Lord, they have killed thy prophets and digged down thine altars."

One other case occurs in the New Testament, 1 Tim. ii, 1, "I will, that first of all prayers, supplications and *intercessions* be made." Here it is clearly manifest that *intercessions* are somewhat different from *prayers* and *importunate entreaties*. This third expression, *intercessions*—is not mere sound without precise meaning? It signifies, *The presentation of a case before a judge and the claiming of a decision according to law*. Such was the action of the Jews before Festus. They importunately urged the judge to pass on Paul's case, according to their representations of it. Such was the action of Elias, he presented the sins of Israel before God, and urged the expression of his vengeance upon them. Such, I contend is the meaning in all the other cases. When the Spirit, Rom. viii, 26, maketh intercession for us with unutterable groanings,—he presents our case—the case of Christ's people and earnestly demands a decision in their favour according to law—he manages their cause for them. When Christ v. 34,

"maketh intercession," it is the same. He presents the cause of his people. He shews before the presence of the Fathers tribunal, where he is "our advocate," that all his people have in himself fulfilled all law in all respects, viz: *He*, for them, has paid the penalty and fulfilled the precepts. Consequently he urges a decision in their case, and that a favourable decision. He *claims* it on the ground of his own merits—merits which he evinces, are for them, and therefore they ought to be pardoned and justified and saved. Jesus our advocate manages our whole cause for us. Thus the Greek word, translated *intercession*, does not necessarily mean *praying for;* it often means *praying against.* It may include either, for it simply describes all the actions and doings of one who urges and presses a suit in court, that it may be decided: and that irrespective of that decision whether it be for or against. Applied to Christ, it of course includes whatever he does towards procuring, at the bar of God, a decision in favour of his people. He is their advocate with the Father and pleads their cause.

Now this suggests the idea of accusation and an opposing pleader. So the Bible has it; Satan is called "the accuser of the brethren," Rev. xxii, 10. And inasmuch, as there is a powerful "adversary," there ought to be a powerful advocate. In Math. v, 25, we are advised, "agree with thine adversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, &c;" which shews that the *adversary* is the person prosecuting a claim against another. Hence Peter, 1. v, 8, admonishes us, "be sober, be viligant; because your *adversary* the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about." And the widow, Luke xviii, 3, cried, "Avenge me of mine adversary." Give judgment in my case. The phraseology of the Bible all leads us to the idea of an *accuser*, who is a pleader *against;* a tribunal at which he wishes to procure a sentence *against* a person; an *advocate*—one who pleads for the person accused and shews cause why a favorabe sentence should be pronounced, and thence urges the court for such a sentence. The intercession

of Christ then, consists of his plea and his claim founded on his plea.

SECTION II.

Christ's plea on behalf of his people.

This plea consists of two parts; viz: that which goes to repel the accusation; and that which goes to establish the very opposite of it. As to the former, its nature must in all cases be determined by the nature of the accusation; for it consists in resistance to it. Now, the accusation brought by the adversary, is that these men have sinned and, according to the law, ought to be delivered over to himself, to become a part of his accursed and wicked crew. Satan desires to have them as his own subjects, and the ground of his claim is, that they have identified their interests with his, and of right and law are doomed to be with him.

Against this, "our advocate with the Father" puts in the counter plea, that he himself has suffered in the room of his people—has met the entire penal claims of law against them; so that their deliverance into the hands of the tormentor, would be unrighteous; for it would be a second infliction of penal evil for the same sins. Satan claims them as sold slaves under sentence of law. Christ claims them as having redeemed them from the curse of the law and points to his pierced feet and hands and side —to his tears and groans and bloody sweat. Hence obviously, he admits, that once the accusation was just and their deliverance into the tormentor's hands would have been right; but now the torment—the punishment due, by course of law and right, has been inflicted upon himself as their surety, and hence, he *claims* the release of his people from all the agonies of the curse.

This part of Christ's advocacy is beautifully represented in the law of Moses. The High Priest represents Christ, in the progress of his ministrations, this High Priest offers up the sacrifice on the altar of burnt offerings, without the tabernacle. This is Christ suffering without the gate. The Priest then takes a part of

the blood and passes through the blue vail into the most holy place and sprinkles it on the mercy seat; this is Christ passing through the blue vault of heaven into the presence chamber of the great King and carrying with him the evidence of his sufferings and death. The Priest thus secures forgiveness of sins for the people; Christ thus repels the accusation of the adversary and evinces the right in himself, to his people's deliverance—that is, he obtains the remission of their sins. (Heb. ix.) "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us"—"but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us." "Wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth *to manage their cause with God*—to make intercession for them." A very material—an all important part of Christ's intercession is his presenting the evidence of his death—that is, his satisfaction rendered to divine justice for his people's sin. Without this, his appearance before God for us were all in vain. And this vanity is also illustrated by Moses. If even the high priest, without having first offered the proper sacifice, enter the most holy place, within the vail, he shall die. (Lev. xvi. 2.) The sacrifice must first be offered, before he dare enter into the most holy place and before he can take fire and the incense, which represents prayer, and offer them before the mercy seat. Here, the incense sets forth Christ's supplication for his peoples's pardon: and it becomes available only by fire from the altar of burnt offerings. That is, the entire offering of Christ's prayer for his people, depends upon his previous sacrifice. Unless he carries with him the memorial of his own blood, this incence of his prayer can have no odor: his cause is lost.

2. The second part of Christ's plea consists in presenting the evidence of his having fulfilled all righteousness for his people. Not content with their rescue from the positive suffering of the curse, he proceeds to assert a claim for them to positive blessedness. He shews, that as the second Adam, he has established for his peo-

ple, by his own perfect obedience, the ground on which life was promised to the first Adam and all his posterity. And consequently all that life and happiness which was promised in the covenant to the children of the one, must of right pass over and belong to the children of the other.

Now this plea, in which he evinces the perfection of his atonement and of his obedience, our Advocate lays down as the basis of his claim.

SECTION III.

Christ's claim on behalf of his people.

This of course consists of two parts, corresponding to the basis of it.

He claims for them exemption from the penal evils of the curse: as we have already seen. And this includes their deliverance from guilt and woe; which deliverance is, of course, not an abstraction; not a mere name; but a blessed and glorious reality. Hence the Holy Spirit is sent to rescue them from the spiritual death which sin had brought into their souls, and to inform them of the fact that their sins are forgiven—that the plea of their advocate is sustained in the court of heaven; and they are now the reconciled children of God.

Now you will observe, this mission of the Spirit, and his entire work of regeneration, and bearing witness in the souls of Christ's people, that they are his, is obtained by our Advocate, as matter of *right* to Him: He *claims* it: and "him the Father heareth always;" consequently the Holy Spirit is sent. This accords to what he states, John xvi. 7: "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will come unto you; but if I depart I will send him unto you." Ch. xv. 26: "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me."

Analagous to these sacred truths are the affairs of men. All our rules of right are from God. Whenever

a faithful advocate at a human tribunal evinces the justice of the cause he has espoused, and secures a sentence in favour of his client, he *claims*—and justice gladly responds to his claim—he *claims* the release of the prisoner. It is *justice* that throws open the prison door, and proclaims liberty to the captive. It is *justice* that wings the messenger of mercy from the throne of God—*justice* to the Redeemer is mercy to his redeemed ones.

2. The other point, in the claim of our Advocate, regards the precept of the law. According to the essential nature of moral government, the law holds out some good as the motive to its obedience; when the mind yields to the force of motive and obeys, the good thing proffered must, of right, be given. This is the essence of the covenant of works. God commanded obedience, and promised life. In the original form, this covenant was broken by man, and thus came death. In great condescension, God set on foot a remedial covenant, in the hands of an infallible surety—the second Adam. Here is the point in which mercy is exercised. By no principle of law was God bound to do this: it is wholly gratuitous and gracious. But now, this second Adam performs the obedience required—he establishes the principle of the original institute, and claims for his own people the promised life. The *claim*, you will see, is based upon the fact of his having fulfilled the law by an entire, total, and complete obedience. To such obedience God at first promised life to man; and now Christ, as the Advocate of his redeemed people, presses his *right* to their blessedness forever. In his plea he gives evidence of this fact, and having proved a full compliance with the conditions of the promise, he looks to the Father for a similar compliance in the bestowment of life. "Father, I will that those also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me:" John, xvii. 24.

With these views before us, let us remark in conclusion:

1. The loose and undefined notion, entertained (it is to be feared) by not a few, that Christ's intercession is simply, his bald and naked request or prayer for men,

is erroneous, and consequently mischievous. It is erroneous, because it omits the main matter of intercession, viz: the *plea* on which the *prayer* is founded: the argument of the cause. It leaves out of view, partially, if not totally, the moral and legal relations of the parties.

It is mischievous, for the same reason; and hence leads to low thoughts of Christ and his work. If he only prays—asks benefits for his people, that can be done by a fellow sinner, or a saint on earth and in heaven. Sincere and ardent and importunate prayer is offered up by men for their fellow men. If this is all Christ does, then men may as well approach God through the intercession of St. Patrick or St. Peter, or the blessed Virgin. Hence all the idolatry of the popish system.

On the contrary, if the chief item in intercession be and is Christ's plea, in which he shews his fulfilment of all claims of law upon his people, then all men must see and feel a vast difference between the intercession of Christ and that of mere men. We may intercede for our friends, but we have no merit of our own to plead. We may refer to Christ's all-sufficiency, and through him have acceptable approach to God.

2. We see why our *persons* must be accepted with God, before our prayers and other services can be. There is no way of acceptable approach to Him, but through Christ, who is the way, and the truth, and the life. Unless, therefore, we come unto God by him, he is not able to save us to the uttermost or to the least degree. All Christ's power to save depends upon his atonement and obedience.

3. We learn why it is that Christ never prayed for all men indefinitely. The fact is undeniable; unless, indeed, you choose to contradict his own express words: "I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world —— — I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me—Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word," John xvii. 6, 9, 20. The fact of Christ's prayer being limited

to and for those whom the Father gave him, and to whom he grants faith to believe, being plainly undeniable, we see the reason of it. His prayer is founded on his plea of right, and can only extend as far as his plea. The Father gave him a portion "out of the world;" the rest of the world or race of men he left to their own ways. The Son "giveth his life for these sheep;" and for these only can he put in a claim of right, and demand their deliverance from death and hell and sin: to them he gives eternal life, "and this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." "For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me."

If, on the contrary, Christ should pray for those whom the Father never gave to him; whom he never redeemed; to whom he shall say "depart from me, ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels," then it could not be said, that he put in a plea and a claim of right for them: it could not be said "him the Father heareth always." But it could be said—Jesus has prayed in vain: he has advocted the cause of devils and spirits damned and lost forever! Will any man affirm it? Dare any say of the "Advocate with the Father," that he undertook a bad cause and failed in it? If this is a blasphemy too gross, let us return from it to the plain Bible doctrine, that Christ puts in a plea for his people, which the Father admits, and a claim which he grants.

4. We learn why our prayers for ourselves and for others, are often not heard. They are inconsistent with the will of God and not based upon the atonement, and do not of course go up perfumed with the incense of Christ's intercession. Every prayer offered in faith—that is, offered to God in the exercise of a real and true confidence in the all sufficiency of Christ, is and shall be answered, in substance, if not in the form we may have expected. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you. Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name: ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full." John xvi. 23, 24. "In my name," here, cannot surely mean, a

simple sounding of the word *Jesus* or *Christ*. But it is the heart's confidence in the fulness of his atoning sacrifice and his justifying righteousness. Now this confidence, trust, faith, is a grace of the Spirit, and can exist only in the soul that is regenerated and united in fact, as well as law, with Jesus Christ. "Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered."

5. It will be repetition but I call it up for distinct remembrance—Christ's work, viz: his obedience and death are the basis of his intercession.

6. The sanctification of the soul, its repentance, new obedience, faith, regeneration; all are consequences of the mission of the Holy Spirit to that Soul; and this mission is a consequence of Christ's intercession: and this intercession being based on his work of atonement; therefore the whole work begins at the altar. Our High Priest offers up the victim; viz: himself; he taskes the blood into the most holy place and appears now in heaven for us; he presents the plea of his own obedience and death, and on that founds his claim to his people's release from sin, death, hell and the grave; the Father sends the Spirit; the Spirit restores to life the dead soul, produces faith, repentance, love and holy obedience; we ask in faith and our joy is full.

CHAPTER XX.

ON SAVING OR JUSTIFYING FAITH.

The connexion which the sacred scriptures affirm everywhere, between faith and salvation, very fully evinces the importance of the topic upon which we now enter. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved"—"He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." Faith and life, unbelief—the absence of faith and death. How important then to have correct views of its nature and operations.

SECTION I.

Faith as a General Principle.

That all men believe very many things—that it is a law of man's nature to repose confidence in the testimony of his fellow men, is so perfectly notorious, as to require no argument or illustration.

That there exists in the mind a disposition, a habit, an inclination to trust, confide, believe in testimony, is equally plain and undeniable. That this disposition, habit, inclination, is prior to the respective acts of believing, to me at least, appears equally plain: and there is no difficulty thrown around this doctrine of a *habit* or *principle* of faith more than around any other *habit* or *principle* of action. That is, prior to any and to all *acts* of believing, there is, in the constitution of the mind itself, a something which adapts it, which fits it, which inclines and predisposes it to put forth such acts of believing.

Now this principle of faith is original in the human mind. That is, man is by *nature* inclined to believe

what is told to him. It is not an acquired habit, but comes into the world with him. It is as much a part of his nature as the habit of body by which he is inclined to breathe as soon as he is ushered into life: or as the disposition to draw his nourishment from his mother's breast, or to reason, or be excited to joy or sorrow. Without this principle of faith, he would not be man; but an entirely different being. He could never believe —there could be no such thing as faith in the act—no such thing as confidence in testimony—no knowledge derived from this source—no human society.

It is the more important to be well settled on this point, however small a matter and however clear, it may seem, because of the important position which the opposite sentiment occupies in certain systems of unbelief. By an assumption, as false as it is gratuitous, infidelity has attempted to remove the foundations of the Apostles and prophets. The false assumption is, that faith, or the disposition to rest upon testimony, is an *acquired* habit not an original law of man's nature. Believing is the result of experience. We hear a testimony—some man tells us something; we subsequently ascertain that the thing is, as he told us; we rest upon his declaration, with a small measure of confidence. Again he testifies to another and another, and our growing experience of his veracity, is the measure of strength in our growing habit of belief.

Now I aver this to be contrary to universal fact. So far from belief being thus the product of experience, faith in human testimony is *natural* and *unbelief* is the result of repeated experience.

Every man must feel within himself the consciousness of this truth. All I need, is simply to refer him to it. He at once accredits the declarations of others: and finds an effort to be continually necessary to guard him against the evils of too hasty a belief. Hence the ease with which children and inexperienced persons—inexperienced in the duplicity and untruth practised by men towards one another—are duped and often injured, through their unsuspicious confidence. Hence the proverbial *credulity* of little children. There is not a

trait of their character more prominent than this—their unreserved confidence, trust, faith in testimony. They at first believe all that is told to them. So thoroughly is this the leading characteristic of children; that we constantly refer to them as illustrations of the same quality in grown persons. A man is disposed to believe all he hears,—we say of him, he is as simple as a child.

The Saviour who "knew what was in man," speaks of this same law, when he says, "except ye be converted and become as little children"—that is, credulous of all their father tells them—believe every thing—"ye cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Faith is the door of entrance into it—he that believeth is saved—if ye therefore become not as little children in this main feature of their character, ye are lost and undone. But if ye exercise toward God that simple confidence, that firm belief which a child reposes in its father, ye are the sons of God.

Here then, we rest with confidence. The principle of faith in testimony is an original element of the human constitution. It is one of the chief avenues to knowledge. Indeed it is the main avenue. Almost all the knowledge we have, has entered by this door. Let a man draw a line between the amount of knowledge he posesses, which entered his mind by faith—i. e. for which he simply trusts in the veracity of others; and that which he has independently upon testimony, and how insignificant the one in comparison of the other? What we know by faith, includes the entire facts of history—all knowledge, except that which is the direct result of personal observation—which is original with the individual. Reject all knowledge obtained by faith, and what diminutive pigmies modern infidels would then be! Let the knowledge breathed into them by the breath of testimony, be let off, and the baloon of their vanity would soon collapse into a very insignificant concern. It is rather a singular fact, that the infidel philosophers, who denying this primitive law of mind, should be more especially than other men, dependent on the faith of testimony for their knowledge and distinction. Many of the

most popular historians are infidels: and it seems not to have occurred to them, that in rejecting or attempting to discard faith, because of its important influences in religion, they have been laboring to pull down the pillars of their own temple of fame.

"Their folly shall be known to all men."

(2.) *Perception of truth secures belief.*—This law of the human understanding is arbitrary and absolute. It is not optional—it is not a matter of choice, whether we believe or not. When the mind; that is, the man—the person—when I *perceive* a thing to be true, I have no power to disbelieve it. If it were otherwise—if man had a power to withhold his belief after he perceived the truth of the thing, it might be a very convenient way of obtaining relief in times of trouble. Why should a man *will* the belief of that which gives him pain? If a mere act of volition could regulate our belief, disastrous news would have a remedy at hand. The fact, however, is far different. A man's belief is directly and necessarily as the perceptions of his own mind.

Testimony, or the affirmation of rational agents, is one of the modes by which the mind perceives truth. We speak, indeed, in a figure, of believing the testimony of our own senses. We often attribute speech and intelligence to our own eyes and ears, and say we believe what they tell us. That is, the senses are avenues to knowledge; and what is conveyed to the mind through them, we rest upon as truth. This *confidence* or *resting* is also involuntary. It is not a matter of choice whether we believe or not in the reality of cold that freezes us; or fire that burns us. The same law holds good as to the testimony of our fellow men. Our confidence, trust, reliance upon their solemn declaration, is the means of almost all the knowledge we possess; nor is our exercising of this *trust* a voluntary matter. Our minds are so constituted, that no opposition of feelings and desires can secure a state of distrust, when we have clear testimony to the truth of any thing. We often wish we could disbelieve what we hear, but in vain. We perceive the truth, and, according to the clearness of our perception, rest or rely upon it.

(3.) For, I remark again, truth, or the reality of things, is that to which the mind looks. And in moral agents, *veracity*, or that quality of mind which prompts to state honestly our own perceptions of truth, is the basis of our confidence. Exactly as we discover in a witness the requisite knowledge of the thing about which he testifies, and the attribute of *veracity*, so will be the measure of our faith or reliance upon his testimony. Had we never known an instance of prevarication or falsehood, the law of belief would have remained unbroken, and men would always believe every testimony delivered to them.

(4.) The intellectual and moral powers of man have been so deranged by his sin, that he has, in his fallen state, no faith in God; because no clear and correct notions of his character, his law and his government; and in this alienated state he ever would remain, but for the renewing of the Holy Ghost. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, &c." This utter inability to any thing good has been fully discussed. The bible doctrine most plainly is, that all mankind are by nature in a state of unbelief, and consequently of death. The essential requisites to a true faith, viz: a spiritual understanding—a holy vision of divine things—a view of God as the sum of all excellence—he has not, and never, without supernatural aid, can have. A relict of the original law of belief he still has, as of all the other original laws of mind; and this enables him, in some degree, to perceive truth and veracity in his fellow men, as to the affairs of this life. But in all that relates to the spiritual world, he is darkness and death.

We have also seen that this want of capacity to know the things of the Spirit, and consequently to believe the testimony of God, in his law and in his gospel—for the former is as much God's testimony as the latter—this incapacity is man's sin, and not his apology. This prepares the way for,

SECTION II.

Faith in God is a duty.

This position must be viewed in a twofold aspect, viz: in reference to the twofold division of the divine testimony—the law and the gospel.

1. The law of God is called a testimony; inasmuch as it is such an exhibition of his perfections as is calculated and intended to reprove all iniquity. In and by it God testifies or bears witness to his own glorious perfections, and against the corruptions of the race. Hence the two tables of stone on which its summary compend was written, are called his testimony. God directs Moses, Ex. xxv. 21, 16. "And thou shalt put the mercy seat above upon the ark, and in the ark thou shalt put the testimony that I shall give thee"—that is, the tables of the law. Ex. xxxi. 18, "two tables of testimony, tables of stone; written with the finger of God." Hence the ark, in which this sacred deposit was laid up, is called (Ex. xli. 3) "the ark of the testimony"—and the tabernacle, the tabernacle of testimony—and of witness.

Now God requires man to accredit this testimony of his law: And we have seen that its obligation is perpetual: no man can ever escape from it. But this requirement embraces not simply the acknowledgment of its truth, but the *practical* acknowledgment. He who believes the declarations of God in his law, sets to his seal that God is true. But this belief must be a practical principle. If a man say he believes the wages of sin to be death eternal, and yet revels in iniquity, the latter, viz: his *conduct* speaks his real belief in opposition to the former. He contradicts himself, and cannot be believed. But if a man professes in words to believe the testimony—all the testimonies of God's law, and lives, or endeavors to the utmost to live and act agreeably to them, his actions combine with his words, and shew the reality of his belief.

Thus you perceive, how unbelief lay near the root of

the tree forbidden—the serpent's temptation is the insinuation of an untruth—"Ye shall not surely die:" and the original sin of our race included belief in the lie.

You see also how, enforcing the duties of the law—the belief and practice of this part of God's testimony, is connected with and leads on to the duties of the gospel and its promises. He who in reality believes the truths of the law, will try to practice them. He will soon find his awful deficiency: he will soon tremble under apprehension of its terrific denunciations. He will soon cry out for pardoning mercy. He will soon have an open ear to the invitations of grace and the promises he will soon believe to the saving of his soul.

2. Thus we are led to the second grand division of the divine testimony. God has in the sacred scriptures, revealed his will concerning the salvation of the lost. Having enjoined a return to the fullest confidence, trust and obedience to God, he extends his testimony in the form of a promise of life and salvation to every repenting and returning rebel. Now, as it never can cease to be the duty of man to confide in his Maker, the refusal to return is sin: as we have before seen. Hence the constant connexion of the *mandate* with the *promise*, "*believe—and thou shalt be saved.*"

It is unnecessary here, to dwell upon the authoritative character and form of Christ's teaching, and the obligations which lie upon all men to whom he sends the message, to receive it. This has been sufficiently evinced. Every where, men are *commanded* to repent and believe the gospel; and every penitent believer has the promise of salvation. But "how can these things be?" If the views already given of man's utter incapacity to make himself a new heart, repent and believe in Christ, be correct, what mockery, to tell a man he shall be saved if he do these things, and yet tell him he cannot do them? This leads us to another position.

SECTION III.

Faith—saving faith is a grace.

It may be necessary here to mark a distinction between *gifts* and *graces*. Any benefit conferred short of salvation, where no claims of right to it existed, is a gift. Thus the power of speaking with tongues, whether miraculously or not, the power of working miracles, &c. all of which fall short of any special saving change upon the persons, are gifts. But the shedding abroad of the love of God in the heart, is a grace. True spiritual illumination—saving repentance, humility, and all the deep seated, permanent moral virtues of the renewed mind, are graces. A grace thus includes the idea of a permanent moral benefit resulting to us from the indwelling Spirit of God: whilst a gift implies only a temporary benefit. This is the commonly received distinction.

When therefore we say, saving faith is a *grace*, we mean, that there is in the soul, produced by the Spirit of God, a holy habit—an abiding fixed principle of the spiritual man, constantly leading forth the soul to confide in God: so that whenever his testimonies in the bible are presented, the mind rests upon them. The soul perceiving in God, the testifier, the attribute of veracity, throws the weight of its immortal interests into the Redeemer's hands. "Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation." The principle is thus to be distinguished, as before, from its particular exercise in believing.

To suppose no fixed, permanent principle, is to suppose an act without a power of action—an exercise without power called into exercise. Some singular consequences would follow, if faith were simply and only the act of believing; then the man could be called a believer only whilst exercising faith; any such thing as a fixed character, he could not possess. Whereas the bible speaks of believers in quite a different manner.

They have character, stable and permanent: and are not liable to be carried about by every wind of doctrines.

Another result of denying faith in the principle or habit, would be, that there could be no growth in this grace. There could be no strong faith—no babes in Christ. All the scriptures, therefore, that contain or suggest the idea of believers advancing in gracious attainment—all prayers for increase of faith, imply the permanency of it as a principle.

The origin of this grace, as already intimated, is to be sought in the renewing of the Holy Ghost. It is impossible to believe where the mind has no evidence. This is true equally of the natural and of the gracious principle. Until, therefore, the mind is renovated, so as to have a capacity to discern the things of the Spirit of God, it is not possible, it can perceive the truths of his testimonies. Spiritual illumination is an important step towards the resuscitation of the principle of faith.

In this matter our knowledge is limited. We know not how it is—or what it is, the spirit of God does in the regeneration of the soul. We are as ignorant here, as we are in the matter of giving sight to the blind—or in the manner of vision with the eyes of the body. How the mind perceives by the natural eye we cannot tell. So the Spirit does something—he that was blind, now sees. He that was deaf now hears God's testimony—perceives the veracity of God—sees the truth of the testimonies contained in the law and in the gospel: and seeing the truth, that Christ died that whosoever believeth on him, should not perish, he sets to his seal, that God, in this testimony, is true.

SECTION IV.

Difficulties and objections.

It will perhaps have occurred to you, that the act of believing, if it be involuntary, can have no moral character. For it is agreed generally, that *volition* is necessary to a moral act. The act which is done without

design, intention, will, choice, cannot be said to be good or bad, in any moral sense of the words. Consequently, believing, if it necessarily follows the perception of truth, is without moral character.

This consequence I admit; but only, you will observe, in reference to the *act* of believing: not with regard to the *principle* or *habit* of the mind, or to the *motive* which induced the act. The possession of capacity to perceive spiritually the truth of God's testimony, is a grace and a moral excellence; and the weighing of moral motives and yielding to the stronger, is a moral virtue. We thank no man for believing that, for the truth of which there is presented to his mind overwhelming evidence. But we do thank him for his patient attention, his voluntary exertion of his powers of body and of mind, whereby we have been enabled to present to his mind the evidence of the truth: and also for the *expression* of his belief. The court which pronounces a sentence in my favour according to the truth, has my gratitude; but for what? For believing my cause a just one, after clear proof was made out? Not at all. But for opening their eyes and ears to the proof; and for uttering their belief, after it had been wrung from them, perhaps, by the power of the evidence. On the contrary: the court which pronounces against me, I censure. For what? For believing according to the evidence, as it actually existed in their minds? By no means. But for their prejudices, which prevented their seeing the truth. Their indolence or their wilful ignorance, which barred the entrance of truth into their minds. How much morality is there in believing the truth of a mathematical problem, after it has been demonstrated before your eyes.

If, then, it be asked where do you connect moral accountability with believing;—I answer, in the preparatory steps toward the act of believing; not in the act itself. To give moral character to an act, we have seen it is requisite that it be *voluntary*—i. e. done in view of motives operating upon choice—and that the motives be such as to call into action the moral faculty, viz: that

power of the mind by which we judge of right and wrong: in other words, that they be moral motives.

Now, for our belief we are morally accountable to the whole extent to which we have had a voluntary agency in presenting the evidence to our minds. If we voluntarily shut our eyes against the light of truth, and thus are led to believe a lie, or believe things to be as they are not, it is sinful; but the sin lies not in the immediate act of belief, but in the previous neglect. Every man may find the proof of this in his own bosom. Who has not at times believed a thing to be different from what it really is? And who has not blamed himself? But for what? For his immediate belief! No. In that he is *conscious* of no ill intention, and yet evil has resulted. But he censures his previous neglect of the proper means to inform his mind correctly. Those means lay within his reach. He had only to will, and his body would have carried him to the place where his mind would have perceived the truth, and his belief have been secured in rectitude. Until, therefore, a man ceases to have power to use means for attaining knowledge, he remains accountable for his belief. He who voluntarily stays away from the place where he knows the truth of God is taught, will probably be sealed up in the belief of a lie, and then be punishable for that belief. This often occurs in practice. Absentees from public worship, very often hear and believe incorrect statements of the doctrine taught, and find mischief and trouble resulting. Many times men are thus absent, simply because of the peculiar state of their minds. They hear truth preached which tends to destroy their false peace, or to interfere with their darling lusts; and conscience seems to them disposed to force upon their minds the belief of them. They feel uneasy and stay away; remain ignorant of God's salvation, and perish—"they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables." 2 Tim. iv. 4.

There is a striking analogy, and indeed relation, between this view of faith and the point of its connexion with responsibility, in the operations of conscience. A man does what, according to his deliberate conviction

and best judgment, he at the time thinks right:—he persecutes the church of God—he follows therein the dictates of his conscience. Is it right for him to do so? Would he do wrong in acting contrary to his conscience? Certainly he would: and yet his conduct on *the whole* is wrong. His immediate act in doing a wrong thing, he believing it to be right, is a right act, because his motive is right, viz: the glory of God. But his previous conduct, in not putting his mind in possession of right knowledge, and presenting right motives, all this is wrong. The transaction, as a whole, is sinful, but the turpitude lies not in the last act, it lies in the causes of this last act. Saul of Tarsus neglected and refused, through the force of prejudice, and the power of corrupt feelings, to put himself in the way of proper influences: he blindfolded conscience, and followed the blind guide, until mercy removed from his eyes the bandages of sin and corruption; and conscience, enlightened by grace, spoke the terror of truth in his soul.

(2) Your view of saving faith makes the faith of the gospel a duty of the law: so that life eternal, which is connected with faith, is secured to the sinner by a duty of law. Believe and thou shalt be saved. Now, if to believe is a duty, and the sinner is active in believing, and salvation is inseparably connected with faith, then how can you avoid the conclusion, that salvation is dependent upon works, or doing a duty? Is not your faith, or the principle of it, the very same as that which Adam exercised in his pristine condition? And if so, are you not bringing us back to Adam's covenant?

Several distinct remarks are requisite here. (1.) It is true, faith in its principle is the same always—it is trust, reliance, confidence, resting upon the testimony delivered, for the truth of the matter. And consequently, its particular character must depend upon the nature of the testimony and the testifier. So long as Adam rested on God's testimony, "thou shalt not eat of it, lest ye die," he stood safe: the moment he transferred his confidence, trust, resting to the testimony of Satan, "thou shalt not surely die," he fell. Here, as always, the act is characterised by the motives which produced it. The

motives to eat were evil, and the testifier who presented them to his mind was evil, and the result, viz: Adam's belief in Satan is disbelief in God, and his correspondent actions were all evil.

(2.) My design *is*, in one sense, to bring you back to Adam's covenant; for by the terms of it only can man ever be saved. Righteousness and life are connected, and, we have seen, to nothing also is life, as a reward, promised but to righteousness, that is, obedience to law. But this obedience to law, though it must be wrought by man, yet cannot ever be effected by *mere sinful* man. The second Adam, and he only can fulfil all righteousness, and secure salvation to man. His gospel is a remedial law, and introduces no new principle. No doubt, if a man now have the same trust and confidence in God that Adam, before his fall, had, he is the friend of God, and God will own him as such, and bless him accordingly. But then, this neither is nor can ever be the case with any sinner, except only by the working of regeneration, the renewing of the Holy Ghost: by which recreation of the man he is made alive in Christ, and is interested, in fact, in all the merits of his obedience, and all the efficacy of his atoning blood.

(3.) The objection supposes, that faith is an act of the believer, and an act only: whereas, we have shewn, there is a principle or habit, which, existing in the mind as a governing law by the grace of God, is not the work of man, but of the divine Spirit, and the distinct acts of believing, are the evidence of its existence. Now, it is not the distinct acts of the man, or of the principle within him, but the law or habit of faith itself, that unites us to Christ. These acts are the fruits, not the tree. They evince our engrafting into Christ (contrary to nature,) but they are not the tree engrafted, and whose nature has been changed by the operation. Nor yet is the engrafting operation, viz: the Spirit's work, that which entitles the believer to life. On the contrary, this very work of the Spirit is itself an *effect* of Christ's merits. In Christ Jesus, before the world was, every saved sinner was chosen, that he should be thus engrafted in due time, and made actually, what he had been eternally by

covenant, a member of Christ's body. "By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God."

(4.) Therefore, faith, neither in the principle nor in the act, is the *meritorious* cause of salvation. It is merely the state, habitual and occasional, of mind and of heart, which must necessarily exist in every person who is renewed by the Spirit of God. It is an effect of the Spirit's work, and this is a result of his mission; and his mission is a result of Christ's merits: which merits are the effectual procuring cause of salvation. It is manifestly, therefore, incorrect to say that faith secures salvation: except only in the sense in which we are commanded to make our calling and election sure—i. e. sure to ourselves—that our own hearts may rest and have joy, and peace in believing. But the salvation is secured and made certain, by the merits of Christ: and these secure faith, as well in its first principle as in its subsequent growth. "Increase our faith," (Luke xvii. 5,) said the disciples, plainly intimating that its growth, and how much more its original germ, depends upon divine grace.

It is usual to speak of faith as the *instrumental cause* of salvation. It is the hand that receives the bread of God. But neither the hand nor the mouth is the bread itself. They are only instruments. Such is the allusion in the Assembly's catechism. Faith—is a saving grace, whereby we *receive* and rest upon Christ. It is not the act of receiving—but the gracious habit, principle, state of mind, which goes forth in action—*whereby* we receive and rest.

3. It may be objected to the foregoing view of faith, that it can scarcely be called even the instrumental cause of salvation; seeing the Holy Ghost acts as a regenerating Spirit, prior to the *exercise* of faith. This is evident from the allegation that the faith itself is the work of the Spirit: and neither the habit nor its act can be, until the soul is regenerated. Consequently, the sinner is saved before he becomes indeed a believer, and therefore it must be improper to say that he is saved by faith.

To this it may be a sufficient response, that no order,

as to time, can come into our views. We cannot, with propriety, speak of regeneration, faith, repentance, holiness &c., as having any chronological order of existence. Regeneration is a general idea, comprehending all the life giving movements of the Spirit, in and by which the dead soul is made alive; the unbeliever a child of faith; the unholy, a holy man. &c. &c. But whilst there is no chronological order—i. e. there is no period when it can be said, the man is regenerated, but he is not yet a believer; he is a believer, but not yet penitent; he is penitent, but not yet holy, &c.; yet is there in the *nature* of these graces an order of existence; first life, then the attributes or qualities of life, faith, love, holiness, &c.

SECTION V.

Of the appropriation of faith.

By appropriation is meant, the special application to himself, by the believer of the benefits of Christ's death and obedience. And it has been made a question whether or not, this special application belongs to the nature of saving faith.

For an intelligent and satisfactory answer, let us refer to scripture. And here it must be conceded by all, that the command to believe, is not special but general. Why it is and must be so, we have already seen. Faith in God is a duty of the law of nature and can never cease to be binding upon all his moral creatures.

But (2) The promise is addressed to the persons believing, and is special. Hence, the language of the Bible, describing the exercise of faith, consists largely of the possessive pronoun. "The Lord is *my* Rock, and *my* Fortress, and *my* Deliverer; *my* God, *my* Strength, in whom *I* will trust; *my* Buckler, and the Horn of *my* salvation, and *my* high Tower." Psa. xviii. 2. "Thou shalt love the Lord *thy* God." "I know," said Job, "that *my* Redeemer liveth." "Hear, O Israel, the Lord *our* God is one Lord." "God is the strength of *my* heart and *my* portion forever." "He loved *me* and gave himself for *me*." "Being justified by faith, *we*

have peace with God through *our* Lord Jesus Christ." Thomas said, "*My* Lord and *my* God." "He is *my* God, and I will prepare him a habitation, *my* father's God, and I will exalt him." Ex. xv. 2. "He laid down his life for *us*." And a thousand other passages might be adduced of a similar kind—all shewing that saving faith takes to *itself* Christ and all the benefits of his work. It *appropriates* and makes its own the promises which are addressed to believers.

(3) This appropriation is a leading and distinguishing characteristic of that faith which saves: distinguishing it from that which does not save. That there is a dead faith is obvious—that is, a naked assent to the truth. "The devils believe and tremble." They perceive as intellectual beings, and know and believe that Christ died to save men. Wicked men believe the leading facts of the gospel, i. e. their minds perceive the truth and are constrained to assent to it. But the faith of devils and lost men, has no appropriating attribute in it. "I know thee," said the demon, "who thou art, the holy one of God"—but he did not appropriate to himself the merits of Christ. His belief of the truth was unconnected with any realizing views of a saving interest in it—he could not say "thou art *my* Rock." And this, because no change had been effected by the Holy Ghost in the moral man. The enmity had not been slain—love had not been shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Spirit. There was no attraction of his spirit toward Christ.

The blessings of salvation are represented as a balm, and the administrator as a physician. "Is there no balm in Gilead, is there no physician there?" Now, the medicine will not heal unless it be applied. Faith applies or appropriates the healing balm. The same characteristic is taught in the sacrament of the supper. The bread and wine represent Christ. The application of a portion to himself, by the communicant, represents the appropriation of faith. As the hand and the mouth make this bread and wine my own actually, so faith makes Christ and his benefits mine actually. They were before, mine virtually, by deed of gift from God in

Christ; but they now are mine in fact—in actual possession. In all this, it will be seen, reference is still had to faith in its act—the working of that holy principle implanted by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. Such acts bespeak their cause in the renewed mind and evince the presence of the life giving Spirit.

SECTION VI.

The object of saving faith: or the precise thing which is believed.

Intimately connected with the question of appropriation, is that of the precise matter appropriated. In other words, the exact thing which is to be believed for salvation. What say the scriptures? "And this is the record—the *testimony*—that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son, 1 John v. 11. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish but have everlasting life." "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." The precise thing then, which we are called on to believe, is that there is salvation in Christ for all that receive and rest upon and trust in him. In other words, that Christ's atonement has cancelled the claims of law against all believing penitents: and that his righteousness is all sufficient for them, as their title to eternal life. It is the precise province of saving faith to receive and rest upon Christ in these two parts of his work. It recognizes, in his blood, the price of redemption for lost men and in his obedience, the title, according to Gods covenant with the first Adam, of the believer to life eternal: and it applies these to itself. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the *testimony* in himself." His mind, by God's enlightening Spirit, is enabled to see the truth of the Gospel promise, and can be "no longer faithless but believing," and exclaims, "My Lord and my God." It is obvious therefore, that saving faith is not merely "a belief of the truth." This belief exists as strong in hell as in heaven or on earth. The convinced sinner, that is,

the man who is enabled to perceive and believe the truth of God's testimony in the law, "not only assenteth to the truth of the promise of the Gospel, but receiveth and resteth upon Christ and his righteousness, therein held forth." This *receiving* and *resting* are acts of the living principle of faith. The mind or soul, having been enlightened in the knowledge of the gospel plan, so as to perceive the perfect satisfaction of Christ's atonement, and the fulness of his righteousness, throws itself upon them—rests in them as the only sure foundation. The precise thing believed is, manifestly, *that testimony* of God which declares that Christ wrought out this righteousness, or obeyed the law; and perfected this atonement, or made satisfaction to divine justice, for his people. And the moment the mind thus rests, trusts, appropriates this Savionr, the benefits of his death and obedience begin to be experienced.

SECTION VII.

Is assurance of the essence of saving Faith?

This question has been agitated to a considerable extent, and has divided those who agree in almost the entire system of divine truth. It is *therefore*, highly probable, that an accurate definition and understanding of the term, would settle the question. Let us then see what is the scripture meaning of it. This must govern us. In our English Bibles it occurs but seven times, viz :

Deut. xxviii. 66. Moses depicting the evils of the Jews' apostacy—tells them that "among the nations shalt thou find no ease. And thy life shall hang in doubt before thee; and thou shalt fear day and night; and shalt have none *assurance* of thy life." The condition of the seed of Abraham for eighteen centuries, is a very clear comment on the meaning of the term *assurance.* Theirs is a condition of doubt, uncertainty, anxiety, and consequently of comparatively small enjoyment. The opposite is a state of assurance. The

mind rests in safety, and confidence, free from perplexing and distracting cares and tormenting anxieties.

Assurance, then, is trust, confidence, leaning upon that which is expected to sustain; Cant. viii, 5. "Who is this that cometh up from the wilderness, LEANING upon her Beloved. Its effects are peace and quietness; Isaiah, xxxii, 17, speaking of the blessedness of the full gospel day, when "the Spirit be poured upou us from on high"—marks the consequences of this effusion, in the general distribution of justice between man and man. "And the work of righteousness, shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness, quietness and *assurance* forever." Here again assurance is that state of the mind, wherein trust and confidence are placed on an unfailing dependence; and it is a result of the Spirit's presence.

In Acts, xvii, 31, the assurance which God is said to have given to all men, of the resurrection and judgement is the pledge of *fidelity*—affording to all men faith—giving them sufficient ground, in the fact of Christ's resurrection, to believe the doctrine.

The other cases in which the word *assurance* occurs, are entirely different from the last, as to the original term. It is translated once assurance: 1 Thes. i, 5, but in connexion with a term which rendered the usual translation difficult. "Our gospel came unto you—in much *assurance*"—whereas the word is in the other places rendered *full assurance.* Col. ii, 2—"*full assurance* of understanding." Heb. vi, 11—"We desire that every one of you do shew the same diligence, to the *full assurance* of hope, unto the end," and x, 22. "Let us draw near, in *full assurance* of faith." This full assurance, says Owen, is a "sure, stable, firm, certain faith, or persuasion." The order ought to be noted. There is a "full assurance of *understanding:*" Here the reference is to the bright beaming in of truth upon the mind, by the teachings of the Holy Ghost. Then there is "a full assurance of *faith;*" as a consequent of the former: the mind sees the promises afar off, or near, and is persuaded of them and enabled to embrace them. Then comes a full assurance of *hope*

—that measure of confidence which gives joy and peace. Hope is the daughter of faith and the parent of joy, so far as joy results from distant objects. It implies the previous maturity and full strength of faith. Faith takes a vigorous hold upon the promise or pledge of veracity; hope springs forward upon the thing promised. Faith builds her house upon the foundation stone; hope takes up her abode in the habitation and blesses the whole household. Faith looks back upon Calvary and the cross; hope's bright eye is turned forward upon Paradise and the crown.

Assurance then, is a resting and confiding of the mind and heart in Christ as the ground of its hope; and is but another name for faith itself. Accordingly, as we have a strong and a week faith; so we have assurance and a full assurance. But it ought to be distinctly observed, that true faith in us and our knowledge of its presence, are distinct things. The Spirit of God, who by his mighty power, giveth us, in the behalf of Jesus Christ to believe in him, does not instantly give us a knowledge of that operation. The assurance of the mind must have a reflex influence in order to our sensible experience of it and knowledge by experience. This suggests the distinction, long since made and applied with advantage in this discussion.

"The assurance of faith is a firm persuasion of God's love to us, founded on his promise; the assurance of sense is a persuasion that we have already tasted of his love: Heb. xi. 1, 13. 1 John v. 9, 10, 20." Brown's catechism, Qu. 36. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." "These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were pilgrims and strangers on the earth." These present faith in its form of assurance.

"He that believeth on the Son of God, hath the witness in himself. We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." Here is the assurance of *sense:* our experience teaches us that a change has taken place within us. The former is

perhaps the same, or nearly the same thing, which some express by the *direct*, the latter the *reflex exercise* of faith.

"It would greatly conduce," says a public document from the eloquent pen of the late Doctor Mason, (see works, iii. 332.) "It would greatly conduce to clear views of this subject, were the distinction between the assurance of *faith* and assurance of *sense*, rightly understood and inculcated. When we speak of assurance as essential to faith, many suppose we teach that none can be real christians who do not *feel* that they have passed from death unto life, and have not unclouded and triumphant views of their interest in Christ, so as to say, under the manifestations of his love, "My beloved is mine, and I am his." But God forbid that we should thus offend against the generation of his children. That many of them want such assurance may not be questioned. This, however, is the assurance, not of faith, but of sense; and vastly different they are. The object of the former is Christ revealed in the *word;* the object of the latter, Christ revealed in the *heart*. The ground of the former is the testimony of God *without us;* that of the latter, the works of the Spirit *within us*. The one embraces the promise, looking at nothing but the veracity of the promiser; the other enjoys the promise in the sweetness of its actual accomplishment. Faith trusts for pardon to the blood of Christ; sense asserts pardon from the comfortable intimations of it to the soul. By faith we take the Lord Jesus for salvation; by sense we *feel* that we are saved, from the Spirit's shining on his own gracious work in our hearts.

"These kinds of assurance, so different in their nature, are very frequently separated. The assurance of faith may be, and often is, in lively exercise, when the other is completely withdrawn. "Zion said, *My Lord hath forgotten me;* and the Spouse, "*My beloved hath withdrawn himself, and was gone.*" "He may be a forgetting and withdrawing God to my feelings, and yet to my faith my Lord and my God still." This case is accurately described by the prophet: "*Who is among you that feareth the Lord, that obeyeth the voice of his*

servant, that walketh in darkness and hath no light? Let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God." Here the believer, one who *fears the Lord*, is supposed to be absolutely destitute of sensible assurance, for he *walks in darkness and hath no light;* yet he is required to exercise the assurance of faith by TRUSTING *in the Lord and staying upon his God.*"

SECTION VIII.

How the saved are united actually to Christ.

It has been said, that faith is the bond of union with the Redeemer, and thus the *instrumental* cause of salvation. This, I conceive, is true or not, just as faith is understood of the *act* or of the *principle*. If by faith be meant the *act of believing*, viewed as man's act, the sentiment is erroneous; for it makes the standing and safety of the sinner dependent upon his own act. Because manifestly the branch must continue in connexion with the tree, or its vitality must cease. If, therefore, that connexion is dependent, not on God, but on man's act, man and not God must have the glory, at least, of perseverance in grace.

If by faith be meant the *principle of holy trust and confidence in God's testimony*,—which principle, be it remembered, is the work of the Spirit in regeneration, and is kept alive in the soul by His continued residence and sanctifying influences there, then it is true. This is saying, in other words, that the Spirit is the bond of union with Christ. "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit," (1 Cor. vi. 17.) "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body," (12: 13.) Hence the duty of endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace: "There is one body and one Spirit." And of this body Christ is the head, and the fact of membership consists in the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. "For he that hath not the Spirit of Christ, is none of his." It is, therefore, more directly and obviously true, to affirm that the Spirit of God dwelling in the hearts of his people, as in his temple, is the bond of

union, than to assert that faith is that bond. Faith in the principle, being a result of the Spirit's powerful presence, can exist only where there is union with Christ, and is *evincive* rather than *productive* of such union. And the goings out of this faith in acts of holy confidence in God our Saviour, become the evidence of that great change called regeneration.

Nevertheless, it is here as elsewhere. Mutual consent creates moral union. In the matter of faith, volition is concerned. The mind and heart, which were at enmity with God, are now renewed. The will is turned to holiness. The man chooses God as his portion. There is as perfect volition here as is possible; and consequently, the soul's consent to this moral union is secured, and the union is complete. Thus in the marriage relation. It is the mutual consent of the parties, lawfully and intelligently given, that makes them one for the purposes specified; that is, within the limits of their consent. But this unity of will and sentiment, in the spiritual matrimony, is the work of God's Spirit; and whenever these exist the union is consummated. Thus also, in all the various associations of men, for all kinds and descriptions of purposes, mutual consent creates moral union. So true is it, that not a single principle admitted by the mere moralist into his system, stands independently of the religion of the Bible. Morality is the application of religious truth to the government of human society. Thus union with Christ is effected by the Spirit. Covenant union, we have seen, is from eternity: but actual union is by the Holy Ghost dwelling in us, and working faith in us.

SECTION IX.

The doctrine of Imputation applied.

We have seen, that imputation is the legal charging to an individual, of his own act, or of another's act: or the holding of him responsible in law for it; and that whether the results may be beneficial or not. Imputing is accounting a person responsible in law for an act. And where

the act is not his own, imputation is based upon some existing legal connexion between him and the person whose own act it is.

Attempts are often made to confuse the subject, by representing the impossibility of a transfer of actions. The act of one man can never become the act of another man. Such attempts, if not a result of ignorance, flow from some worse source. It might be known—for the means of knowing it have been spread all over the discussions of Calvanistic writers,—it ought to be known, that imputation is not the transfer of acts, but of legal responsibilities.

Equally absurd, and as perversely absurd, is also the view sometimes held up of this doctrine, that it is a *transfer of moral character*. It is a melancholy proof of the doctrine of human depravity, (which some of those persons deny,) when men insist that the advocates of imputation teach a transfer of moral character—that the moral character of the sinner is conferred on Christ, and he becomes a corrupt sinner. On the contrary, he is holy; yet, as we have seen, he assumes his people's legal responsibility, and fulfils all law for them. Now imputation is God's reckoning, or setting down to the account and for the benefit of the believer, all that Christ, as his surety, has done for him, viz :

(1) The fulness of his satisfaction rendered to divine justice. When Jesus, as his people's advocate, presents evidence, to God the Father, of himself having suffered for them the full and entire demand of the law, the Father reckons, or sets it down to them as a complete and full satisfaction. This secures to them *pardon*. Christ has a right, and claims their deliverance from death and all other legal consequences of sin. Pardon is passing by a transgressor of law without punishment. It is an act of sovereignty. In human governments it always implies a sacrifice, in whole or in part, of the claims of justice. But here, both justice and mercy meet. Justice has its satisfaction in Christ's death : and mercy from Christ freely forgives. The sinner *himself* has no right to have the prison door thrown open, and to be set at liberty ; but Christ, his Friend and Surety, has such

right, and doth exercise it. Thus is pardon secured, and thus is it conferred. It is the province of the Holy Spirit to give to the believer a realizing sense of this pardon, and when this is done, the soul rejoices with joy unspeakable.

Now we ought to distinguish between this and justification. I know, indeed, great efforts have been made to confound them, and great success has attended these efforts. But I know that just in the same proportion have indistinct and often erroneous views been entertained—views, which, if run out to their legitimate results, land in ruin. Therefore do I the more insist, that pardon is not justification. It is an accompaniment of it in man's condition, but is not the thing itself. To declare a man innocent, as we have seen, is a different thing from declaring him righteous. A mere negative virtue is really no virtue at all. Therefore,

(2) The setting down or reckoning of Christ's righteousness, all his acts of obedience to the law, to the account of the believer, is the precise matter which secures justification. The righteousness of Christ is the believer's in the book of God's account. There it stands for his benefit. He is righteous in the law's eye. The judge perceives the fact, and declares it so to be. This declaration is the precise thing meant by justification. It is the judicial and declarative act, which results, by an inevitable necessity, existing in the nature of law and of justice, and in the facts of the case. The sinner's heart is changed; he believes in God and his Christ; he appropriates to himself Christ and the benefits of his death and obedience; Christ, his Advocate, makes this appear before the presence of the Father; shews that entire restitution has been made to the violated law—that a full and perfect obedience has been rendered to the precept; and that these are made over to this sinner,—are his; the Father reckons them accordingly; they are so viewed, and the judge of all the earth pronounces a sentence according to law, averring the fact that this sinner is entitled to eternal life.

Thus is confirmed and forever established, the principle of the original Institute, that obedience and life, dis-

obedience and death, are inseparably connected. And thus the remedial law of the second covenant triumphs over the ruins of the first.

CHAPTER XXI.

JUSTIFICATION SECURES ITS SUBJECTS FOREVER.

In chapter IV, we settled the general notion of the term Justification: see p. 80. It is the act of a Judge declaring the fact, that the subject of law has obeyed the law, and is consequently entitled—he has a right, to the reward of his obedience. The Judge pronounces the man righteous and declares, that, by a necessary consequence, the thing promised as the reward of righteousness, he is entitled to receive.

In Chapter XX we have just seen, that this judicial act occurs at the moment in which the sinner becomes a believer, by the Spirit of God working faith in him, and thereby uniting him to Christ. This union with Christ, by the indwelling Spirit, confers actually upon the believer, an interest in the entire merits and efficiency of the Redeemer's work. This consists of two parts, viz: his sufferings—or satisfaction to the penal claims of law, and his righteousness, or active fulfilment of the entire precepts of law. The former of these, secures the believer from the curse of the law. Its sentence "thou shalt surely die," cannot in justice be executed upon the sinner's Surety, and also, upon himself. Hence, by a necessity existing in the very nature of moral government, it must follow, that the sinner be pardoned: that is, the punishment which was due to him for sin, is not inflicted upon him; he is released from punishment and from liability to punishment. The latter, viz: Christ's active obedience—the whole

of what he has done to fulfil the law and honour its precepts, being now reckoned to the account and benefit of the believer, constitutes his righteousness, and entitles him to life eternal. The declaration of this fact, by the Judge, is Justification; and he, who is thus accepted in the beloved, stands complete in him. Eternal justice has pronounced her fiat: immutable judgement has recorded her sentence: and He, the habitation of whose throne is justice and judgement, seals it up forever. "I will never leave thee nor forsake thee."

To evince the perfect stability of God's people, a few remarks will be sufficient.

1. Their pardon and justification have regard purely to legal relations. They respect the condition in which they stand to the law and government of God—their relative position in the Divine administration. "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus." Once there was condemnation to those persons, so that it was said of them, "ye are condemned already;" but *now*—after their faith has united them to Christ—there is no condemnation. They are pardoned—the debt of their sin has been paid by their great Surety—it has been merged in the cleansing fountain of his blood. Through death He has destroyed death, and him that has the power of death. To them "the Lord will not impute sin," and hence the pains and anguish of Spiritual death, they cannot endure; but must be blessed. Their iniquities are forgiven and their sins are covered; and hence they are blessed. Nor is this act of pardon revocable. Where pardon has been issued, as an act of mere sovereignty, it might be difficult to shew that it could not be recalled by a similar act. But the pardon of God's people results from a complete satisfaction having been rendered—so complete, that He said, "it is finished:" and this, too, in execution of a covenant engagement. Thus is effectually precluded the recall of the pardon. The Father stipulated to release the people of God from the curse, provided the Son would meet the claims of justice against them. The Son complied with his Father's will—Lo! I come: He lived in sorrow—he died in

agony—he drank the bitter cup—his soul was exceeding sorrowful even until death—therefore shall he see his seed—he shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied. They cannot be again brought under condemnation. Sooner shall the lightnings of omnipotence shiver the Rock of ages. Sooner shall the sword of justice cleave the helmet of the Almighty. "They shall never perish."

In like manner the righteousness of the Redeemer passes over to his people. It is theirs by his gift—but it is theirs: it is so reckoned and set down. They are not only treated as if they were righteous: but they are righteous. Arrayed in white robes—the wedding garments of their Redeemer's providing, they stand in all the perfection of beauty. Before his glorious throne, spotless as that throne, they stand adorned as a bride prepared for her husband. This investment in the righteousness of God their Redeemer, is also a legal concern, confirmed by covenant. Jesus obeyed—he fulfilled all righteousness for them, and now, having bestowed it upon them, and having given evidence of the fact, before his Father's throne, He accounts them righteous. The Judge sees them perfect in Christ, and declares the fact: and so it shall stand forever. "For the mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed; but my kindness shall not depart from thee, neither shall the covenant of my peace be removed, saith the Lord that hath mercy on thee." Isa. LIV. 10.

2. So long as the basis of a legal decision remains firm, the decision itself cannot be moved. "It is God that justifieth God's elect," Rom. viii. 33. If his act in so doing is founded in right principles, "who is he that condemneth?" Who will reverse his decision? Where is the superior tribunal, to which this cause can be carried? Who will detect the errors that lie at its foundation—the fallacies which led to the conclusion? Who will make it appear that however once it may have been correct, and have rested on a substantial basis, yet subsequently the basis has failed and the structure must fall?

The foundation of man's pardon and justification, is

Christ's death and obedience or righteousness. Other foundation can no man lay. If this is complete and perfect in itself, then must the building it sustains endure to everlasting ages. So long as the atonement and righteousness of our divine Surety are perfect, so long his people shall abide under the shadow of this great rock in a weary land. So long as the justice and law of God are satisfied with what Jesus has suffered and done, so long his people are safe under the protection of his almighty arm. The possibility, therefore, of any sinking under condemnation, supposes the possibility of an erroneous judgement on the part of God, or of a falling off in the all-sufficiency and perfection of Christ's work. From either alternative every sober mind must shrink; and, therefore, the idea of any justified man falling away and perishing in hell, can exist and be entertained as true only in minds confused and indistinct in their notions, relative to the legal relations of men. Such an idea can exist only where man's acceptance with God is deemed to be partly on the foundation of his own good works, faith and penitence. And this truly we will at once concede. *If* man's acceptance with God be based at all—even in the least degree—upon any thing he has done or can do, then, and in that case, we not only concede that he may, but assert that he most infallibly will, fall away and perish forever. But if this justification rests solely on Christ's merits, and is a change of his legal relations, this change must be stable as his own glorious throne.

3. The justification and pardon of God's elect, have settled and established forever the pillars of Jehovah's throne. The moral government of the universe is confirmed. God has given to his rational and moral creation the highest conceivable evidence of the immutability of his own justice. Mercy, it was his purpose to manifest, for the praise of his own glorious grace. But the claims of justice are first to be heard. Mercy is a contingency, as to the essentials of moral government; not an absolute necessity. But justice is indispensable. "Justice and judgement are the habitation of his throne." To prepare the way for mercy, by the sacrifice

of justice, were to proffer a curse under the guise of a blessing. For if the foundations of eternal right be broken up: if the principles of righteousness and justice be violated, that sinners may escape punishment, where is the assurance to the moral universe that rectitude and justice shall hereafter govern or characterise the divine administration? If God may disregard the claims of right and justice, to lift a sinner up to heaven, may he not do the same to thrust a saint down to hell?

But now the contrary of all this has occurred. Justice is fulfilled in the death of Christ. Her sword she would not stay, even when the Son of God, in tears and agony and blood, cried, "if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." Surely if ever justice could have relaxed her claim, it must have been at this awful juncture. But no: Jesus drank her bitter cup. The moral government of the universe is confirmed. Let all the rational creation know that God is just. Let all sinful beings tremble, for God is just. Let all holy beings rejoice, for God is just. In his government holy and sinless beings shall never suffer. In his government polluted and sinful beings shall not go unpunished.

But, moreover, another voice sounds out from Calvary. Justice, indeed, triumphs in the agonies of crucifixion; but, then, she acquiesces in the truth, "it is finished," and unbars the gates of death. Mercy, brilliant in the orient beams of the Sun of Righteousness, flies on wings of love, proclaiming "peace on earth, good will to men." Thus, "it became him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." In this precise character, as Lord Creator and Lord Governor of the universe, it was suitable and proper for God the Father to save men through the sufferings of his own Son. These sufferings, therefore, for the purpose of bringing many sons unto glory, are intimately connected with the welfare of the whole universe. For by them is evinced the immutability of divine justice, whilst through them is displayed his mercy. Here, on this little ball that we inhabit, is enacted that wondrous scene, which excites the admi-

ration of all holy beings, and the terror of all unholy beings. Our earth's Aceldama is the grand arena of conflict and of blood—the battle field, where are decided, not the fate of armies and their kingdoms, but the fate of worlds unnumbered in the regions of space. The stars of light borrow their brilliance from the Sun of Righteousness. Angelic hosts, rising rank above rank, confirmed by what their eyes see and their ears hear, burst away to bear the news to heaven's high court, and spread the tidings from world to world throughout the vastness of Jehovah's empire.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON GOOD WORKS—THEIR NECESSITY AND TRUE POSITION.

Having shown that man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law, I propose to conclude this little work by pointing out the necessity and true position of good works.

SECTION I.

The necessity of good works.

That man should be received into heaven, with an unholy heart, and a hand that never wrought righteousness, is very far distant from the system of doctrine taught in the Bible. I have no sympathy with any creed which does not embrace good works as indispensable to salvation. I have endeavoured to evince that every sinner saved by grace is saved *from* his sin,—not *in* his sin. And though this work professes not to treat on the doctrine of sanctification, yet incidentally, it has been touched upon. Nor is it here my design to discuss that

doctrine ; but merely to state in few words the evidence of the position taken in this section.

The scriptures nowhere proffer heaven to the indolent, and careless, and sinful; but only to the holy, and attentive and diligent. They urge to duty. They command us to believe, to repent, to maintain good works for necessary uses, to produce good fruit. They assure us that every tree which produces not good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire—that the tares shall be gathered into bundles to be burnt. They teach us "that by works a man is justified and not by faith only." James ii. 24. A dead faith—a faith that is unconnected with vital action in the production of good works, is utterly vain, and the soul is dead that has it. Works are indispensible to justification. There ought to be—there can be no dispute about this matter. All readers of the Bible must know, that God's children are required to be holy as he is holy ; and "without holiness no man shall see the Lord." "He that feareth God and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him," but all the workers of iniquity he knoweth afar off, and will say to them, "depart from me, all ye that work iniquity."

SECTION II.

The true position of good works.

Whilst it is agreed on all hands, that good works are necessarily connected with salvation, there is nevertheless some discrepancy of opinion, as to their relative position.

Some appear to suppose that good works, are antecedent to regeneration, conversion, and faith: and moreover, in some sense, procuring causes of themselves. They seem to speak as if they believed the prayers, fastings, and sighs, and groans, and charities, &c. &c. which men sometimes practice, have a merit and an efficiency in themselves. They lay God under certain obligations to bestow his Spirit and grace. Their goodness reacheth unto him. Without distinctly avowing it as their principle, that man's salvation is by his own

righteousness, they seem to think so, by referring to portions of scripture, which they suppose have a leaning that way. Our Saviour's direction to the young man, who wished to know how he might have life, they misunderstand. "If thou wilt have life, keep the commandments." Whereas, a little reflection would convince them, that this and the direction to another, "go, sell all that thou hast and distribute to the poor," have the same object; viz: to convince men, that their hearts are deceiptful above all things and desperately wicked. If you are bent to "do some good thing, that you may have life," try it—see how far you can go in the way of holy obedience without my grace and strength.

Those who thus lean, are not aware of the spotless holiness of the divine law—of the deep depravity of their own hearts. They rush on, resolved if they perish, it shall not be their fault. Little do they think, if they perish it will be wholly their own fault. In their sins they shall die, if they live in them, And the most ruinous of them all, is the sin of "going about to establish their own righteousness," whilst they refuse to submit themselves to the righteousness of God, by faith in his Son Jesus Christ.

Where then is their great error. Precisely here. They misplace good works. They put the effect for the cause and the cause for the effect. They put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter. They will have the fruits of righteousness to grow, before the tree is planted, or before it is engrafted contrary to nature. When some incident averts their attention to eternal things, they put themselves upon severe duties—they attend religious meetings, they read, they pray, they weep, they sigh, they groan, they reform and do many very good things—good for their substance, though bad for their origin, and then think God must have done something in them, or must yet do. They feel that they have done many things—they have worked out their own salvation, unapprised of the truth, that unless God works in us, we work nothing to profit—that all our righteousness is as filthy rags.

Here then, is the fallacy. Good works are indispen-

sable ; not as the cause of the divine favours and our acceptance ; but as their effects. Not as the antecedents, but as the consequents of regeneration. Not as the reason why God ought to be merciful to us ; but as the evidence that he has so been. "First make the tree good and his fruit good also." All men are by nature wild olive trees ; they bear not good fruit : consequently, the more fruit they bear, the worse for themselves. Until the tree is made good, its fruitfulness is not a blessing. The Saviours plan is to renew the heart, to regenerate the soul—to make the tree good, first ; then the fruits of holy living will follow, by a necessity in the nature of the tree. Thorns will not produce grapes ; figs will not be gathered off thistles. No application of stimulating nourishment, no hot house forcing, can change the nature of the tree : rather such applications hasten the developement of its nature in the display of its fruit. No artificial excitements ; no machinery of human devise, can ever produce holy action in an unholy heart, or bring a clean thing out of an unclean. To expect good works, before the heart is regenerated by the Holy Ghost, is to set aside the entire gospel and to build upon the quicksands of human depravity, the edifice of your hopes for eternity. These good works you must indeed have, but you must have them wrought in you by the good Spirit of our God. Prior to regeneration all you do is sinful—your very prayers and religious duties are sinful. What then ? Must we cease such efforts ? Nay, but cease to rest on them as good and able to commend you to God. Look upon them as vile and polluted, because of their source in a polluted heart.

If then, good works are subsequent to regeneration, which is sanctification begun—if this is their true relative position—another enquiry remains, viz : is regeneration and the cosequent progressive holiness,—are these consequents and effects of Justification ?

To this I reply, they are consequents of Justification, necessarily flowing from it as effects from their cause. The evidence of this will appear, if you bear in mind, that the Holy Spirit is the immediate operating agent

in renewing the Soul to Spiritual life. It is the Spirit that quickeneth—that giveth life. Faith, hope, charity, &c. all these worketh that one and the self same Spirit. Believers are changed from glory to glory as by the Spirit of the Lord.

Take in connexion with this, another scriptural truth; the Spirit is sent to accomplish all his work, by the Father, at the instance of the Son. "I will pray the Father and he will give you another comforter, even the Spirit of truth." And "because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his son into your hearts." And "the peace of God, which passeth all understanding," results from the Spirit's testimony in the heart. "Therefore, being justified by Faith, we have peace with God." This gift of the Spirit and all his work, are secured to the sinner by the merits of Christ. If the Rock had not been smitten, the water had not flowed forth, to the refreshing of God's heritage. The obedience and death of the Lord our Redeemer, are not less intimately connected with his peoples justification; than that justification is connected with their sanctification.

Suffer me then, dear reader, before we part, to press upon your acceptance, the great gift of God, his own dear Son. In him, if you ever see life, you must find it. On this Rock you must build, if your building will stand in the day of trial. To him flee as to a strong tower. He is the only city of refuge. His blood alone can cleanse your soul from dead works, to serve the living God. His righteousness alone can cover you in the day of his glory. Washed in this blood—arrayed in this righteousness, you shall stand before the great white throne, from the splendours of whose glory, the heavens shall flee away—you shall stand undismayed, and hearken to the sentence of your justification from the blessed lips of the final Judge. "Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Surrender the world's pleasures, and the world's joys, and say in the full flowing of your soul: "What things were given to me, those I counted loss for Christ. Yea, doubtless,

and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord: for whom I have suffered the loss of all things; and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Chirst, THE RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH IS OF GOD BY FAITH."

Μονω τω Θεω δοξα.

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